ˇ@
Beguiled by Wenˇ¦s missile promise
BY J. MICHAEL COLE
Speculation has been rife in recent months that Washington might reconsider its
policy on arms sales to Taiwan if Beijing agreed to dismantle, or at a minimum
redeploy, the about 1,500 ballistic missiles pointing in Taiwanˇ¦s direction.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (·Ĺ®aÄ_), in New York to attend the UN General Assembly
meeting late last month, added grist to the mill when, asked by reporters for
his thoughts on withdrawing the missiles, he said: ˇ§I believe the issue you
mention will be realized one day.ˇ¨
Coincidentally, little more than a week later experts on Taiwanese and Chinese
security gathered at the conservative Heritage Foundation in Washington to
discuss the feasibility of such a scenario. Though unconventional in itself,
what is particularly worrisome about the meeting is the fact that the fine
points raised by participants could easily be missed, misconstrued, or
conveniently ignored, as appears to be the case.
On paper, the idea of disarmament in the Taiwan Strait is worthy of serious
consideration. However, if not handled carefully, talks on the matter could very
well play into Beijingˇ¦s hands and end up hurting Taiwan.
Here are some of the problems associated with the recent enthusiasm surrounding
the idea of demilitarizing the Taiwan Strait:
For one, there is less to Wenˇ¦s Sept. 22 remarks than meet the eye and nothing
that he said justifies the positive reception they received in the media and
from President Ma Ying-jeouˇ¦s (°¨^¤E) administration. By not providing a timeline
or context to his answer, ˇ§realized one dayˇ¨ could mean just about anything. In
fact, Wen would not be lying if his ˇ§one dayˇ¨ meant the day when Taiwan is
annexed by China, at which point deploying the missiles would be nonsensical.
Other Chinese officials and academics who have discussed the matter have also
done so in general terms, an age-old tactic by Chinese officials that leaves too
much room for interpretation for a problem of this magnitude.
Although a full redeployment ˇX including the ˇ§entire infrastructureˇ¨ of five
missile brigades belonging to the Second Artilleryˇ¦s 52 Base, as the Project
2049 Instituteˇ¦s Mark Stokes, a speaker at the talks and a longtime advocate of
arms sales to Taiwan, proposed at the conference, would represent a measure of
ˇ§goodwillˇ¨ and diminish the immediate threat to Taiwan, such a move would come
with its own set of challenges.
For example, who would monitor the redeployment or dismantling of the missiles?
It is hard to imagine Beijing allowing US military officials to do so, let alone
Taiwanese. The same applies to the possibility of China destroying older
missiles, only to build and deploy more advanced and accurate ones elsewhere.
Second, though a redeployment into the hinterland would give Taiwan more time to
prepare should China at some future point decide to bring the missiles back
within firing range, it nevertheless means that within a matter of weeks, the
status quo could be re-established.
Last ˇX and this author is as guilty as any in making this mistake over the years
ˇX the overemphasis on missiles has obscured the fact that Chinaˇ¦s military
threat to Taiwan is far more substantial and multifaceted. In other words,
neither the threat nor the intent would disappear even if every missile aimed at
Taiwan were removed.
Another problem lies in the asymmetrical nature of the proposed disarmament.
While the measures on the Chinese side would be temporary and could be
overturned, the repercussions of an arms freeze for Taiwan would be much more
far--reaching. Every year that passes without the sale of military equipment to
Taiwan translates into a loss of capabilities relative to China. Furthermore, as
arms sales are drawn-out, even a brief hiatus can result in years of delays in
terms of procurement, transfer and integration, leaving gaping holes in the
maintenance of a credible deterrent force, with no possibility of a quick fix.
Stokes has always emphasized that promises, such as those made by Wen, are not
good enough and that a missile withdrawal should be real, with substantive
movement to reduce the threat.
Arms sales, he would remind us, should be judged based on the ˇ§actualˇ¨ threat to
Taiwan as per the guiding premise behind the 1982 Joint Communique, not about
what Beijing ˇ§couldˇ¨ do for us in North Korea or the economy, for example. In
other words, the threat reduction must be real, verifiable and permanent and
arms sales to Taiwan be predicated on the threat level.
The really troubling part is that a number of US officials, academics and media
appear to be naive enough to buy into Chinese hints of a redeployment, without
all the inconvenient caveats mentioned by more knowledgeable academics like
Stokes and others. Therein lies the great danger to Taiwan.
There are already rumors that certain groups of individuals (including, we are
told, a wealthy Taiwanese businessman) may have already engaged in talks to
consider the possibility of arms reductions. Without guarantees that those
individuals fully understand the complexity of what they are trying to
accomplish, there is a very real risk that the informed remarks by experts will
be used, exploited and taken out of context to add legitimacy to the half truths
spoken by the likes of Wen.
Should this lead US officials to believe that even the conservative wing of US
academia, individuals and institutions that for decades have advocated
maintaining a strong Taiwanese military, are now proposing the very opposite,
who could accuse the US State Department or the White House of abandoning
Taiwan? Especially at a time when the US government is giving every indication
that it regards the Taiwan question as more of a hindrance to good relations
with China than as the object of principled diplomacy, and large swathes of the
US establishment seem to have given up on the notion of Taiwanese independence,
it is incumbent upon academics that they weigh what they say on the record with
great caution. There is no knowing how their good intentions might be twisted to
facilitate policies that will prove detrimental to 23 million Taiwanese and the
democratic way of life they fought for and cherish.
Stokesˇ¦ well-considered approach to arms reduction is extremely important and
should be memorized by anyone involved in such an endeavor: If Beijing doesnˇ¦t
like US arms sales to Taiwan, it should reduce its military posture.
However, arms reduction is not something that should be negotiated, especially
not behind closed doors. Facts on the ground need to be confirmed, but that is
unlikely as long as Beijing continues to regard its military more as a deterrent
to Taiwanese independence than as an instrument of terror and aggression, as it
appears from a Taiwanese perspective.
J. Michael Cole is deputy news editor at the Taipei Times.
ˇ@
|