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US arms sales crucial for Taiwan
By Doug Bandow
Tuesday, Jan 26, 2010, Page 8
The Obama administration is preparing a new arms package for Taiwan. Ironically,
selling weapons to Taipei may be the best way for Washington to get out from the
middle of one of the world’s potentially most volatile relationships — the one
between China and Taiwan.
Relations between the two are improving, yet the former continues to point more
than 1,300 missiles at the latter. The threat of military force remains a
backdrop to expanding economic and tourist contacts across the Taiwan Strait.
The US is positioned uneasily between them. Formally committed to the principle
of one China and providing weapons to Taiwan for its defense, Washington cannot
easily square the circle. As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) grows in
economic strength and international influence, pressure will grow on the US’
relationship with Taipei.
Taiwan’s precarious situation was demonstrated by the transformation of Bush
administration policy. By the end of his term former US president George W. Bush
was holding back arms from Taiwan and limiting transit by Taiwan’s president
across US territory — as had Bill Clinton.
The election of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) in March 2008 was greeted with
relief in Beijing and Washington. Ma has downplayed Taiwan’s quest for a
separate international identity and promoted ties with China.
Yet the underlying substantive issues remain unchanged. The PRC sees only one
outcome, whether the result of negotiation or ultimatum: Chinese sovereignty
over Taiwan.
In contrast, Ma, no less than his predecessor, opposes submitting Taiwan to rule
by the PRC.
At some point China’s patience is likely to fade. Continuing arms sales may be
the best hope of forestalling conflict.
During the Cold War no one doubted the US’ will and ability to prevent the PRC
from attempting to conquer or intimidate Taiwan. Neither is certain any longer.
Go to war with China and the 21st century looks a lot uglier, even if the US
handily wins round one. And round one no longer would be a slam-dunk.
While the PRC cannot, at least for the foreseeable future, match US military
power, it can create a substantial deterrent capability, sharply raising the
potential cost of US intervention. Beijing’s increasing ability to sink US
carriers with submarines and missiles alone would force any president to
hesitate sending the Seventh Fleet into the strait for battle.
As protecting Taiwan goes from being a guaranteed freebie to a potential
catastrophe, Taipei will no longer be able to rely upon the US. Taiwan has been
a good friend for many years, but few US presidents would decide to protect
Taipei if doing so put Los Angeles and New York at risk.
Arms sales offer the best path out of the Taiwan thicket.
In 2001 the Bush administration offered Taiwan a US$12 billion weapons package.
For political purposes, the then opposition-dominated legislature blocked the
purchases.
Then the Bush administration showed its pique with former president Chen
Shui-bian (陳水扁) by freezing arms sales to Taipei. The result was to accelerate
the already disturbing erosion of Taiwan’s defensive capabilities.
Taiwanese weakness could be dangerous. Should the PRC grow impatient — and
believe that victory would be swift and bloodless — the temptation to act could
prove overwhelming.
Of course, even fulfilling Taiwan’s “wish list” would not enable it to defeat
China in a full-scale war. But Taipei needs sufficiency rather than equality — a
military capable of making any attempt at coercion more costly than the likely
benefits of victory.
So far China has been cautious and pragmatic in exercising its increased
diplomatic influence and military power. Taiwan needs enough military force with
enough capabilities to reinforce these good instincts.
Before leaving office the Bush administration resumed arms sales. Now a new deal
is in the works. The PRC responded that the US “should respect China’s core
interests.”
Nevertheless, there should be no US retreat from the principle of selling Taipei
the weapons that it needs for its defense. Taiwanese have built a free and
democratic society. They deserve access to the tools that will enable them to
defend that society.
Moreover, the best strategy for ensuring a peaceful resolution of Taipei’s
status is a robust Taiwanese defensive capability. Selling arms is a far better
option than intervening militarily in any conflict.
To presume that China, with far more at stake than the US, will forever back
down would be a wild gamble. Whether Chinese concerns are driven more by
nationalist passions or geostrategic concerns, the more direct Washington’s
involvement, the more dangerous Beijing’s likely response. And there would be no
greater calamity than a war between the US and China.
The US should not be expected to risk major war with nuclear powers to protect
other states, however friendly or democratic. But Washington can help other
nations defend themselves. Selling weapons to Taiwan would empower it without
inserting the US into any cross-strait crossfire.
Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a
fellow with the American Conservative Defense Alliance.
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