|
¡@
Dangerous diplomatic precedent set
The Philippine government¡¦s decision last week to abide by a request from
Beijing and extradite 14 Taiwanese to China ¡X despite a request by Taipei not to
do so ¡X is a situation that President Ma Ying-jeou¡¦s (°¨^¤E) administration will
have to handle with care.
The precedent set by Manila is a clear example of the difficult environment
Taiwan continues to navigate despite improving relations across the Taiwan
Strait. It highlights yet again the willingness of regional states beholden to
Chinese money to toe the line on Beijing¡¦s ¡§one China¡¨ policy.
Prior to last week, pressure by Beijing ¡X even when cross-strait relations were
more strained ¡X tended to be limited to symbolic matters, such as the name under
which Taiwanese delegations attend artistic events. In more extreme cases it has
resulted in the blocking of a Taiwanese trade office in Phnom Penh or the
prevention of Taiwan from participating in regional organizations or UN
agencies.
As the Chinese economy continues to grow and the region becomes increasingly
attached to China, such behavior by third countries will likely become more
frequent.
The forced deportation to China of the 14 Taiwanese takes us into completely new
territory, where an increasingly confident China now believes it has
extrajudicial rights over Taiwan.
The illegality of extrajudicial deportations aside, this case opens the gates
into the slippery world of Chinese jurisprudence, where the definition of what
constitutes a crime is often creatively determined by the authoritarian system
in which it operates.
Even as Taiwanese law enforcement agencies strike agreements with their Chinese
counterparts on joint crime-fighting efforts, Taipei readily admits, as it did
in August last year when Chinese Vice Minister of Public Security Chen Zhimin
(³¯´¼±Ó) secretly visited Taiwan, to substantial differences in the use of legal
terminology between the two countries. The gaps were wide enough that Taipei
felt it necessary to add caveats to a tacit agreement signed during Chen¡¦s visit
on religious and political persecution.
However, not all countries cooperating with Beijing in law enforcement efforts
may be as careful in ensuring the rights of individuals targeted by China¡¦s vast
security apparatus.
The case of Huseyin Celil, a Uighur and Canadian citizen, is a case in point.
Celil, who grew up in China and obtained political asylum in Canada in 2001, was
arrested by Uzbek authorities while visiting his wife¡¦s family in 2006, and then
deported to China, where he was sentenced to life in prison for ¡§separating
China and ... organizing, leading and participating in terrorist groups.¡¨
Given all this, it is not impossible that, at some point, Taiwanese who are
active in supporting Taiwanese independence ¡X seeking to ¡§separate China,¡¨ as
Celil allegedly did ¡X could be arrested somewhere and deported to China, where
the judicial system, which serves the Chinese Communist Party more than it does
the state, would be heavily stacked against them.
Not only could Taiwanese who did not break any law other than those conjured up
by the authoritarian regime in Beijing face the threat of arrest and deportation
within the region, but once deported they would be swallowed whole by a system
that time and again has shown its willingness to rely on the harshest of
interrogation techniques to break inmates and extract whatever ¡§confession¡¨ is
sought by state prosecutors.
Last week, a very dangerous precedent was established, and the Ma administration
must immediately set red lines and seek the prompt return to Taiwan of its
citizens. Any failure on this front would be an invitation for Beijing to ante
up its so-called extraterritorial rights and launch its own program of
extraordinary rendition.
¡@
|
