Chen hopes for quick ruling from Grand Justices
　

By Shelley Huang
STAFF REPORTER
Thursday, Jun 25, 2009, Page 3

Former president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) court-appointed attorney yesterday said the former president was hoping for a speedy response from the Council of Grand Justices to a request for a constitutional interpretation on the transfer of his case to Presiding Judge Tsai Shou-hsun (蔡守訓).

Speaking to reporters during a recess in the former president’s trial, Tseng Te-rong (曾德榮) said Chen had expressed concern about when the Council of Grand Justices would hand down its decision on whether switching judges in his case was constitutional.

Tseng said Chen told him he hoped the interpretation would be announced before the district court delivered its verdict, as any decision after that would be too late to have a significant effect, adding that “prompt justice is the only form of justice.”

In January, Chen’s office asked the council to rule on the legitimacy of his pre-trial detention and the switching of judges from Chou Chan-chun (周占春) to Tsai Shou-hsun (蔡守訓), who now presides over Chen’s embezzlement and corruption trials.

When Chou was presiding over Chen’s case last year, he twice ruled against detaining Chen, saying that Chen had no way to flee because as a former president he was constantly under the protection of special agents.

However, when the case was handed over to Tsai, he repeatedly ruled to keep the former president behind bars, arguing that Chen might collude with witnesses or try to abscond.

In December, a panel of judges ordered that Chou be replaced by Tsai, who would also preside over four additional cases filed against the former president. The switch was controversial, causing skeptics to question whether the decision to merge the trials was procedurally flawed and politically motivated.

The former president and his attorneys appeared in court yesterday as former Presidential Office secretary Chen Hsin-yi (陳心怡) and former Presidential Office director Lin Teh-hsun (林德訓) were questioned about the former president’s use of the presidential “state affairs fund.”

Chen Hsin-yi testified that the former president’s bookkeeper, Chen Chen-hui (陳鎮慧), had instructed her to put cash in the former first family’s safe, in amounts of between NT$5 million (US$150,000) and NT$10 million at different times. Chen Hsin-yi said she was told the money was “for the president’s use.”

She also said that in July the former president asked her to file an application for a passport for him “most urgently.” She said the reason was because the former president had been invited to visit overseas.

Also yesterday, former first lady Wu Shu-jen (吳淑珍) was questioned yesterday by the Supreme Prosecutors Office’s Special Investigation Panel (SIP) as a defendant for the first time.

The purpose of the session was to determine the value of the former first lady’s jewelry, as well as the flow of money in the former first family’s overseas accounts, local media reported.

Her lawyer Chen Kuo-hua (陳國華) accompanied her during questioning, but declined to comment on the case, saying only that the former first lady’s physical condition was fine.

Meanwhile, pro-­independence groups yesterday said they would hold a rally on July 25 in support of the former president.

The groups said the purpose of the rally was to ask the Taipei District Court to release Chen Shui-bian and respect his rights.

The district court is scheduled to decide whether to keep Chen Shui-bian in detention on July 14, the groups said in a statement. They called on the public to support the former president outside the court that day and welcome him if he were released.

If the court decided to continue to detain him, they would hold a sit-in in front of the Presidential Office, the groups said. The July 25 rally would go ahead if Chen’s detention was extended, it said.

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has proposed a signature drive to support Chen Shui-bian and has asked the court that he be released immediately.

DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) said yesterday the party was in contact with prominent individuals to sign the petition.
　

Referendum must pass threshold
　

By Liu Chien-sin 劉建忻
Thursday, Jun 25, 2009, Page 8

As it petitions for a referendum on the proposed economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) with China, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has suggested the following referendum question: “Do you agree that the government should put the signing of an ECFA between Taiwan and China to a referendum to be decided by the people of Taiwan?”

Although the text is in the form of a question, it is not asking the public’s opinion. Rather, the party initiating the referendum is proposing a political opinion for which it is seeking public support to turn it into a binding policy. Current legislation does not give Taiwanese the right to decide on an ECFA in a referendum, nor is the government obligated to hold referendums on policies or agreements.

The significance of our text is to force an amendment of the Referendum Act (公投法) to give the public more direct powers and request the safeguarding of Taiwan through democratic mechanisms and the resolution of disputes over cross-strait policy through a referendum system.

Some say the question should be: “Do you agree to the signing of an ECFA or any other cross-strait economic and trade agreement?” They believe this is enough to stop President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) government from signing an ECFA with China, even if the referendum fails to pass the threshold.

This, however, is the same skewed logic that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) used when the previous DPP-proposed referendums failed to be passed. It does not have a legal basis, and we certainly should not dance along to the KMT’s tune.

No matter how the referendum question is phrased, it is only legally binding if the threshold is passed. If the threshold is not passed, the government would feel justified in signing an ECFA with China. Besides, by accepting the KMT’s logic, wouldn’t that mean that, in previous referendums, Taiwanese voters have rejected US arms procurements, regaining the KMT’s inappropriately obtained assets, and even Taiwan’s UN bid?

Restrained by the flawed Referendum Act, the cruel fact is that this is our only remaining weapon in addition to pursuing the “mass line” and the legislative alternative.

Opinion polls have showed that many people who are in favor of or not sure about an ECFA are willing to have the issue put to a referendum. That we are appealing to democracy should give us the courage to give it a try.

The KMT and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are not afraid of a public veto of an ECFA because they can sign agreements under many other names. What they are afraid of is that Taiwanese will enjoy referendum rights. A referendum is a symbol of sovereignty, not to mention that such a decision can prevent the two parties from colluding with each other.

