Taipei pajama protesters call on Ma to step down
　

ACTIVIST ART: Many at the parade brought handmade placards with slogans such as 'Ma is the biggest disaster' and 'the president is jogging, it’s time to start running'
　

By Loa Iok-sin
STAFF REPORTER
Sunday, Sep 20, 2009, Page 1
　

Around 1,000 people joined a “pajama parade” yesterday — though only a handful of people actually wore pajamas — organized by artists unhappy with President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) leadership, calling on him to step down or to stop getting paid.

Following banners that read “stop paying the incompetent” and a woman dressed up as a Chinese zombie to portray Ma’s administration as a “zombie government,” demonstrators departed from the assembly point in front of the National Taiwan University and headed toward Ketagalan Boulevard in front of the Presidential Office, before moving on to Liberty Square for a rally in the evening.

Many brought along homemade placards voicing their discontent at the government, with slogans such as “Ma is the biggest disaster” and “the president is jogging, it’s time to start running,” alluding to Ma’s signature sport. Even with a busy schedule as president, Ma still manages to find time to take part in many running events.
　

“We wanted to make this a ‘pajama parade’ because our government is always asleep, and with such an incapable government, the people may need to be prepared to escape from disaster in their pajamas at anytime,” said Koma Chen (陳佳汝), one of the event’s organizers and a theater artist.

As most of the organizers are artists, they decided to make the parade a little different from most other political demonstrations.

“We hope to turn the demonstration itself into action art, as well as a festival,” she said.
　

Besides the organizers, however, only a few people actually wore their pajamas to the march.

Among the demonstrators were bajiajiang (八家將) performers. Traditional belief has it that the bajiajiang are eight generals who remove all evil spirits from a road before deities are to travel along them.

In most Taoist parades of deities on religious holidays, there are usually people dressed as bajiajiang marching and performing ahead of the deity statues.

The presence of the bajiajiang in the parade was thus to clear away evil spirits and misfortune for Taiwan, the organizers said.

Founder of the Taiwan Republic Campaign Peter Wang (王獻極) painted himself black and carried large rocks made of polystyrene foam, walking barefoot among the demonstrators.

“This is a representation of typhoon victims who, with mud all over their bodies, have lost everything, including their shoes, but have been forgotten by the government,” he said. “The rocks represent the ‘mudslide of anger’ from the devastated areas that is now heading toward the Presidential Office.”

Wang was referring to the devastation wrought by Typhoon Morakot, which hit the country on the weekend of Aug. 7 and took more than 700 lives in severe mudslides and flooding.

While the parade proceeded peacefully, with passers-by and motorists responding positively to the marchers for the most part, an elderly woman living in a high-rise apartment building along the parade route was upset by the demonstration, and threw water over the demonstrators from her fifth-story window.

Protesters responded with louder cries of “Ma Ying-jeou, step down.”

No further exchanges occurred between the woman and the demonstrators.

The artists performed a skit re-enacting scenes of people suffering and dying as the storm hit, implying that the government did not lend a helping hand fast enough.

“I want to tell the residents of Taipei — who are usually silent on political events — that if you think you can still believe in this government and wait for them to solve all of our problems, you’re putting your children’s future at stake,” one of the artists, Hsia Lin (夏林), said.

Later on, several independent bands and solo artists performed at a rally in Liberty Square.

Musician Chu Yueh-hsin (朱約信), better known as Joy Topper (豬頭皮), opened the event, performing songs in his own unique style — half singing and half talking lyrics that are half pre-written and half improvised on the spot, blending criticism of current events and politicians.

“Coming here is a way to show that I love and care for my country,” said Ann Chiu (邱薇潔), a 26-year-old woman in the audience.

Chiu said that although she was never a supporter of Ma, she had been hopeful that he would do something good for Taiwan and act efficiently, since the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) holds an absolute majority in the legislature.

“I’m totally disappointed,” she said. “Ma is doing a worse job than I expected.”

Kaohsiung to screen controversial film
　

RESPECTING FREEDOMS: The Kaohsiung City Government confirmed the movie about Rebiya Kadeer will be screened, while Freddy Lim has invited her to visit
　

By Shih Hsiu-chuan
STAFF REPORTER
Sunday, Sep 20, 2009, Page 1

Despite pressure from Beijing and local tourism operators, the Kaohsiung City Government yesterday said a documentary on prominent Uighur independence activist Rebiya Kadeer would be screened at the upcoming Kaohsiung Film Festival as planned.

“The selection of the films at the festival was made by the film committee, an independent commission, months ago. We respect its decision,” said Hung Chih-kun (洪智坤), director of Kaohsiung City Mayor Chen Chu’s (陳菊) office.

