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Post-ECFA China will seek social
integration
By Lin Cheng-Yi 林正義
Tuesday, Jul 20, 2010, Page 8
For China’s leaders, the period from the signing of the
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) until Taiwan’s 2012 presidential
election will be a key period, during which their central strategy will be to
help facilitate the re-election of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九).
Based on this premise, China will avoid actions that could raise questions about
Ma or cause a public backlash. For example, stopping Taiwan from signing
free-trade agreements (FTAs) with Southeast Asian nations would make it
impossible for Ma to deliver on his promises and lead to criticism from the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). As a result, China’s opposition is likely to
start out small and only gradually move from individual cases to a firm
political stance.
Now that the ECFA has been signed, Beijing will quietly wait for Taiwan’s
year-end special municipality elections and devise an appropriate post-election
response. In his quest for re-election, Ma might ignore pressure from Beijing
for political dialogue and negotiation, and if that happens, China will be
forced to wait patiently and respect Ma’s wishes.
Taiwan Affairs Office Director Wang Yi (王毅) understands that the time is not yet
ripe for political talks and Beijing understands that premature political
negotiations could be detrimental to cross-strait relations. Beijing does not
agree with the concept of “one China, with each side having its own
interpretation” and instead wants terms such as “one China, with both sides
having the same interpretation” or “one China uniformly agreed on and expressed
by both sides,” while emphasizing the the “one China” principle.
However, China has shown some flexibility and now accepts terms such as the
“1992 consensus” and “the one China framework.” If the ECFA is the first step in
Beijing’s unification strategy, then economic integration will be followed by
social integration.
Having achieved its goal of institutionalizing cross-strait trade relations,
China will continue to claim that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are
Chinese.
The annual cross-strait forum held in Fujian Province, which was inaugurated
last year, has attracted Taiwanese from all sectors of society and established
links between people from both sides of the Strait. Chinese President Hu Jintao
(胡錦濤) said in his “six points” that exchanges between young people from both
sides of the Strait must be strengthened and that China is willing to negotiate
cultural and educational exchange agreements in order to promote exchange and
cooperation in these areas.
Last month, Shanghai’s Fudan University hosted a summer camp for Taiwanese
universities, attended by students from 12 national and private universities
around Taiwan. The camp focused on the World Expo in Shanghai and the economic
development of cities south of the Yangtze River. The aim was obviously to
challenge the stereotypes young Taiwanese have about China.
Beijing knows that the US, the EU, Japan and South Korea will not sign FTAs with
Taiwan, so it will only have to deal with possible FTAs between Taiwan and
Singapore or the Philippines. For China, the ECFA greatly reduces cross-strait
tensions, placing the onus on the US to resolve the issue of arms sales to
Taiwan according to undertakings made in the 1982 joint communique signed with
the US.
Beijing could become more flexible and adjust its deployment of missiles aimed
at Taiwan, but at the same time, it will also be looking to sever, once and for
all, the channels through which Taiwan might obtain military arms from foreign
countries.
Lin Cheng-yi is a researcher at the Institute of European and
American Studies at Academia Sinica.
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