Everyone has a different view when interpreting a failed referendum. Hence, we should make every effort to break through the voting threshold to prevent the signing of an ECFA while protecting Taiwan through democracy.

Liu Chien-sin is deputy director of the DPP’s Policy Committee.

Beijing makes itself indispensable
　

By J. Michael Cole 寇謐將
Thursday, Jun 25, 2009, Page 8

‘Beijing is unlikely to have assumed its role as moderator out of altruism, and its position has been beneficial to its image.’

Ever since the Agreed Framework signed in 1994 between the administration of former US president Bill Clinton and North Korea crumbled in 2002, Beijing — Pyongyang’s principal backer — has successfully positioned itself as an indispensable ally in global efforts to denuclearize its neighbor.

Throughout the years, China has come to be seen as a convener of the Six Party talks and, given its relations with Pyongyang, as a lever to keep Kim Jong-il’s regime from sparking war in the Korean Peninsula.

China’s involvement in the Six Party talks has conveniently dovetailed with its attempts to reassure its neighbors — and the West — that it is rising peacefully, and that as an emerging power it is ready to act as a responsible stakeholder. At the same time, Beijing has also managed to serve as a buffer and to mitigate international responses to Pyongyang’s long streak of seemingly irrational brinkmanship.

For both sides in the conflict, therefore, China has increasingly become an indispensable moderator, a counterbalance reining in North Korea when it threatens to act out of bounds, and pacifying jittery South Korea, Japan and the US when Pyongyang conducts nuclear tests or launches ballistic missiles.

Despite its hardening stance on North Korea in recent weeks, and the backing of a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution that strengthens sanctions against Pyongyang, the fact remains that China is an ally of North Korea, and the unknowns surrounding the depth of its ties with Pyongyang may have acted as a deterrent against South Korea, Japan and the US, who would perhaps have resorted to force by now to resolve the nuclear impasse.

How would China react if North Korea were attacked preemptively? Memories of China’s entry into the Korean War of 1950-1953, added to the high secrecy surrounding Beijing’s relations with Pyongyang, have made a military solution far more problematic.

Beijing is unlikely to have assumed its role as moderator out of altruism, and its position has been beneficial to its image. In the process it has managed to extract concessions in a way that is reminiscent of the gains it made when the administration of former US president Richard Nixon sought its help in the Cold War (to isolate the Soviet Union) and the Vietnam War (to stop supporting North Vietnamese), a precedent that should not escape our attention.

Washington, meanwhile, has helped to reinforce Beijing’s image of itself as an indispensable ally and become unhealthily dependent on Chinese participation in the disarmament talks, often at the expense of regional allies.

Nothing underscored this reality more than comments by Stephen Bosworth, the US’ special envoy to North Korea, who has made no secret of his position that China’s leverage on Pyongyang trumps such “annoyances” as Taiwanese independence and the fate of two US journalists jailed by the North.

Sadly, through Bosworth may have been more blunt than other officials, he isn’t the only one at the US State Department and elsewhere to believe that the West can afford to pay a price to ensure China’s continued role in the North Korea talks.

Long used to a style of diplomacy in which political gifts come at a price, Beijing is fully aware of the West’s growing dependence on it regarding North Korea and has used its position to soften Washington’s support for Taiwan.

This could explain the George W. Bush administration’s volte-face after 2001, drifting from strong support for Taiwan to nearly constant condemnation of the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) administration. (The timing of Bush’s change of heart on Taiwan and escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula could not be more apt.)

With North Korea’s isolation intensifying in recent years, China’s trade and investment with it increased by more than 40 percent year-on-year to US$2.8 billion last year, and throughout the nuclear impasse Beijing has continued high-level contacts with its counterparts in Pyongyang while managing most of Pyongyang’s financial transactions (though some banks have now stopped doing so).

Many experts have drawn the conclusion that despite close diplomatic relations and economic ties, Beijing has been unable to influence the North’s decisions on its nuclear program.

A less explored possibility is that Beijing is exploiting its ambiguous relationship with Pyongyang to create some sort of status quo in which the North Korea nuclear issue is never fully resolved, because an end to the conflict would severely diminish Beijing’s ability to bargain with the international community.

Consequently, while it has proven amenable to Western policies and UN action on North Korea, Beijing has just as often worked to water down UNSC resolutions or pushed for further Six Party talks, a policy that, while ostensibly rational, has ensured that the North continues to threaten its neighbors, reactivate its nuclear weapons program and test fire missiles in defiance of international law.

That ambiguity, along with doubts that Beijing is fully committed to forcing Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear ambitions, was reinforced earlier this month when reports emerged that Kim’s third son, Kim Jong-un, had visited Beijing and met with Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) and other senior Chinese officials.

Given the secrecy, it is impossible to know what agreements and commitments were made during those meetings.

It is evident, therefore, that the perpetuation of the status quo is in Beijing’s advantage, as it helps bolster its image of a positive force in the region while it gains concessions from the US and others on core issues such as human rights and, above all, Taiwan.

This is not to say that China relishes a nuclear North Korea that could spark a destabilizing war in the Korean Peninsula.

But if it manages its neighbor well — not allowing it to spark a war while preventing the international community from disarming it, effectively playing one camp against the other — Pyongyang can be used by Beijing as a precious instrument to buttress the foundations of its rise while achieving its political objectives.

Ironically, over-reliance on China by Japan, South Korea and the US on the North Korean nuclear issue could make it less likely that the problem will be resolved, and more probable that they will end up giving too much to ensure that China continues its “indispensable” role.

J. Michael Cole is a writer based in Taipei.