The city government held a meeting yesterday to discuss the matter after Chen returned from a business trip to Japan.

“On the principle of respecting art, creativity and freedom of speech, the documentary will be screened as scheduled,” Chen said yesterday, adding that the city government would work with the tourism industry to attract more tourists to the city.

The screening of the film, however, will be brought forward to Tuesday and Wednesday.

The director-general of the city government’s Information Office, Hsu Li-ming (??, said the pending screening had caused great controversy, and that it would be unfair to the other 78 films to screen the film during the festival.

“The Kaohsiung Film Festival does not begin until Oct. 16 and we do not want the protests to drag on until then, we will show the film in advance,” he said.

Representatives of the tourism industry in Kaohsiung had called on the city government to remove the documentary The 10 Conditions of Love from the film festival, citing low hotel occupancy rates in the city as the result of Chinese tourist groups canceling hotel and restaurant reservations and trips.

According to Lin Kun-shan (林崑山), the chief of the city’s tourism bureau, however, the occupancy rate of hotels has dropped nationwide because of the recession and the devastation wrought by Typhoon Morakot.

“From January to August this year, the rate declined by 10 percent in Taipei City and Hualien County compared with the same period last year. In Kaoshiung City, it dropped by between 3 percent and 5 percent,” Lin said.

Hung said the city government had talked to representatives from the tourism industry on Friday and decided to stick to its decision to screen the documentary at the festival.

“Kaohsiung is a city that enshrines human rights and art should be above politics,” Hung said.

The Executive Yuan maintained a neutral stance on the issue yesterday after remarks by Premier Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) the previous day were deemed as opposing the screening of the film.

On Friday, when fielding a question from Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Legislator Chu Feng-chih (朱鳳芝) about the potential decline in the numbers of Chinese tourists because of the screening, Wu made an analogy that drew criticism.

“[It’s an issue of] how to get along with people. You want me to shop more in your store, but you do things that make me feel uncomfortable. Then I will not go to your store,” Wu said.

Executive Yuan Spokesman Su Jun-pin (蘇俊賓) downplayed Wu’s comments yesterday by saying that Wu was describing Taiwan’s predicament of dealing with cross-strait relations and relations with the international community.

“The Executive Yuan’s position is that the government will not interfere, regardless of the predicament,” Su said.

“We are a country that has independent sovereignty and freedom of speech. It is out of the question that the government could interfere with or prohibit the screening of a film,” Su said.

At a separate setting yesterday, Freddy Lim (林昶佐), president of civic group Guts United Taiwan, said the group had sent a letter inviting Kadeer to visit Taiwan.
　

Former envoy to US warns on Ma policies
　

WORRISOME TRENDS: Since Ma took office, some US academics believe China has gained more influence and leverage over Taiwan than the US, Joseph Wu said
　

By J. Michael Cole
STAFF REPORTER
Sunday, Sep 20, 2009, Page 3

“Lack of resources, corruption charges and an unfriendly media environment are preventing the DPP from being more effective in its efforts.”— Joseph Wu, former representative to Washington

The Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) administration is proceeding carelessly in its cross-strait policies, is unreceptive to criticism and appears to be focusing on its relations with Beijing at the expense of the nation’s ties with long-standing allies, former representative to Washington Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) said in an interview with the Taipei Times this week.

In its efforts to develop ties with China, Wu said, the Ma administration seemed to have decided on the political end-state before conducting the proper security/strategic assessments to determine the wisest course of action.

“On the higher national security level, there has been no grand assessment on Taiwan’s standing with China and all other important countries, and no report on Taiwan’s priority list with other countries, including China,” said Wu, who is now a research fellow at National Chengchi University’s Institute of International Relations.

Since Ma came into office, old allies like the US, the EU and Japan have been ignored, he said, adding that the only country that seemed to matter to Ma was China.

He also said some prominent US academics had begun to worry that China has gained more influence and leverage over Taiwan than the US.

One sign of this development was the fact that the US was kept in the dark on cross-strait political issues such as WHO negotiations that resulted in Taiwan being allowed to participate as an observer at the World Health Assembly, the WHO’s decision-making body, earlier this year.

Wu said a US official had told him that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government was not willing to provide any information to the US about negotiations between Taipei and Beijing on the matter.

“American officials and members of the policy community in [Washington] are very eager to know what is being talked about on political issues such as peace agreement and military confidence-building measures because these issues may fundamentally change the American security environment in East Asia,” Wu said.

“But apparently the American side seems to be getting very little information from the KMT government,” he said.

