| ¡@ Not the right time for political talks 
with China
 By Ko Shu-ling
 Staff Reporter
 Tuesday, Aug 10, 2010, Page 3
 
 ¡§The KMT administration and the CCP are actually sleeping in the same bed, 
but sharing very different dreams. The KMT seems to want more peace than 
unification, at least in public, while China is interested in not only peace, 
but also unification.¡¨¡ÐTung Chen-yuan, National Chengchi University political 
science professor
 Despite China¡¦s mounting pressure for political and military 
talks, the time is not ripe for Taipei and Beijing to engage in such 
negotiations, analysts said.
 Chinese Ministry of Defense spokesman Geng Yansheng (¯Õ¶¥Í) on July 30 said China 
was willing to talk about redeploying its missiles aimed at Taiwan under the 
¡§one China¡¨ principle when the two sides discuss the establishment of military 
confidence-building measures.
 
 It was the first official response from Beijing to President Ma Ying-jeou¡¦s 
(°¨^¤E) call to remove missiles aimed at Taiwan if both sides are to begin 
political negotiations.
 
 Following the Chinese defense ministry¡¦s comment, the Ma administration 
skillfully sidestepped the ¡§one China¡¨ principle and focused on the so-called 
¡§1992 consensus.¡¨ The ¡§1992 consensus,¡¨ the administration said, was a consensus 
reached by Taiwan and China in 1992 in which the two sides agreed there was only 
¡§one China,¡¨ while each side had its own interpretation of what that meant.
 
 However, the ¡§1992 consensus¡¨ is a term former National Security Council 
secretary-general Su Chi (Ĭ°_) admitted inventing in 2000 in a bid to describe 
the KMT claim that Taiwan and China had agreed on the existence of ¡§one China,¡¨ 
but with different interpretations.
 
 The Ministry of National Defense said it welcomed China¡¦s redeployment of 
missiles, but emphasized that it did not bear any substantive significance 
militarily because the missiles are mobile.
 
 The ministry also denied a media report on Aug. 2 claiming that it began 
planning the creation of military confidence-building measures with Beijing in 
June and they had proposed that a list of weapons systems targeted for 
withdrawal be submitted in future military-to-military negotiations.
 
 The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) urged China to establish mutual trust by 
renouncing military intimidation against Taiwan. It also called on China to 
review its ¡§Anti-Secession¡¨ Law targeting Taiwan, which it said was impeding the 
development of ties between Taipei and Beijing.
 
 Mainland Affairs Council Minister Lai Shin-yuan (¿à©¯´D), while in the US, urged 
Beijing to abolish ¡§policies and laws¡¨ concerning military deployments 
targeting Taiwan, but fell short of asking Beijing to abolish its 
¡§Anti-Secession¡¨ Law.
 
 She also said the timing and conditions were not ripe for military or political 
negotiations.
 
 Former council secretary-general Chan Chih-hung (¸â§Ó§») said the administration 
was not yet ready for political talks with Beijing.
 
 Chan said he understood some military personnel have been attending academic 
forums to discuss military negotiations with their Chinese counterparts, but 
added that official talks had not yet begun.
 
 Chan said Beijing¡¦s claim that it was willing to talk about military 
redeployment was nothing new, adding that it was a rehash of what Chinese 
President Hu Jintao (JÀAÀÜ) said in ¡§Hu¡¦s Six Points.¡¨
 
 However, the administration seems unable to react to China¡¦s pressure for 
political talks even though Ma urged China to remove its missiles more than two 
years ago when he was campaigning for president.
 
 If the administration is not ready for political negotiations, it would be best 
to delay the process, Chan said.
 
 ¡§The additional cross-strait flights fiasco tells us that it is better for the 
administration to postpone political negotiations, at least until after 2012, 
but I doubt that Beijing can wait until 2012 because they are not certain 
whether Ma will win the re-election,¡¨ he said.
 
 Chang said Beijing might think that if political negotiations cannot bear fruit 
by 2012, they should at least start negotiations so Beijing can exert more 
pressure on the Ma administration over the next two years.
 
