20100810 Not the right time for political talks with China
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Not the right time for political talks with China

By Ko Shu-ling
Staff Reporter
Tuesday, Aug 10, 2010, Page 3


¡§The KMT administration and the CCP are actually sleeping in the same bed, but sharing very different dreams. The KMT seems to want more peace than unification, at least in public, while China is interested in not only peace, but also unification.¡¨¡ÐTung Chen-yuan, National Chengchi University political science professor

Despite China¡¦s mounting pressure for political and military talks, the time is not ripe for Taipei and Beijing to engage in such negotiations, analysts said.

Chinese Ministry of Defense spokesman Geng Yansheng (¯Õ¶­¥Í) on July 30 said China was willing to talk about redeploying its missiles aimed at Taiwan under the ¡§one China¡¨ principle when the two sides discuss the establishment of military confidence-building measures.

It was the first official response from Beijing to President Ma Ying-jeou¡¦s (°¨­^¤E) call to remove missiles aimed at Taiwan if both sides are to begin political negotiations.

Following the Chinese defense ministry¡¦s comment, the Ma administration skillfully sidestepped the ¡§one China¡¨ principle and focused on the so-called ¡§1992 consensus.¡¨ The ¡§1992 consensus,¡¨ the administration said, was a consensus reached by Taiwan and China in 1992 in which the two sides agreed there was only ¡§one China,¡¨ while each side had its own interpretation of what that meant.

However, the ¡§1992 consensus¡¨ is a term former National Security Council secretary-general Su Chi (Ĭ°_) admitted inventing in 2000 in a bid to describe the KMT claim that Taiwan and China had agreed on the existence of ¡§one China,¡¨ but with different interpretations.

The Ministry of National Defense said it welcomed China¡¦s redeployment of missiles, but emphasized that it did not bear any substantive significance militarily because the missiles are mobile.

The ministry also denied a media report on Aug. 2 claiming that it began planning the creation of military confidence-building measures with Beijing in June and they had proposed that a list of weapons systems targeted for withdrawal be submitted in future military-to-­military negotiations.

The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) urged China to establish mutual trust by renouncing military intimidation against Taiwan. It also called on China to review its ¡§Anti-Secession¡¨ Law targeting Taiwan, which it said was impeding the development of ties between Taipei and Beijing.

Mainland Affairs Council Minister Lai Shin-yuan (¿à©¯´D), while in the US, urged Beijing to abolish ¡§policies and laws¡¨ concerning military ­deployments targeting Taiwan, but fell short of asking Beijing to abolish its ¡§Anti-Secession¡¨ Law.

She also said the timing and conditions were not ripe for military or political negotiations.

Former council secretary-­general Chan Chih-hung (¸â§Ó§») said the administration was not yet ready for political talks with Beijing.

Chan said he understood some military personnel have been attending academic forums to discuss military negotiations with their Chinese counterparts, but added that official talks had not yet begun.

Chan said Beijing¡¦s claim that it was willing to talk about military redeployment was nothing new, adding that it was a rehash of what Chinese President Hu Jintao (­JÀAÀÜ) said in ¡§Hu¡¦s Six Points.¡¨

However, the administration seems unable to react to China¡¦s pressure for political talks even though Ma urged China to remove its missiles more than two years ago when he was campaigning for president.

If the administration is not ready for political negotiations, it would be best to delay the process, Chan said.

¡§The additional cross-strait flights fiasco tells us that it is better for the administration to postpone political negotiations, at least until after 2012, but I doubt that Beijing can wait until 2012 because they are not certain whether Ma will win the re-election,¡¨ he said.

Chang said Beijing might think that if political negotiations cannot bear fruit by 2012, they should at least start negotiations so Beijing can exert more pressure on the Ma administration over the next two years.

Chan said Ma would not dare publicly endorse the ¡§one China¡¨ policy, but his administration could engage China politically via unofficial means or make under-the-table deals.

Tung Chen-yuan (µ£®¶·½), a political science professor at National Chengchi University¡¦s Graduate Institute of Development Studies and former MAC deputy minister, concurred that the administration was not ready to engage in political or military talks with Beijing.

¡§The administration does not have the public consensus on the issue nor any mechanism to integrate different opinions,¡¨ he said.

Taiwan must one day address political differences, but until then, the administration must figure out how to best protect Taiwan¡¦s interests, Tung said.

Public consensus is key to political talks with Beijing, Tung said, adding that mutual trust is equally important for both sides to move forward.

Tung said the administration figured that the best tactic at the moment was to delay political negotiations because the vague ¡§1992 consensus¡¨ provided the KMT a comfort zone. Once it engages in political or military negotiations with Beijing, it would be forced to make clear its political position, and it could put itself in an unfavorable position when it exposes its definitive stance.

The government would get itself into further trouble if the results of their negotiations with China did not satisfy the public, he said.

Therefore, the government¡¦s policy is to focus on economic, cultural and social issues, hoping that any economic benefits would score political points and build up public confidence in its cross-strait policy, he said.

Beijing has been willing to play along because it thought by doling out economic favors it could pressure the KMT to move toward their common ¡§one China¡¨ goal, he said.

Tung said Ma was reluctant to admit that his ultimate goal was unification, but unification remains the KMT¡¦s intention. The administration also does not want to rush the process, but instead wants to see the situation develop gradually. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), on the other hand, has been clear about its goal of ¡§peaceful unification,¡¨ and is eager to see some result, he said.

¡§The KMT administration and the CCP are actually sleeping in the same bed, but sharing very different dreams,¡¨ Tung said. ¡§The KMT seems to want more peace than unification, at least in public, while China is interested in not only peace, but also unification. So in Beijing¡¦s mind, Taiwan is pushing for peaceful independence, not peaceful unification.¡¨

The administration also has a few bargaining chips, Tung said, but Beijing is unwavering in its position and clear about its tactic.

When it comes to military negotiation, Beijing likes to link it with the ¡§one China¡¨ principle and US arms sales to Taiwan, Tung said.

It is clear that Beijing wants Taipei to accept the ¡§one China¡¨ principle before the two sides begin negotiations and that Beijing wants Washington to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan.

¡§If the administration¡¦s only demand at the negotiation table is to ask China to remove its missiles, I want to know what the administration is offering in return,¡¨ he said.

Chang Jung-feng (±iºaÂ×), ­director-general of the Taiwan Association for Strategic Simulation and former deputy secretary-general of the National Security Council, said he was not so concerned about when the administration should begin political negotiations with Beijing, but it worried him that the administration had no idea what it wants from cross-strait negotiations and he asked whether it had any contingency plan should negotiations go awry.

Taking China¡¦s military deployment as an example, Chang said if the two sides cannot see eye to eye on whether the issue should be set as a precondition for negotiations or a discussion topic, they should not begin negotiations at all.

¡§The best timing for the administration to engage in any political negotiations with Beijing is when it knows what it wants and when it has the ability to get it,¡¨ he said.

So, if political negotiations between the two sides are inevitable: Which side has the advantage of time?

Chang said time was on the side of the party that works harder to build up its strength, Chan said time was on the side of the best prepared, and Tung said time was on Taiwan¡¦s side because its democracy has built a stable political and social environment, while China is facing many political and social challenges and uncertainties.

If Taiwan stands by its democratic institutions, time should be on Taiwan¡¦s side, he said, unless some politicians deliberately do something unfavorable to hurt Taiwan.
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