During his election campaign and soon after entering office, Ma repeatedly said that his government would endeavor to improve relations with Washington and undo the “damage” caused to bilateral ties during former president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) eight years in office.

Another level where the Ma administration has failed to conduct risk assessments is in cross-strait economic liberalization, Wu said.

“No impact assessment at all [was made] before Ma made the decision on an ECFA [economic cooperation framework agreement] and shifting TFT-LCD [thin-film-transitory liquid crystal display] and 12-inch wafer fab production to China,” Wu said.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs announced earlier this year that it would review the technological cap set on TFT-LCD production in China by Taiwanese manufacturers.

“TFT-LCD and [computer chip] fab production have been considered as two key strategic industries for the Taiwanese economy. Even some KMT legislators who favor better relations with China said to me that they do not agree with the decision-making process,” he said.

Under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration, while encouraging trade liberalization with China, Taiwan imposed limits on the types of key technologies that could migrate to China, mostly to ensure that Taiwan retained its technological edge.

Since Ma took office, however, caution has been thrown to the wind, with no assessment of the impact that technology transfer could have on Taiwanese competitiveness in crucial sectors of its economy, said Wu, who has also served as Mainland Affairs Council chairman under the DPP government.

Aside from Ma’s disregard for criticism from both the DPP and some members of the KMT, Wu said Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng’s (王金平) public attitude toward Ma “seemed to have changed after Ma ran for the party chairmanship.”

“I figured that he must have seen the situation that Ma is trying to control the party and the LY [Legislative Yuan] party caucus and there is no way for him to publicly dispute with the administration now,” Wu said.

There were clear indications that the Ma administration was also proactively seeking to silence former officials from the Chen administration, including himself, Wu said.

Wu said earlier this year he was invited by Project 2049, a US-based think tank, to participate in a conference coinciding with the 30th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act on Capitol Hill.

He was quietly informed, however, that Taiwan’s representative in Washington repeatedly requested that the organizer of the conference have Wu “disinvited.”

Wu also said the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which funded some academic projects, had requested the organizers to drop him from participating in another conference in Washington and other academic activities.

“A book project by a government-funded think tank was about to be completed and [I] was a contributor,” Wu said. “But the book project was ordered dropped.”

Faced with such censorship, Wu said he and other former DPP officials felt they had a hard time getting invited to conferences and events, lest their presence cause trouble in relations with the KMT and China.

“Lack of resources, corruption charges and an unfriendly media environment are preventing the DPP from being more effective in its efforts” to counter Ma’s cross-strait policies, Wu said.

Asked how the DPP could turn things around, Wu said: “Some people argue that the DPP should try to come up with its own platform on cross-strait policy or other policies. My view is that it is not time yet — any platform by the DPP now will probably look out of touch because of the fast pace of change. A better timing will be when the [DPP’s] presidential candidate [for the election in 2012] is selected and a platform, or grand policy proposal, is offered as a contrast to the KMT’s failures or its policies.”

“In short, we are counting on the final moment of a duet with the KMT and Ma when 2012 approaches,” Wu said.

‘Status quo’ is a hostile takeover
　

By J. Michael Cole 寇謐將
Sunday, Sep 20, 2009, Page 8

Ever since the US ended diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) and recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, a move followed by the passage of the US’ Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in April that year, Washington’s policy on Taiwan has consistently been that its future cannot be determined through the use of force by China.

The diplomatic relationship with Beijing, the TRA reads, “rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means [and that] any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes” would be “of grave concern” to the US.

This remains Washington’s official line on the Taiwan Strait, which was reinforced by the fifth article of the “Six Assurances” to Taiwan issued in July 1982, stating: “The United States would not alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan … that the question was one to be decided peacefully.”

Attendant to this formulation has been Washington’s reliance on ambiguity through the so-called “status quo,” which on the one hand is contingent on Beijing not using force against Taiwan, and on the other on Taipei refraining from doing anything — adopting a new Constitution, moving toward de jure independence, and so on — that would undermine that stability.

For three decades, this strategy appears to have been wise, for aside from the Missile Crisis of 1995 and 1996 and occasional violations of Taiwanese airspace by Chinese military aircraft, the Taiwan Strait has not descended into war and both sides remain de facto separate entities.

Despite this, however, the Taiwan problem has not disappeared. Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the “status quo” is dynamic, which undeniably works in Beijing’s favor. Not coincidentally, Beijing has adopted a course of non-confrontation with the US, knowing full well that even after a decade of double-digit investment in its military, it could not wage war against the US and expect to win.

