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China¡¦s aggression and insecurity
By Jeffrey Wasserstrom
Saturday, Sep 25, 2010, Page 8
China¡¦s government has been using unusually strong language
of late to assert its sovereignty over disputed stretches of international
waters near its shores. This has led to a ratcheting up of tensions, in
particular between China and the US, with US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton stressing that US President Barack Obama¡¦s administration is now ready
to step in and help ensure the fair adjudication of disputes relating to the
South China Sea. Chinese spokesmen denounced this as a throwback to the days
when the US thought it could, and should, try to ¡§contain¡¨ the People¡¦s Republic
of China (PRC).
One way to interpret China¡¦s elevated rhetoric ¡X and its tough response to joint
US-South Korean military maneuvers ¡X is as another indication that Chinese
leaders have grown supremely self-confident and are eager to throw their weight
around. The reality, though, is more complex. A closer look reveals that Chinese
President Hu Jintao¡¦s (JÀAÀÜ) words and deeds are often shaped by a mixture of
insecurity and cockiness and that Chinese officials alternate between playing up
and playing down the country¡¦s rise.
Of course, there are moments when China¡¦s leaders do seem like people who know
that they are succeeding and want others to acknowledge it. Even before the
current diplomatic controversies, China¡¦s leaders were gleefully drawing
attention to how much more effective their stimulus package had been than
Obama¡¦s in countering the negative effects of the financial crisis.
And yet, when news broke last month that China had officially replaced Japan as
the world¡¦s second-largest economy, instead of crowing about surpassing a
longtime rival and having the top spot, held by the US, in its sights, the
government issued statements emphasizing that theirs remains a ¡§poor,
developing¡¨ country.
The self-confident side of the leadership¡¦s split personality is often what
worries China¡¦s neighbors and the US alike. Still, it is important to remember
that there¡¦s a positive aspect to the Chinese Communist Party¡¦s (CCP)
self-confidence. As political scientist Kevin O¡¦Brien has argued, China¡¦s
increased readiness to compromise with some domestic protesters, rather than
treat all forms of collective action as subversive, can be seen as reflecting a
growing sense of security.
Conversely, some of China¡¦s most disturbing moves can be chalked up to
exaggerated feelings of insecurity. Consider the harsh treatment of the gadfly
critic Liu Xiaobao (¼B¾åªi), sentenced to 11 years in prison on trumped-up charges
of ¡§subversion¡¨ for launching an Internet petition drive championing civil
liberties. Would a truly self-confident ruling elite have been so skittish
about his activism?
The confident side of the Chinese leadership¡¦s split personality is easy to
understand. From the late 1980s until 2000, many observers presented the CCP as
being on its last legs, certain to succumb to the ¡§Leninist extinction¡¨ that
began with communism¡¦s collapse in Europe. But the party remains in charge
today. Airport bookstores that once displayed Gordon Chang¡¦s The Coming Collapse
of China now offer Martin Jacques¡¦ When China Rules the World.
Why, then, do China¡¦s rulers continue to backslide into doubt and fear, and why
do they seek to avoid having China labeled a superpower?
For starters, downplaying China¡¦s rise has practical benefits. It helps to be
seen as a ¡§poor, developing¡¨ country, not as an economic giant, because
¡§developed¡¨ nations are expected to do more to combat major global challenges,
like climate change.
At the same time, China really is still a ¡§poor¡¨ country in terms of per capita
income. And parts of the country are more similar to sections of troubled
¡§developing¡¨ countries than to China¡¦s showplace cities.
The CCP is in a vulnerable position ¡X and knows it. That is no excuse for
paranoia and repression, but just because the party has outlasted predictions of
its demise does not mean that it has no Achilles heel. Most notably, the anger
over corruption and nepotism that fueled the Tiananmen protests has never gone
away.
China¡¦s leaders thus continue to depend on a form of nationalism structured
around tales of victimhood. They now base their legitimacy on the notion that
the CCP, which rose to power as the nation fought foreign domination, is
uniquely qualified to keep China from being bullied in a hostile international
arena, and that only they can provide the stable environment needed for growth.
The Chinese leadership¡¦s split personality explains a curious phenomenon that
former US Department of State adviser Susan Shirk noted in her book, China:
Fragile Superpower. When she mentioned the book¡¦s title to American friends,
they wondered why she used the modifier ¡§fragile,¡¨ whereas Chinese friends said
calling their country a ¡§superpower¡¨ was premature.
Shirk¡¦s title still captures a significant phenomenon that bedevils diplomatic
affairs. Outsiders are increasingly convinced that China is a superpower and
that it needs to show that it can be a responsible one. However, China¡¦s rulers
only sometimes embrace the designation ¡X and the CCP still sometimes behaves as
if it had only a tenuous hold on power.
Jeffrey Wasserstrom is a professor of history at the
University of California, Irvine, and editor of The Journal of Asian Studies.
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