ECFA: Let the protests continue
Wednesday, Mar 10, 2010, Page 8
The first round of working level talks on a proposed economic cooperation
framework agreement (ECFA) between Taiwan and China was held in Beijing at the
end of January. The second round is expected to take place in Taipei this month.
The Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) proposal for a referendum on the issue
was rejected last year, as was the appeal, after which the baton was passed to
the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), which is working on a second drive for a
referendum.
By all accounts, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist
Party are piling on the pace, trying to get the agreement done and dusted as
soon as possible.
The government’s reason for opposing a referendum on an ECFA was that it has
nothing to do with politics or sovereignty. President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is
still singing the same tune as the second round of talks draws near.
A senior Mainland Affairs Council official recently claimed that cross-strait
political talks would not happen within the next two years and that there was no
pressure to discuss these issues. The official also said Ma would not engage in
political discussions with China during his first term.
Rubbish.
It took an official over in China to talk straight. Taking questions about the
proposed ECFA during a National People’s Congress (NPC) meeting in Beijing last
week, NPC spokesman Li Zhaoxing (李肇星) said China has always viewed issues
involving Taiwan on the basis of its “one China” principle.
Regardless of what Ma says, this means China expects to discuss the ECFA from
its consistent standpoint — that Taiwan is part of China. As far as China is
concerned, the ECFA it wants to sign with Taiwan — like the closer economic
partnership arrangement (CEPA) it signed with Hong Kong — should be seen as an
agreement between Beijing and a regional government. The proposed ECFA, like the
CEPA, is built on the principle of “one country, two systems.”
‘1992 CONSENSUS’
China’s fundamental standpoint does not need to be pointed out to either Ma or
his government. They are well aware of what it is. In fact, Ma still adheres to
the so-called “1992 consensus” — that both China and Taiwan belong to the same
country, which is an implicit acceptance of the “one China” principle. So the
issue is not whether cross-strait politics will be discussed during Ma’s first
term: It’s pretty much a moot point, since he already adheres to China’s
fundamental standpoint.
During the first round of working level talks, the government claimed, out of
the blue, that the ECFA talks would be conducted in terms of Taiwan’s
relationship to China. This is consistent with what Li was saying, although the
Ma administration added that “there was no pressure to conduct political
discussions.” This is not a case of being unaware of the situation; rather it is
a case of intentionally trying to hoodwink the Taiwanese public.
NOT ABOUT TRADE
It is quite clear that the ECFA that Ma is so insistent on signing and claims is
absolutely imperative has absolutely nothing to do with the professed goal of
strengthening trade and economic exchanges. It is nothing but a smokescreen for
the eventual handover of Taiwan’s autonomy to China.
An ECFA will have a huge impact on investment, jobs and salaries — all of which
will fall. On top of this, and this is something Chinese officials have been
quite explicit about, once an ECFA is signed, Taiwan will have to secure China’s
permission if it is to sign free-trade agreements with other countries.
Ma is single-mindedly pursuing the signing of this pact as part of his ultimate
objective of eventual unification. Concerned, the public is calling for a
referendum, but Ma is not listening. His pro-China leanings seem to have gone to
his head, and Beijing’s dictatorial style has rubbed off on him. As far as he is
concerned, important national policy decisions are his business, and democracy
be damned.
This hasn’t gone unnoticed. His anti-democratic proclivities have stirred up
noises of dissent not only amongst the public but also in the pan-blue camp and
internally within the KMT.
The second ECFA referendum drive initiated by the TSU and the DPP’s proposed
amendments to the operating principles of the Legislative Yuan’s Cross-Strait
Commission, stipulating that important cross-strait policy should go through the
legislature and be subject to a public vote, are necessary to secure Taiwan’s
sovereignty and protect the rights of its people.
Dissatisfaction with Ma is evident in the recent string of legislative
by-election defeats for the KMT, as well as the party’s poor showing in the
three-in-one elections. Given this, the time is ripe for a referendum on the
ECFA.
KEEPING FOCUS
It is imperative that anyone concerned about the future of Taiwan does not get
distracted by the upcoming five special municipality elections and allow their
guard to fall on the ECFA issue.
The consequences of signing an ECFA are serious and far-reaching, and would be
difficult to reverse the damage it will inflict on Taiwan.
This month’s talks in Taipei should be met with protests against the collusion
of the KMT and the Chinese communists, which will only end in Taiwan being
swallowed up by China, and it should be taken as an opportunity to galvanize the
public to decide its own destiny. It should also be used as a chance to push for
a second wave of referendums, to give Taiwanese a voice in their children’s
future.
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