Rather than escalate military tensions in the Taiwan Strait, therefore, Beijing has sought rapprochement with Washington and is biding its time with Taiwan while adopting an asymmetrical approach to its annexation.

As stated earlier, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), though far more formidable today than it was a decade ago, is no match for the US military and will not be for some time. As scenarios involving the invasion of Taiwan would invite US intervention on Taiwan’s side, PLA demonstrations of force in the past decade have mostly emphasized political maneuvering and avoided actions that risk escalating tensions with the US.

Rather than seeking unification with Taiwan through force, therefore, Beijing has avoided crossing the red lines drawn by the TRA and other agreements with the US, instead embarking on a strategy that, in the past year in particular, has proven most successful.

In financial terms, it is a strategy that can be likened to a hostile takeover.

The US — which has set its red lines in military terms — has been caught wrong-footed, because Beijing is exploiting a weakness in the TRA. It states: “Nothing … shall contravene the interest of the United States in human rights, especially with respect to the human rights of all the approximately eighteen million [now 23 million] inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.”

What happens if China’s absorption of Taiwan by economic means — a prospect that gained considerable momentum after President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) came into office in May last year — becomes the determinant of Taiwan’s future?

This strategy is “peaceful” inasmuch as it does not involve the use of military force. But by relying on a pliant KMT that has been unresponsive to public fears about the wisdom and rapidity of its cross-strait policies, does this approach not deprive Taiwanese of their most fundamental right to self-determination? This is the desired outcome for top Chinese officials, who have openly admitted that cross-strait economic liberalization is a stepping-stone to unification — rhetoric that has not disappeared despite warmer relations between Taipei and Beijing.

There are clear indications that the proposed economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA), which could be signed as early as next year, together with memorandums of understanding on financial matters, would make Taiwan dependent on China for its economic survival. It is a view that is shared by both the pro-independence pan-green camp and a growing number of moderates in the pan-blue camp.

Furthermore, even if critical sectors such as telecommunications and defense remain off-limits for the time being, by opening up to Chinese institutional investment, the Ma administration is making it possible for China — with its vast economic resources, most of which remain under state control — to elbow local rivals out of key sectors such as real estate, banking, manufacturing and agriculture. If, as is often the case, Chinese firms are controlled by — or receive financial backing from — the state, then their entering the Taiwanese market will create a situation in which Taiwanese firms will be simply unable to compete.

The more Taiwanese lose control of their financial institutions and companies, and the more dependent Taiwan becomes on China for trade, the less power Taiwanese will have to determine their future. Yet this is occurring as opposition to unification and support for the “status quo” steadily rises, together with the public’s identification as “Taiwanese” or “Taiwanese first and Chinese second.” It is a juxtaposition that sows the seeds of conflict.

While it could be argued that Taiwanese voted Ma into office on his pro-China platform, few predicted that he would proceed to liberalize cross-strait trade so quickly, or act like a dictator when it comes to dissenting views or calls for caution on cross-strait policy.

Perhaps this gradual shift in the “status quo” was what Washington hoped for all along: a means to avoid getting involved in a costly war with China. Others saw the US’ embrace of the “status quo” as a way of maintaining Washington’s image as a champion of democracy while sweeping the Taiwan problem under the carpet.

More likely, however, is the possibility that China has outwitted the drafters of the TRA and subsequent US policies on the Taiwan Strait by employing an asymmetrical approach that skirts the military content embedded in the document altogether.

If the US remains committed to democracy and to the spirit of the values enshrined in the TRA, a re-evaluation of the meaning of “status quo” and of the implications of “non-violent” developments that threaten to deprive Taiwanese of their rights would be in order.

J. Michael Cole is a writer based in Taipei.

The green and black superpower
　

This could be the most crucial question that all of us face: Just what is China’s climate change strategy?

By Ian Katz
THE GUARDIAN, LONDON
Sunday, Sep 20, 2009, Page 9
　

What is China playing at on climate change? That may be the most important question in the world right now, thanks alone to its status as the world’s biggest producer of greenhouse gases. But what Beijing is — or is not — prepared to do will also determine whether the rest of the world can reach a deal on combating global warming that is worth the paper it’s written on.

So it is hardly surprising that reading the Chinese approach has become the latter-day equivalent of Cold War Kremlinology. Britain alone has more than 20 diplomats in Beijing devoted to monitoring and nudging the Chinese position ahead of December’s UN Copenhagen summit. The US has twice as many.

