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The true cost of peace with China
By Hsu Szu-chien ®}´µ»ü
In the field of international relations, there is a theory called ˇ§domestic
audience cost.ˇ¨ According to this theory, the political leaders of a country
might send out signals to intensify a conflict with an enemy state in the hope
that this will function as a deterrent to the state in question. This is risky,
however, because if they then pull back once conflict intensifies, they run the
risk of disappointing their domestic audience. The cost of that could affect
their political standing.
In democracies, the domestic audience cost is evaluated in regular elections
where voters can punish those leaders that have disappointed them through their
ballots. In authoritarian countries, however, there are no regular elections to
highlight domestic audience cost.
According to the theory, as the risk of conflict intensifies, democratic states
are better than non-democratic states at clearly conveying a credible deterrent.
The domestic audience cost analysis is generally used to explain the domestic
effect encountered by political leaders during ongoing conflicts and their
understanding of the intentions of the leaders of the enemy state.
Simply put, because of the higher degree of transparency in democratic states
there are more effective restraints on the power of political leaders, and this
makes it easier for their opponents to see their intentions.
If the political leaders in a democracy send out signals that will lead to the
intensification of a conflict, those statements will inevitably create a
domestic reaction. That reaction will quickly make the statements of political
leaders self--fulfilling, and as such, must be taken seriously.
By comparison, the domestic audience cost is lower in events aimed at creating
peace. If a leader in a democratic country expresses a wish to create peace with
a belligerent state, but later regrets having done so, some domestic peace
proponents might criticize the leaderˇ¦s moral rectitude, but generally speaking,
the strength of their condemnation might not be as strong as the support from
those who are in favor of a more hawkish stance, particularly if the democratic
state in question is under threat.
How believable is it if a non-democratic state sends out signals that it wants
peace?
Non-democratic states are not transparent and there are no restraints on their
powers. This makes it very likely that people would doubt claims that they are
interested in peace.
To go one step further, if political leaders in an authoritarian state retreat
from a claim that they want peace and instead move in a more hawkish direction,
that creates almost no domestic reaction because in such a state people are more
likely to hold a jingoistic attitude toward the outside world. Peace activists
will find it very difficult to make their voices heard in such a state.
Further, if this non-democratic state is threatening another state, any promise
of peace should be met with even more skepticism. For the leaders of a
non-democratic state, therefore, the domestic audience cost of retreating from a
call for peace will be lower than in a democratic state and lower than if they
step back from a promise to increase the tension in a conflict.
It will also be lower than it would be in a state that is under threat.
This means that a move toward peace by a non-democratic state that is also
threatening another state is the least credible of all.
This theory provides a clear explanation of why Chinese official Jiang Pingˇ¦s
(¦żĄ) statements at the Tokyo Film Festival triggered such a vehement response in
Taiwan so quickly. It also explains why Chinaˇ¦s promises to Taiwan of peace are
always met with suspicion and expectations that it has ulterior motives.
In terms of cross-strait relations, precisely because Taiwan is a democratic
state and China is not, and precisely because Taiwan is under threat, but China
is not, the domestic audience cost for any promise of peace on behalf of China
will be extremely low. This is why it is so difficult for Chinaˇ¦s political
leaders to win the trust of the Taiwanese public no matter how hard they try and
no matter how many concessions they may make in Taiwanˇ¦s favor.
Hsu Szu-chien is an assistant research fellow in the
provisional office of Academia Sinicaˇ¦s Institute of Political Science.
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