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Does Taiwan need nuclear weapons? 
 
Tuesday, Sep 14, 2010, Page 8 
The recent publication of a memoir by former US negotiator 
Jeremy Stone re-ignited a controversy last week over alleged plans under former 
president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) to launch a nuclear weapons program. 
 
Stone’s allegations, which ostensibly were sourced from and corroborated post 
facto by former National Security Council secretary-general Su Chi (蘇起) — who at 
the time the controversy emerged was a Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) 
legislator — are hard to substantiate. That the Chen administration, for all its 
faults, would have engaged in nuclear adventurism stretches credulity. Though it 
has the technical know-how to do so (and inside sources say a turnaround could 
take as little as one year), Taiwan could hardly have launched a nuclear weapons 
program without the US, let alone China, becoming aware of it. 
 
One does not have to read Stone’s book too closely to realize that the views of 
the former president of the Federation of American 
Scientists-turned-cross-strait-troubleshooter are wildly skewed in Beijing’s 
favor. Nothing makes this more evident than the many variations he uses to 
portray the Chen administration as a “troublemaker,” which may account for 
Stone’s credulity on the alleged nuclear program. 
 
Unbeknownst to Stone, this very bias against Taipei — not his alone, but that of 
the international community — lies at the very heart of Taiwan’s defense 
malaise. In fact, the inherent imbalance was the main reason behind this 
newspaper’s decision, in August 2004, to publish an editorial that put the 
nuclear option on the table (despite what Su and Stone may believe, however, the 
Taipei Times did not and does not have a direct line to the Presidential Office 
or Democratic Progressive Party headquarters). 
 
More than six years have elapsed and the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait 
has only continued to shift in Beijing’s favor. Furthermore, nuclear-armed China 
continues to threaten Taiwan, the would-be “troublemaker” who at no point under 
Chen adopted anything that could have been interpreted as a belligerent posture. 
 
Given that this situation appears to be a comfortable “status quo” for the likes 
of Stone, is it not conceivable that Taiwanese would ponder various means to 
oppose China militarily and present it with a credible deterrent? In and of 
themselves, peace and democracy will be of little help against an opponent who 
plays by different rules, as highlighted by Beijing’s refusal to renounce the 
use of force against Taiwan amid supposedly warming ties. While nuclear weapons 
may be an extreme recourse — and an unadvisable one at that — Taiwan cannot 
afford the gullibility that has marked the course adopted by President Ma Ying-jeou’s 
(馬英九) administration in cross-strait rapprochement. 
 
While his Cabinet has rightly stuck to less problematic, though by no means 
inconsequential, matters like economics in its dialogue with Beijing, there is 
no doubt that in the months ahead — especially as we get closer to Chinese 
President Hu Jintao’s (胡錦濤) stepping down as head of state — talks will touch on 
more controversial issues such as identity and sovereignty. Once those topics 
are tackled, friction is bound to emerge, which could quickly escalate and spin 
out of control. Any outcome to the 2012 presidential poll in Taiwan that isn’t 
to China’s taste could also serve as a catalyst for a military option. 
 
In such a situation, Beijing, seeing a weakened opponent, could calculate that 
it can get away with the use of force at little cost, making military action 
more likely. 
 
That is why, even amid untested signs of rapprochement, Taiwan must continue to 
acquire and develop not only the means to protect itself, but solid deterrent 
capabilities so that any military adventurism on Beijing’s part to fulfill its 
irredentist dreams would come at great cost. A strong Taiwan means less risk of 
war, not the other way around. 
 
Does Taiwan need nuclear weapons for this? Probably not, but it certainly needs 
more than naivety and Ma sloganeering, and more than the dishonest diplomacy 
exercised by the likes of Stone. 
  
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