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Talks with China demand caution
By Peng Ming-min 彭明敏
In a recent interview with the Associated Press (AP), President Ma Ying-jeou
(馬英九) touched on the subject of potential political dialogue with China, a
sensitive subject that stirred up controversy both in Taiwan and abroad.
Although he was quick to clear up what he considered to be misrepresentations of
what he said, the affair served to focus attention on the issue and raise
several key points.
The first is whether it is possible to separate economics and politics. The
government would have us believe the two are quite distinct. However, it seems
that in modern international relations the situation is so utterly complex and
all aspects — not just economics and politics, but culture and education, too —
are so intimately connected, that the tiniest adjustment in one area is bound to
have a knock-on effect elsewhere.
One cannot claim the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) is a purely
economic agreement, as it touches on Taiwan’s sovereignty and its status in
international law. The idea that economic negotiations come first, with
political talks following, is misleading to all concerned and in fact is steeped
in political significance in and of itself. The director of China’s Taiwan
Affairs Office himself admitted that there was a political element to the
economic talks between China and Taiwan. In other words, the government has
already embarked on the road of political discussions with China.
Second, can China be trusted? Of course each side has its differences, but
diplomacy needs at the very least to be based on mutual trust. China’s political
culture is cut from a different cloth than the internationalized culture of
modern pluralistic societies. Some things just will not fit no matter how hard
you force them, like sticking a square peg in a round hole.
This will become all the more apparent now that China is in the midst of its
economic ascension and on the way to becoming a major economic power. For the
reasons described above, it is sure to create tensions with other countries as
it moves up, for it will seek to do things in ways considered unconventional by
these countries. Even if Beijing does officially sign international treaties,
that does not mean it will abide by them, and it may in fact openly flout them.
China might be rich, but in the eyes of many countries, it has not yet developed
the refinement that attends wealth: It is still “New Money,” the “Vulgar Rich,”
and not yet ready to take up its position as a responsible member of the
international community. Whether or not it will fully implement or honor any
agreement it signs with Taiwan is by no means assured. Such agreements are by
and large meaningless, and certainly suspect.
One must bear in mind that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are masters of the
negotiation table, something that even former president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石)
found out to his peril. It is said that Chiang and former president Chiang
Ching-kuo (蔣經國), his son and successor, would become angry at the mere mention
of them, and the latter actually declared the “three noes” policy: “No contact,
no compromise and no negotiation.”
In other words, Chiang Ching-kuo preferred to keep them at arm’s length. So, it
is into this lions den that Ma and his government venture. Political
negotiations with the acknowledged champions: Lambs to the slaughter.
The third point involves who is to represent Taipe in the negotiations. Given
China’s political culture, there is every possibility that the representative
would turn into a traitor and sell out to Beijing. There is, after all, a
precedent in the delegation led by Zhang Zhizhong (張治中) in the closing years of
the Chinese Civil War. Zhang’s delegation traveled to Beijing to negotiate on
behalf of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government with the CCP and the
whole delegation ended up going over to the other side. The Nationalists became
a laughing stock, at home and abroad.
Contrasting this is the example of former US president Richard Nixon. The reason
he was able to do something no other US president had done, to talk to the CCP,
was that the US public was confident Nixon himself was vehemently anti-communist
and knew that he would in no way sell the US out. The US public knew he would
make utterly sure US interests were protected and they were consequently willing
to accept any agreement he signed with Beijing.
By the same token, when it becomes necessary to enter into talks with Beijing,
it is important that the person or persons negotiating on Taiwan’s behalf are
fully behind Taiwan. They must genuinely have its best interests at heart and be
prepared to be firm in protecting the fundamental values and interests of all
Taiwanese; ideals such as democracy, freedom, human rights and the right to
self-determination.
If the other side proposes anything unreasonable, Taiwan’s representative must
have the courage to walk away from the table. Only someone with these qualities
can go to the table with the support and blessing of Taiwanese and without this
it would be difficult for them to sell the results of the negotiations.
On the other hand, if the negotiator for the Taiwanese side has strong
affiliations with, and empathy for, China, and supports the proposition of
eventual unification, then the talks are doomed to fail. How could one honestly
expect such a person to look out for the fundamental values of Taiwanese? It is
almost certain such a representative would be coming back with a craftily-worded
document amounting to little more than a complete sell-out. Taiwanese aren’t
going to buy that. One shudders at the thought of the chaos and social unrest
that would ensue.
Finally, how are these diplomatic talks to be perceived in Taiwan? There is a
misconception within this country regarding the nature of international
negotiations and this is particularly true of the media. This is reflected in
the belief that if negotiators come away from talks empty-handed, without a
signed agreement, then they have “failed.”
There is the perception that Taiwan’s negotiators have been incompetent or that
they did not perform their duties adequately, and they will encounter criticism
at home for their pains. This is the wrong approach. Negotiations involve
bargaining with the other party, accepting anything within the national interest
and refusing anything that isn’t. If the negotiators stick to their guns and
preserve their nation’s interests, standing firm when needed, and come away
without an agreement as a result, this should be considered a success, not a
failure, and as such should be rewarded.
The pressure born of this kind of misconception — and again, the media is
particularly implicated in this — can mean the negotiators compromise where they
shouldn’t simply to make sure they walk away with an agreement, however shoddy.
It makes no sense at all to expect the negotiator to close a deal within a
certain time limit.
The CCP and the US eyed each other with suspicion from the time the former took
power in China in 1949. After a succession of problems between the two
countries, they finally got around to sitting down to ambassadorial-level talks
in 1955, first in Geneva and later in Warsaw.
The on-and-off negotiations continued all the way until 1970, a 15-year period
in which the two sides met a total of 136 times. Beijing also had complex,
extended negotiations with other countries, leading to its taking over the UN
China seat from the Republic of China on Taiwan in 1971. It wasn’t until 1979
that the US and China established official diplomatic relations, a full 30 years
after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.
Clearly, diplomatic negotiations with Beijing have been a lengthy, drawn-out
process demanding patience, resolve and persistence. Taiwan’s relationship with
China is no less complicated than the latter’s with the US. There are two kinds
of people who would imagine that political talks with Beijing are to be easy:
the naive and those who have been brow-beaten, sweet-talked or otherwise cajoled
into buying Beijing’s line.
Peng Ming-min is a former presidential adviser.
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