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What Taiwan’s ‘few’ are facing
By Richard Fisher, Jr
Thursday, Aug 05, 2010, Page 8
Historical comparison can be a risky game, but it would be
quite reasonable for Taiwanese to consider the plight of another island nation
that successfully overcame one of history’s definitive existential challenges 70
years ago this summer.
By Aug. 20, 1940, former British prime minister Winston Churchill intoned:
“Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.”
Churchill’s words signaled victory, though many more of the “few” would die in
the coming air battles — the British Royal Air Force had succeeded not just in
denying air superiority to Germany’s Luftwaffe, it had survived commander
Hermann Goering’s initial onslaught to remain a viable fighting force. It was
this fact that forced Nazi leader Adolf Hitler to abandon plans for invading
England. While the Battle of Britain would move into other violent phases like
the bombing of London in September 1940, this battle was largely decided before
it began.
Since the mid-1930s, a few military leaders, like British Air Chief Marshall Sir
Hugh Dowding, had perceived the coming storm and pressed the British leadership
to fund an integrated air defense system that embraced an unproven information
technology: radar. They were willing to press their aircraft engineers to push
the state-of-the-art by investing in the Hawker Hurricane and Supermarine
Spitfire fighters, while remaining well-informed about Germany’s advancing
aircraft technology. Britain also benefited from luck and timing: The Battle of
France ended just in time to stem a hemorrhage of pilots and its effort to
expand aircraft production and pilot training bore fruit just in time to make a
decisive difference.
By June 1940, Hitler was widely perceived as unstoppable, having both united and
rearmed Germany and committed it to vengeance and racial domination.
Germany’s unprecedented large-scale combination of armor, mechanized infantry
and airpower laid waste to Poland, the Low Countries, Norway and France.
However, since the beginning of his political career, Hitler had an affinity for
England and when his forces arrived on the English Channel, he was
half-expecting not to have to fight, a factor that resulted in a lack of focus
leading to an air battle that played to Britain’s strengths. Hitler’s initial
hesitancy was also well-justified. Britain’s political leadership was not
unified in the desire for war with Germany, with plenty of politicians quietly
urging negotiations. What Hitler could not anticipate was that Churchill would
emerge from political obscurity to rally his nation and then use the Battle of
Britain to help former US president Franklin Roosevelt end US neutrality.
Fast forward to this year on the Taiwan Strait, and there is much to remind
Taiwanese of Britain’s plight. From China, Taiwan faces a still-growing military
threat to its existence as a democracy despite its recent efforts to reach out
and improve political and economic relations. Perhaps before 2005, a “Battle of
Taiwan” would have turned on the contest of air forces, but since then, the
People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) massive missile, electronic, submarine and mine
warfare capabilities might also prove decisive. However, by this year, it is
also possible to see the PLA’s increased preparations for an actual invasion of
Taiwan. What this means is that unlike Britain in 1940, Taiwan cannot afford to
invest in a largely “defensive” war; a realistic future threat of invasion means
it may not be able to favor its air force and navy over its army, or deny itself
new “offensive” weapons, especially the missiles that could attack invasion
forces.
Also, Taiwan cannot assume that China’s preparations for war against Taiwan will
fall victim to internal contradictions. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has
never wavered in its commitment to “recover” Taiwan and the PLA has had 60 years
to consider this battle. Taiwan’s transition to full democracy makes it an even
greater threat to the CCP’s monopoly of power and its preparations for war date
back to the early-1990s. China’s economic and cultural offensives are intended
to lull Taiwan, while hiding China’s growing preparations for war. China
perceives these to have been successful enough to justify pressing Taiwan to
move toward a peace treaty.
While President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has denied such is under consideration, a
treaty might be welcome if China would accept a free Taiwan. However, the CCP’s
abhorrence of the Democratic Progressive Party only highlights its hostility
toward democracy, especially in Taiwan.
As with Britain in 1940, Taiwan’s future as a free nation rests on the ability
of its “few” not only to resist an initial PLA attack, but to defeat its
invasion forces. Only by ensuring China’s fear of failure can Taiwan deter war
and thus ensure its continued survival. Here is where the US remains decisive.
When Washington wavers in its willingness to sell adequate arms, as is now the
case with new F-16 fighters and submarines, it undermines Taiwan’s security and
emboldens China. Appeasing China will work no better for Washington than did
former British prime minister Neville Chamberlain’s attempts to appease Hitler.
Before the military balance shifts decisively in the Taiwan Strait, it is
necessary for the US to reassess Taiwan’s long-term requirements to deter
Chinese attack.
Richard Fisher, Jr is a senior fellow with the International
Assessment and Strategy Center.
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