Academics call for more transparency in cross-strait talks
　

By Jenny W. Hsu
STAFF REPORTER
Sunday, Jun 14, 2009, Page 3

Cross-strait stability is crucial for Taiwan’s international relations, but the government should be more transparent in its negotiations with Beijing to appease public concerns, academics said at a forum in Taipei yesterday.

Institute of International Relations director Cheng Tuan-yao (鄭端耀) said that while Taiwan should strive to maintain “effective communications channels” with Beijing and strike a balance to ensure the interests of both sides, the government should also make more information about its dealings with China available to the public.

Cheng made the remarks at a forum hosted by National Chengchi University on President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) “diplomatic truce.”

After 12 years of failed attempts because of Beijing’s obstruction, Taiwan for the first time participated in the World Health Assembly (WHA) last month as an observer under the title “Chinese Taipei.”

Some have said the public remains in the dark about deals that the government may have made with Beijing so that Taiwan could attend.

The WHO has said it was not involved in securing Taiwan’s participation at the WHA and that it only issued an invitation after being notified of the results of cross-strait talks on the matter.

Institute research fellow Yen Chen-shen (嚴震生) told the forum that according to international practice, the details of bilateral negotiations are often concealed from public view. However, he said, Taiwan could consider emulating the US government by sharing the information with opposition lawmakers behind closed doors.

“This is a matter of trust between the people and the government,” Center for International Negotiation director Teng Chung-chian (鄧中堅) said.

The government should brief all political parties at the conclusion of each round of talks with China, he said.

Meanwhile, Yen said that rather than fighting for an official seat at the UN, Taiwan should put energy into seeking participation at UN agencies by adopting the strategy used to gain access to the WHA.

“We should make a priority list of organizations we want to join — and we shouldn’t always have to negotiate with Beijing beforehand,” Yen said, adding that Taiwan should make its case with the agencies.

Meanwhile, the academics welcomed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ announcement that it would close five of its 121 overseas representative offices.

Cheng said the action showed that the government was placing more emphasis on efficiency.

Hsiao Bi-khim describes meeting with PRC official
　

ARGUMENT: The former legislator said a Chinese official had confronted her on political matters late last month at a dinner banquet she attended in Fukuoka

By Lee Hsin-fang
STAFF REPORTER
Sunday, Jun 14, 2009, Page 3

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Department of International Affairs director Hsiao Bi-khim (蕭美琴) recently wrote on her blog about an exchange with a Chinese official late last month in which the official said that the DPP had no future, that Taiwanese independence was a dead-end road and that China had missiles pointed at Taiwan.

In an interview with the Liberty Times (the Taipei Times’ sister newspaper) on Friday, Hsiao said the incident took place late last month in Japan, where she attended a banquet for international representatives hosted by the Fukuoka government.

Hsiao said she shared a table at the Kyushu National Museum with Chinese Consul-General Wu Shumin (武樹民) along with officials from the US consulate, Fukuoka officials and representatives from Thailand and Mongolia.

CHEN CHU

After exchanging name cards, Wu learned that Hsiao was a member of the DPP and said in Chinese that “the DPP’s [Kaohsiung Mayor] Chen Chu (陳菊) has already visited China; after [your people] come, you will change your position of supporting Taiwanese independence,” Hsiao said.

Hsiao said she replied that “Chen’s visit to China does not have any effect on our position of supporting Taiwanese independence. If you are willing to move your missiles, I might be more willing to visit.”

She said Wu responded: “What would removing the missiles do? We can hit you even if we pull the missiles all the way back to Beijing. We don’t just have short-range missiles, we have plenty of mid-range missiles too.”

INTERNATIONAL SPACE

Hsiao quoted Wu as saying: “[The DPP] has done its thing for eight years, but didn’t [former president] Chen Shui-bian [陳水扁] end up in jail? What international space? [President] Ma Ying-jeou [馬英九] accepts the one China principle, so we give him international space. The DPP wants independence for Taiwan, and that is a dead-end road. You are not even from an academic field, so what are you doing here? The DPP is a party without a future unless it accepts the one China [principle].”

In response to Wu’s comments, Hsiao said she turned around and translated Wu’s entire statement into English to the foreign representatives who shared a table with them, which she said embarrassed Wu.

DETERMINATION

Hsiao said in the interview with the Liberty Times that when she encountered people like Wu it made her more upset with the Chinese government.