 Chan said Ma would not dare publicly endorse the ¡§one China¡¨ policy, but his 
administration could engage China politically via unofficial means or make 
under-the-table deals.
 
 Tung Chen-yuan (µ£®¶·½), a political science professor at National Chengchi 
University¡¦s Graduate Institute of Development Studies and former MAC deputy 
minister, concurred that the administration was not ready to engage in political 
or military talks with Beijing.
 
 ¡§The administration does not have the public consensus on the issue nor any 
mechanism to integrate different opinions,¡¨ he said.
 
 Taiwan must one day address political differences, but until then, the 
administration must figure out how to best protect Taiwan¡¦s interests, Tung 
said.
 
 Public consensus is key to political talks with Beijing, Tung said, adding that 
mutual trust is equally important for both sides to move forward.
 
 Tung said the administration figured that the best tactic at the moment was to 
delay political negotiations because the vague ¡§1992 consensus¡¨ provided the KMT 
a comfort zone. Once it engages in political or military negotiations with 
Beijing, it would be forced to make clear its political position, and it could 
put itself in an unfavorable position when it exposes its definitive stance.
 
 The government would get itself into further trouble if the results of their 
negotiations with China did not satisfy the public, he said.
 
 Therefore, the government¡¦s policy is to focus on economic, cultural and social 
issues, hoping that any economic benefits would score political points and build 
up public confidence in its cross-strait policy, he said.
 
 Beijing has been willing to play along because it thought by doling out economic 
favors it could pressure the KMT to move toward their common ¡§one China¡¨ goal, 
he said.
 
 Tung said Ma was reluctant to admit that his ultimate goal was unification, but 
unification remains the KMT¡¦s intention. The administration also does not want 
to rush the process, but instead wants to see the situation develop gradually. 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), on the other hand, has been clear about its 
goal of ¡§peaceful unification,¡¨ and is eager to see some result, he said.
 
 ¡§The KMT administration and the CCP are actually sleeping in the same bed, but 
sharing very different dreams,¡¨ Tung said. ¡§The KMT seems to want more peace 
than unification, at least in public, while China is interested in not only 
peace, but also unification. So in Beijing¡¦s mind, Taiwan is pushing for 
peaceful independence, not peaceful unification.¡¨
 
 The administration also has a few bargaining chips, Tung said, but Beijing is 
unwavering in its position and clear about its tactic.
 
 When it comes to military negotiation, Beijing likes to link it with the ¡§one 
China¡¨ principle and US arms sales to Taiwan, Tung said.
 
 It is clear that Beijing wants Taipei to accept the ¡§one China¡¨ principle before 
the two sides begin negotiations and that Beijing wants Washington to reduce its 
arms sales to Taiwan.
 
 ¡§If the administration¡¦s only demand at the negotiation table is to ask China to 
remove its missiles, I want to know what the administration is offering in 
return,¡¨ he said.
 
 Chang Jung-feng (±iºaÂ×), director-general of the Taiwan Association for Strategic 
Simulation and former deputy secretary-general of the National Security Council, 
said he was not so concerned about when the administration should begin 
political negotiations with Beijing, but it worried him that the administration 
had no idea what it wants from cross-strait negotiations and he asked whether it 
had any contingency plan should negotiations go awry.
 
 Taking China¡¦s military deployment as an example, Chang said if the two sides 
cannot see eye to eye on whether the issue should be set as a precondition for 
negotiations or a discussion topic, they should not begin negotiations at all.
 
 ¡§The best timing for the administration to engage in any political negotiations 
with Beijing is when it knows what it wants and when it has the ability to get 
it,¡¨ he said.
 
 So, if political negotiations between the two sides are inevitable: Which side 
has the advantage of time?
 
 Chang said time was on the side of the party that works harder to build up its 
strength, Chan said time was on the side of the best prepared, and Tung said 
time was on Taiwan¡¦s side because its democracy has built a stable political and 
social environment, while China is facing many political and social challenges 
and uncertainties.
 
 If Taiwan stands by its democratic institutions, time should be on Taiwan¡¦s 
side, he said, unless some politicians deliberately do something unfavorable to 
hurt Taiwan.
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