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‘Resolute defense’ in the face of
China’s rise
By Huang Hua-hsi 黃華璽
Attack is the best means of defense. As such, “effective deterrence” is a much
less costly and more effective policy than “resolute defense.”
When the Ministry of National Defense held a missile exercise on Jan. 18, it
acknowledged that a single surface-to-air missile has a 70 to 80 percent chance
of hitting its target, so anti-missile engagements would mostly involve firing
two defense missiles from either one or two launchers. That means, to defend
ourselves against an incoming missile, we have to fire at least two
surface-to-air missiles, with each costing more than a surface-to-surface
missile. In last month’s exercise, the interception rate was just 73 percent —
just above the minimum that the military considers acceptable. This is the
Achilles’ heel of President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) “resolute defense” policy.
Since the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was voted back in power in 2008, the
Ma government has followed a very different defense policy to that of his
predecessor, Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). Whereas Chen’s defense strategy stressed
“effective deterrence and resolute defense,” Ma has reversed the emphasis with
its policy of “resolute defense and effective deterrence.”
While Taiwan has shifted its focus to a defensive strategy, China continues to
modernize its People’s Liberation Army (PLA), with double-digit annual growth in
defense spending for most of the past decade. Can “resolute defense” maintain
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait in the face of the most concentrated
missile threat in the world?
In September 2004, then--premier Yu Shyi-kun (游錫堃) said: “If you hit Taipei and
Kaohsiung, then we should be able to strike Shanghai in return.”
His words expressed the core spirit of the Chen administration’s “effective
deterrence and resolute defense” policy. As long as others did not attack us, we
would not attack them, but if someone attacked us, we would definitely strike
back. Taiwan would not be the first to use offensive weapons, but if Taiwan were
to suffer a first strike by the PLA, our armed forces could consider using
offensive weapons to make a tactical counterstrike against key political,
economic or military targets in China. The crux of this strategy was to keep the
peace through effective deterrence centered on a counterstrike capability, so
that China knew that it would suffer heavy losses, outweighing its gains, in the
event of war. Based on a rational assessment, China would then drop any plan it
might have to use military force against Taiwan.
However, Ma has replaced this defense policy with one aimed at building a
rock-solid defense force that cannot be intimidated or broken. In September
2008, the Ministry of Defense announced that it would not seek to improve the
range and accuracy of the Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missile that had been developed
under the Chen administration and that its deterrence capability would be aimed
at military targets in China, not cities. This change shows how keen Ma is to
bring about a cross-strait detente, achieve breakthroughs in economic
cooperation, build mutual trust in military affairs and possibly sign a peace
agreement.
Ma also wants to signal to the US that Taiwan is not a “troublemaker” and would
avoid worrying the US by developing a counterstrike capability. In an interview
with CNN in May, Ma said: “We will never ask the Americans to fight for Taiwan.”
So the Ma administration has scrapped its own military strengths and prefers to
huddle down and take whatever blows may come. Ma has gone so far as to renounce
the possibility of Taiwan’s most important ally coming to its aid militarily. It
looks as though Ma’s China-friendly “resolute defense” strategy is really the
biggest worry for Taiwan’s national security.
Huang Hua-hsi is a legislative assistant.
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