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Beijing’s failed policy on Taiwan
By Tung Chen-yuan 童振源
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林)
recently said in Beijing that cross-strait relations must be based on the
so-called “1992 consensus,” and stressed China’s objection to Taiwanese
independence. He even issued a threat, saying that without this “consensus,” the
two sides would not have this current peaceful development.
Chen made the statement in the face of continuing conflict between the Chinese
Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) over the
existence of such a consensus. Obviously Chen has not learned from China’s past
policy mistakes on Taiwan. The long-debated issue on the consensus also
highlights the problems of President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) cross-strait policy.
The Chinese government has become more flexible and pragmatic in addressing the
Taiwan issue after years of monitoring democratic developments and public
opinion in Taiwan. These changes are based on lessons learned from the past
failures of Chinese policy on Taiwan. From 1995 to 1996, Beijing tried to stop
then-president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) being re-elected, but Lee won by a landslide
despite Chinese intimidation and saber-rattling. In 2000, China issued a white
paper on its Taiwan policy, saying it would not rule out the use of military
force if Taiwan refused to talk about peaceful reunification. But with the US
voicing its objection to a military solution, China did not dare mention the
issue again.
Also in 2000, China warned Taiwan of cross-strait conflict if the DPP’s Chen
Shui-bian (陳水扁) were elected president. Chen was elected, but war did not break
out. What’s more, although China had said it would only agree to restart
cross-strait dialogue if Taiwan accepts the “one China” principle, it changed
its stance after Chen took office, saying that cross-strait economic issues did
not have to be predicated on the “one China” principle, leading to the
establishment of the “small three links” and the first lunar New Year charter
flights.
China kept a very low profile during the presidential election in 2004 for fear
of agitating Taiwanese voters. Still, it issued a statement afterwards that war
could break out if Chen continued to move toward Taiwanese independence, and
that only if Taiwan accepted the “one China” principle could cross-strait peace
be maintained. But again, although Chen was re-elected, there was no war.
Instead, Taipei and Beijing began negotiations and reached a second agreement on
Lunar New Year charter flights and four other charter flight agreements. The two
sides also engaged in eight rounds of talks on allowing Chinese tourists to
visit Taiwan, passenger and cargo charter flights, as well as two months of
intense talks about bringing the Olympic flame to Taiwan.
Having learned from its mistakes, China adopted the ambiguous position that each
side has its own interpretation of the “1992 consensus” to initiate cross-strait
talks and exchanges with Ma after he became president. But contrary to the KMT
government’s interpretation of the “1992 consensus” as signifying that there are
two Chinas, the Chinese government says the consensus means both sides adhere to
the “one China” principle. While China does not reject the KMT version that
there is “one China, with each side having its own interpretation,” it has
repeatedly stressed the importance of mutual political trust — meaning the KMT
must object to Taiwanese independence and must accept the “one China” principle.
The KMT government currently only talks about the Republic of China (ROC) in
Taiwan, but dare not mention it in China or in the presence of Chinese
officials. This just goes to show that it can never enforce the “two China”
policy, nor can it apply for admission to the UN or any other international
organization under the name ROC. Even if Taiwan wants to participate in an
international organization or event as an observer, it has to go through
cross-strait negotiations to obtain China’s approval, thus showing China’s
suzerainty over Taiwan.
Whenever China voices its opposition to Taiwanese independence, Ma from time to
time stresses its de-facto independence. In his New Year’s speech, Ma reiterated
that Taiwan’s future must be determined by Taiwanese. When China says the “1992
consensus” refers to the fact that there is only one China, Ma says the
consensus means there is “one China, with each side having its own
interpretation.” Clearly, Chen Yunlin’s talk about abandoning and opposing
Taiwanese independence and accepting the “one China” principle wasn’t only a
threat against the DPP, but also a warning to the KMT.
Apparently Chen Yunlin has learned nothing from Beijing’s mistakes. His
provocative remarks pose yet another challenge to cross-strait peace and
Taiwanese democracy. The foundation for cross-strait relations is fragile and
superficial — built on China’s one-sided prerequisites and actions. Only if
China gains a deeper understanding of Taiwanese public opinion and democracy and
only if it is willing to resolve cross-strait conflict based on democracy, peace
and equality can there be real and lasting peace and development across the
Taiwan Strait.
Tung Chen-yuan is a professor at National Chengchi
University’s Graduate Institute of Development Studies.
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