¡@
Keeping close track of Chinese
investments
By Huang Tien-lin ¶À¤ÑÅï
Chinese investment is not only a Taiwanese concern. In the US, Chinese
telecommunications giant Huawei ran into difficulties with the US Committee on
Foreign Investment last May as it tried to acquire US-based technology firm
3Leaf Systems. There are also rumors that Huawei¡¦s cooperation with Amerilink
Telecom will come to an end.
Is the administration of US President Barrack Obama also narrow-minded and
pursuing an isolationist policy? No, the senators opposing these Chinese
investments are not introducing a new era of McCarthyism: They are speaking up
based on national security concerns and a sense of social responsibility.
Is there a relationship between Chinese investments and US national security?
Yes, of course, because China is a potential threat to the US. By contrast,
China is a current and ongoing threat to Taiwan¡¦s security.
In other words, there is no question of whether Chinese investments should be
controlled. They should be. Australia and Canada, two countries with a free
investment environment, have rejected several Chinese investment projects over
the past two years. Even Taiwan¡¦s strongly pro-China newspaper the Economic
Daily News has argued for the legitimacy of strictly managing Chinese
investments. The problem lies in deciding which investment projects should be
defined as Chinese investments.
If Chinese investments were to be defined as capital controlled by Chinese
authorities, as the Chinese-language China Times said in its Feb. 10 editorial,
or only as investments where Chinese capital exceeds 30 percent as the
Chinese-language Want Daily said in its Feb. 11 editorial, then any investment
review by Taiwanese authorities would be useless from a national security
perspective. Instead, such reviews would become a ruse to cover up illegal
investments by providing a thin veil of legality.
The crux of the problem is not who holds the investments, but the degree to
which a foreign power can influence them. Chinese investment should be defined
as any investment over which the Chinese government can exert official control,
irrespective of the nationality of the source of investment ¡X meaning it could
be Chinese, Taiwanese or any nationality.
The state should keep tabs on investments in industries deemed to be of
strategic importance to Taiwan. It needs to know whether the people who own
these investments will be able to make decisions at crucial moments that might
compromise national security. This is the thing that concerns us and which our
government, as a national instrument, needs to be aware of to be able to
safeguard national interests.
Taiwanese businesses don¡¦t need to be overly concerned about being labeled as
pro--communist, so long as they maintain the majority ¡X more than 50 percent ¡X
of their business activities and capital in Taiwan or any other democratic
country in the world. They might even earn a certain amount of kudos for doing
so. Who would call companies like Formosa Plastics Corp or Taiwan Semiconductor
Manufacturing Co pro-communist?
It is the other side of the coin that Taiwanese investors should think carefully
about. Say a Taiwanese company moves lock, stock and barrel over to China to
take advantage of the benefits such a move entails. They make a success of it
and decide to expand their operations by investing back in Taiwan. They will
find themselves still subject to directives from Beijing. Should their
investments be regarded as Taiwanese or Chinese?
If we needed any reminder of how China is already infiltrating Taiwanese
society, we need look no further than the espionage scandal involving Major
General Lo Hsien-che (ù½åõ). It pays to be vigilant.
Huang Tien-lin is a former national policy adviser.
¡@
|