“You could even say that he poured a whole barrel of oil on my fire for Taiwanese independence,” she said. “It only made our will to fight for Taiwan’s democracy and independence stronger.”

The Ma administration’s policy of pursuing a “diplomatic truce” with China has sent a signal that is excessively generous, she said, adding that China was responding by oppressing and insulting Taiwan.

“Ma’s foreign policy is unrealistic,” she said.

North Korea is China’s nightmare
　

By Sushil Seth
Sunday, Jun 14, 2009, Page 8

North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are proving a major headache for China. Pyongyang recently tested a second atomic device with a much higher yield than the one in 2006.

To make matters worse, Pyongyang is perfecting its missile technology with a series of tests.

Although Pyongyang has gone its own way previously in pursuing its nuclear ambitions, at least it has not been dismissive of China’s concerns.

Indeed, by participating in the Six-Nation Talks in Beijing, it showed some consideration toward China. By the same token, it expected Beijing to play a sympathetic role.

But just when it seemed North Korea might scale back its nuclear ambitions, shutting down its Yongbyon reactor in 2007, things started to go wrong.

North Korea has restarted its nuclear program with greater vigor. And it has abandoned the Six-Nation Talks in Beijing.

It has walked away from the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War. And it has threatened to hit back at those contemplating any hostile action, especially South Korea.

North Korea’s brinkmanship is all the more dangerous now that China seems to be losing control over its communist neighbor.

If anything, North Korea is beginning to distrust China.

Why is this the case? Because, in Pyongyang’s eyes, China has failed to deliver.

North Korea wanted a sequential deal from the talks and believed that the 2007 agreement was a step in that direction.

What this meant was that Pyongyang’s nuclear disarmament would be a step-by-step process, punctuated by rewards from the US and other countries in terms of energy supplies, diplomatic normalization, aid, trade concessions and so forth. And China was supposed to ensure that implementation of any agreement met Pyongyang’s expectations.

In Pyongyang’s view, however, things did not move in that direction. It felt that the US simply wanted North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. Only then, and after full verification, Pyongyang might be entitled to the benefits of the nuclear deal.

Pyongyang came to lean on China for a favorable resolution of negotiations. Instead, it now watches Beijing joining the US and other states in castigating it for its nuclear and missile testing.

Pyongyang thus had no option but to ratchet up tensions by restarting its nuclear program to gain the attention of the world, especially the US government.

The US’ response has been pointed. Washington is not only worried about Pyongyang’s emerging nuclear capability, but also that it remains a conduit for nuclear materials and technology to other hostile states.

In this nuclear roulette, Pyongyang is playing the highest stakes. But there is method in the madness.

Considering North Korea’s overwhelming dependence on China for energy supplies, food and trade, Beijing shouldn’t have much difficulty in reading the riot act to ensure compliance. But it is wary of taking this option as it has little leverage in North Korea’s internal politics.

Short of bringing down the Kim dynasty — and probably the entire country with it — by tightening the economic and political screws, China’s options may well be limited to just this: reading the riot act.

But it is also unlikely to be party to any cataclysmic change that it cannot channel or control. And even without a military conflagration, abrupt destabilization would likely trigger a flood of refugees across the border into China.

Beijing is therefore unlikely to bring down the regime or support international action — through the UN Security Council or otherwise — that might push North Korea into a final mode of desperation.

Even though South Korea is a US ally, its domestic politics frequently carry anti-American overtones that revolve around the politics of unification. Internal divisions and China’s economic weight make China an equally important factor in South Korean strategy.

But North Korea’s reckless and dangerous nuclear politics is making China look increasingly impotent, with the added effect of pushing South Korea further into the US’ fold.

No wonder China is hopping mad over Pyongyang’s nuclear tantrums: It is finding itself increasingly unable to lobby North Korea for fear of creating an even bigger disaster.

Gone are the days when a nuclear neighbor with a highly volatile government might offer diplomatic opportunities. China now fears that Pyongyang’s headlong embrace of nuclear weapons is going to push Japan into acquiring nuclear weapons to balance the threat, potentially disrupting China’s political and strategic architecture for the region.

There is method in North Korea’s madness, but it is dangerous method, indeed: Knowing that Beijing might huff and puff but won’t blow North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s house in.

Therefore, if the US is looking to China for an effective resolution to North Korea’s provocations, it will be disappointed. The most China can do is reconvene another session of the Six-Nation Talks.

But in the present mode of North Korean belligerence, even that seems improbable.

Sushil Seth is a writer based in Australia.