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Updating the US’ policy on Taiwan
By Richard Zalski
During the previous decade Chinese authorities were apparently extremely unhappy
with then-president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). In mid-2005 then--Chinese Nationalist
Party (KMT) chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and then a month later People First Party
Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) visited China.
Itineraries were designed to highlight the common historical bonds between the
Chinese Communist Party (CPP) and the KMT. The voyage was meant to be symbolic,
rather than a political strategy. Lien’s visit was already planned a year
earlier when Lien was expected to win the presidential election.
However, Lien failed for the second time and Chen was re-elected. Lien, who made
his career through KMT nominations, still went to meet the Chinese leaders,
although without much leverage and only a few weeks after Beijing’s adoption of
its hostile “Anti-Secession” Law (allowing China to attack Taiwan should it move
toward formal independence). One of the common goals of the CCP and KMT was to
isolate Chen to undermine his position and pro-independence politics.
The visit’s immediate fallout for the KMT was evident in opinion polls, which
swung favorably toward Lien’s conciliatory gesture. However, there were no major
results for Taiwan — like dropping the “one China” precondition for cross-strait
negotiations, renouncing the use of force against Taiwan, etc.
Even worse, as Sha Zukang (沙祖康), the outspoken former Chinese ambassador to the
UN Office at Geneva and the current head of the UN Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, said: “Taiwan is a Chinese province. Ask chairman Lien and
chairman Soong, and they will tell you the same thing.”
In terms of concrete political gains for Taiwan, Lien and Soong’s 2005 visits
were dead on arrival. Neither visit seemed to narrow the political division
(although it might have recently earned Lien Beijing’s “Confucius Peace Prize”).
The missile buildup and international isolation of Taiwan pursued by the Chinese
authorities continued. This lack of goodwill might have shown the KMT a few
years ago what was obvious to many observers — that too conciliatory politics
across the Taiwan Strait is a dead-end street for Taiwan.
The visits’ long-term aftermath was still being felt when President Ma Ying-jeou
(馬英九) was elected in May 2008. During his campaign, Ma promised to promote
economic cooperation with China, which after the election became largely a
political agenda. Ma’s diplomacy has been conducted beyond the supervision of
democratic institutions. Ma’s all-out engagement and anti-sovereignty policy,
which bypasses the government and official institutions, enjoys the support of a
shrinking percentage of the populace.
Two years after Ma assumed the presidency, voters gave him a red card in last
November’s five special municipality elections. This was partly because of Ma’s
unpopular cross-strait policy and it leaves Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) on the rise.
What does all this mean for US President Barack Obama’s administration? How can
the US profit from the recent developments? Now is a good time to change
Washington’s outdated policy on Taiwan, which is based on three decades-old
communiques that originate during the height of the Cold War. This approach
satisfies neither Washington, Taipei nor Beijing.
Since neither Chen’s nor Ma’s approach worked, some limited US correction would
help. The Obama administration might do it the Chinese way and reach out to the
DPP to initiate a dialogue by inviting high-ranking DPP members, preferably Tsai
and her advisors, to Washington and receiving them in government buildings. Also
let the DPP members meet with the Taiwanese community in the US and speak to the
US media and public to show that there is an alternative to what Beijing claims
about Taiwan.
This policy should be accompanied by White House and Department of State or
Department of Defense officials traveling to Taipei. There have been frequent
calls for such actions. In addition to passing the Murkowski amendment to the
Taiwan Relations Act in 1994, the US Congress also adopted conference report PL
103-326, which suggested promoting visits of high-ranking US officials to
Taiwan, as well as the Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.
Four years ago the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa, Global
Human Rights and International Operations approved an amendment in the 2006-2007
National Defense Authorization Act to allow the legitimately elected leader of
Taiwan to visit the US without restrictions. It stated that direct contact with
Taiwan’s legitimate leaders, such as the president, vice president, foreign
minister and defense minister, would be beneficial to US interests.
Despite this, a democratically elected president of Taiwan is currently unable
to visit senior US officials in Washington and respected Tibetan Buddhist
leaders have problems doing so. However, CCP general secretaries are able to
visit the White House.
To seriously affect and improve cross-strait negotiations, the move on
Washington’s part has to be bold. Why? Because this engagement only has
advantages.
With regard to the Asia-Pacific, it would demonstrate the US’ disapproval of
China’s belligerent politics toward its neighbors and provide evidence to US
allies in Asia of the US’ commitment to the region. Also, in contrast to its
disastrous Middle-Eastern engagement, it would prove that unlike China, the US
has real soft power to offer. Finally, in relation to Taiwan, apart from the
aforementioned update to the antiquated policy of strategic ambiguity, the US
would demonstrate its understanding of the trends in Taiwanese politics and the
emergence of Taiwan’s unique identity.
Implementation and execution of this policy should not be conducted with China
experts, who are often heavily involved in business and consultation with US
companies in China, but with Taiwan experts.
A first step might be helping Taiwan join peace-keeping and other activities —
multilateral discussions where statehood is not required for membership.
This change would also send a very strong signal to the KMT that in addition to
Taiwanese voters, Taiwan’s primary strategic ally does not accept surrendering a
democratic success story to an authoritarian regime.
And once the DPP is in power, US backing would help it negotiate with CCP
authorities and also lead to free-trade agreements with other countries.
Moreover, it would show Beijing that Washington expects it to follow Taiwan’s
example, not the other way around. This approach might also be stressed by not
referring to cross-strait politics as “the Taiwan problem,” but as “the Taiwan
opportunity.”
It is to be expected that Beijing would respond to such action with fury. The
important thing would be for Taiwan and the US not to apologize, compromise or
be sorry in any way for doing the right thing. The CCP understands and respects
all too well a strong and self-confident attitude.
The solution here is — when CCP officials complain and threaten US authorities —
to direct Beijing to Taiwanese officials and let both sides talk and discuss the
issues. With US backing, this would be much easier for the DPP and the KMT.
Richard Zalski lives in Taipei and is a doctoral candidate at
the Polish Academy of Sciences.
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