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Ma in no rush on political talks
By Liu Shih-chung ¼B¥@©¾
Tuesday, Aug 10, 2010, Page 8
Since the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement (ECFA) with China on June 29, cross-strait relations have entered a
new phase of uncertainty, as Beijing has increased pressure on President Ma
Ying-jeou (°¨^¤E) for negotiations on political issues.
Despite suggestions that China will not rush into political talks with the
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government, Beijing has made a number of
attempts to push forward political negotiations. In his meeting with the former
KMT chairman Wu Po-hsiung (§d§B¶¯) earlier this month, Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
General Secretary and Chinese President Hu Jintao (JÀAÀÜ) defined the signing of
such an agreement as a ¡§political basis for deterring Taiwan independence and
embracing the ¡¥1992 consensus.¡¦¡¨
In addition, a spokesperson for the People¡¦s Liberation Army revealed China
intends to engage in negotiations with Taiwan on withdrawing some of the
missiles deployed in Fujian Province. However, the Chinese have insisted such
negotiations must be conducted on the basis of the ¡§one China¡¨ principle.
Beijing¡¦s goal is clearly to force the Ma administration to ¡§yield political
interests¡¨ to China following Beijing¡¦s ¡§yielding of economic interests¡¨ in the
ECFA negotiations.
The second goal is to define cross-strait relations under the rubric of the ¡§one
China¡¨ principle, so that even the Democratic Progressive Party would find it
difficult to backtrack if it regained the presidency in 2012.
The Ma administration¡¦s reaction to Beijing¡¦s new call for ¡§political
cooperation following economic cooperation¡¨ and ¡§partial withdrawal of its
missiles¡¨ has so far been cautious. Premier Wu Den-yih (§d´°¸q) and Presidential
Office Spokesperson Lo Chih-chiang (ù´¼±j) reiterated the KMT¡¦s long-time policy
of adhering to the ¡§1992 consensus,¡¨ without directly challenging Beijing¡¦s ¡§one
China¡¨ principle. Ma prefered to highlight the news that Taiwan and Singapore
are to explore the possibility of signing an economic cooperation agreement
under the WTO framework.
At the same time, in her speech to the American Enterprise Institute in
Washington, Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan (¿à©¯´D) identified
China¡¦s military threats against Taiwan and its unwillingness to renounce its
¡§Anti-Secession¡¨ Law as two major obstacles to better cross-strait relations.
If Lai¡¦s statements were made with Ma¡¦s approval, they sent a clear message to
Beijing that the KMT government, is keen to stick to the current policy of
¡§putting economics first and politics later¡¨ and deal with ¡§easier issues first
and harder issues later.¡¨
This strategy aims to downplay Chinese pressure and therefore avoid giving the
pan-green camp additional ammunition for the special municipality elections.
That explains why Ma unveiled his government¡¦s plan to ¡§start¡¨ negotiations with
the Singaporean government on an ¡§economic cooperation agreement¡¨ under the WTO
framework. Despite having no set date or concrete content, the agreement would
have definite symbolic benefits. Ma¡¦s strategy is to boost his popularity by
forging a pact akin to a free-trade agreement (FTA) with non-diplomatic allies,
making good on an earlier pledge he made that Taiwan¡¦s chances of completing
FTAs with other countries would improve after signing the ECFA.
Given such calculations, it is unlikely that Ma will start political talks with
his Chinese counterparts in the near future.
The next step depends on the November elections. If the KMT wins, Ma will have
greater leeway to use cross-strait relations as part of his bid for
re-election, starting next spring. The KMT and the CCP could also work to
generate public support for political talks on a peace agreement, military
confidence-building mechanisms and even a potential Ma-Hu meeting at the APEC
summit in Hawaii in November next year.
If the KMT were to lose badly in the special municipality elections, Ma would
slow down his cross-strait policy and focus on consolidating the sovereignty of
the Republic of China through next year¡¦s centennial celebrations.
How would China react to Ma¡¦s go-slow on political talks? Beijing would of
course suspect that Ma could be a ¡§peaceful separatist.¡¨ Whether China will
obstruct the proposed negotiations between Taiwan and Singapore on an economic
cooperation agreement remains uncertain, but it is clear that we need to watch
carefully the title, content and process of the negotiations.
Liu Shih-chung is a senior research fellow at the Taipei-based
Taiwan Brain Trust.
Editor¡¦s note: The ¡§1992 consensus¡¨ is a term former National Security Council
secretary-general Su Chi admitted inventing in 2000 in a bid to describe the KMT
claim that Taiwan and China had agreed on the existence of ¡§one China,¡¨ but with
different interpretations.
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