A flying visit to Beijing (3.9 tonnes of carbon dioxide to offset, before you ask) does not fill you with optimism about the prospects for a deal. For some months now, the mood music from China has been distinctly upbeat: a massive renewable energy drive that could see it surpass Europe’s challenging targets for clean power by 2020, a climate change resolution passed for the first time by the country’s top legislative body, the beginnings of a public debate about when Chinese emissions should peak and begin to fall. Beijing even retained London public relations firm Freuds to try to polish its image on the issue.

But at a conference on reporting climate change last week, senior Chinese scientists and negotiators were in an altogether less emollient mood. The official Chinese position is snappily summarized as “shared burden, differentiated responsibilities,” which roughly translates as “We’re all in the same boat but it’s your fault that it’s taking on water, so you’d better do most of the baling.”

Both publicly and privately, Chinese officials seemed at pains to emphasize just how differentiated those responsibilities should be.

“The developed countries have the money, they have the technology and they think it’s an important issue,” one told me. “So why don’t they do something about it?”

A leading UK government adviser has sounded another disconcerting note: China will not sacrifice economic growth to prevent the world from warming by more than 2oC, the threshold beyond which scientists warn we could face disastrous effects.

European diplomats say they have noticed a hardening of the Chinese position during the summer.

“In the past they used to refer to rich countries cutting their emissions by between 25 percent and 40 percent [by 2020],” one said. “Now they only talk about 40 percent.”

Some speculate that it is little more than pre-summit gamesmanship designed to increase pressure on developed countries desperate for a deal.

But it may also reflect a deeper ambivalence about the issue within the Chinese leadership, the diplomat suggested. “They are caught between a fairly recent understanding that climate change is real, and going to do them real damage, and the competing idea that they don’t fully believe that it’s possible for industrial economies to grow without producing lots of carbon.”

Understanding China’s approach to climate change involves negotiating a number of apparent contradictions. The country that insists it can only begin to tackle its emissions with the help of Western technology and cash is the same one that is spending billions on an ambitious space program, an industrial behemoth intensely proud of its technological prowess.

Meanwhile, China is — as my colleague Jonathan Watts puts it — on course to become “both a green superpower and a black superpower,” that is, simultaneously the world’s green energy giant and its carbon villain.

One Western expert who advises the Chinese on climate policy says the messages from Beijing may not be as contradictory as they seem. China’s talk of decarbonizing is genuine, he says.

“They are bloody serious about this. Their planning is more advanced than anywhere in the world,” he says.

At the same time, Beijing is determined to make the rich countries cut deeper and hand over more technology and cash to developing nations.

Some of this may have more to do with strategic powerbroking than climate change. According to the senior diplomat, China’s aim is to emerge from Copenhagen as the protective uncle that brings home the bacon for the developing nations — which just happen to have a lot of the resources that China needs to fuel its continued economic growth.

But there are less calculating reasons why most Chinese do not consider carbon dioxide emissions the burning issue that we do — they are more worried about the noxious pollutants they face every day. At the Beijing conference a Chinese journalist pointed out that there are 20,000 chemical plants along the course of the Yangtze.

A year or so ago I asked a leading Chinese environmentalist why he was not making more noise about greenhouse gas emissions.

“Because I’m more concerned about whether my son is going to be able to breathe in the morning,” he replied.

No one is expecting Beijing’s negotiators to undergo a Damascene conversion during the late nights of cajoling and compromise in Copenhagen. Instead, it is hoped that China will make a unilateral move in the run-up to the summit, probably spelling out targets to cut its carbon intensity (the amount of greenhouse gases produced per unit of GDP, rather than total emissions) in its next five-year plan. This would theoretically allow China to continue to enjoy the economic growth it says it is entitled to while beginning to move in the right direction.

Then the hard wrangling will switch to the question of how binding any such commitments are. Too strong and Beijing will balk at them; too weak and the deal will look toothless in Washington, London and Berlin.

What does all this mean for those of us trying to decide whether to do our own humble bit to reduce carbon dioxide emissions? The relentless rise of Chinese emissions is often cited as a reason why small-scale unilateral efforts, or even large-scale ones in small countries like Britain, are pointless. If the new power plants that China is building between now and 2020 alone will produce about 25 billion tonnes of carbon over their lifetime, what is the point of my saving 1 tonne by not flying to Spain on holiday?

The answer is that small signals can matter, even to very big countries. Again and again last week I heard Chinese officials bemoan the failure of the West to lead by example on tackling emissions. There had been no shortage of targets, they complained, but precious little action.

After one session with a group of Chinese science journalists, one young reporter approached me looking quite angry. How could Westerners tell Chinese people that they would have to make sacrifices in future to tackle climate change? “And how are you getting to the airport — by taxi or on the Airport Express?”