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How US can avoid war with China
By Alexander Young
George Washington University professor Charles Glaser wrote in the recent issue
of Foreign Affairs that, because a crisis over Taiwan can easily escalate to a
war, the US should consider making concessions to China, backing away from its
commitment to Taiwan. His views may be questioned on several bases:
The first involves a foreign policy theory question. According to Glaser¡¦s
nuanced realism, China¡¦s rise needs not be dangerous, because the outcome of
China¡¦s rise will depend less on the pressures generated by the international
system than how well US and Chinese leaders manage the situation.
Glaser minimizes the pressures of the international system, but the recent
changes in Chinese foreign policy from former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping¡¦s
(¾H¤p¥) low-posture ¡§hide brightness, cherish obscurity¡¨ dictum and Chinese
President Hu Jintao¡¦s (JÀAÀÜ) earlier ¡§peaceful rise¡¨ line to a more assertive
stance represent China¡¦s response to a shift in the international system,
namely, China¡¦s rapid rise to a continental and sea power and the US¡¦ relative
decline. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates¡¦ report to Congress last year
agrees, citing Chinese leaders¡¦ view that the initial decades of the 21st
century are a ¡§strategic window of opportunity,¡¨ for China¡¦s rise to regional
pre-eminence and global influence.
Second, Glaser¡¦s grasp of China¡¦s status and goals is questionable. Many
specialists consider China an ¡§anti-status quo,¡¨ not a ¡§status quo,¡¨ state.
-However, Glaser writes that ¡§while the Soviet Union during the Cold War was a
highly revisionist state bent on radically overturning the status quo ... there
is no evidence suggesting that China has such ambitious goals.¡¨
He shows little understanding of China¡¦s self-confidence and rising nationalism,
passionately bent on ridding the century-old history of shame of being turned
into a semi-colony and intent on reviving the glory of imperial China¡¦s
hierarchical world order in which China ruled the tributary countries by
military power, cultural attractions, and economic and diplomatic manipulations.
Glaser¡¦s view that ¡§the US should not rush to impute China¡¦s conventional and
nuclear buildups malign motives and should be sensitive to the possibility that
they simply reflect China¡¦s desire for security¡¨ is also naive.
Third, China may not oppose Glaser¡¦s assertion that Taiwan is the US¡¦ secondary
interest, but will vehemently dispute him if he described Taiwan as China¡¦s
secondary interest. Despite Taiwan¡¦s undetermined status, China has long claimed
Taiwan as its core interest. As far back as 2002, a Naval Research Institute
director stressed Taiwan¡¦s strategic importance. Without Taiwan, he stated,
enemies could blockade China inside the first island chain (Japan to Taiwan,
Philippines, Borneo and back north to Thailand), attack China and prevent it
from exiting to the Pacific Ocean.
Control of Taiwan would allow China to break the blockade, extend its defense
line to the second island chain (from Japan¡¦s northern territories, south to the
Mariana Islands in Micronesia and New Guinea) and allow a -growing blue-water
People¡¦s Liberation Army Navy to project its power way out to the mid-Pacific.
Japanese and US experts agree Beijing¡¦s control of Taiwan would turn seas
stretching between the East China and South China seas into Beijing¡¦s inland
lake.
At China¡¦s recent National People¡¦s Congress meeting, military delegates called
for a national maritime strategy to defend China¡¦s territorial integrity and
expand its maritime interests, with Taiwan as ¡§the core interest¡¨ of China¡¦s
maritime security.
Fourth, concessions to China would cost the US dearly, signifying surrender not
only of Taiwan but the US itself, sacrificing 23 million Taiwanese, who are for
coexistence with China yet prefer establishing their own free and democratic
country. It would result in Beijing¡¦s contempt for Washington as well as the
loss of the US¡¦ idealistic foreign policy tradition. The US would lose its
credibility and global standing and hasten Asian countries¡¦ climb onto the
Chinese bandwagon.
Fifth, there is a better way to avoid war with China. One is a realistic grasp
of Beijing¡¦s US policy and methods. Officially, China seeks good relations with
the US, but it can hardly hide its growing -ambition.
War, however, will not be Beijing¡¦s method. China will resort to using its
expanding comprehensive national power. As Major General Luo Yuan (ù´©) stated
recently: ¡§China¡¦s retaliation against US arms sale to Taiwan should not be
restricted to military matters, but should cover politics, military affairs,
diplomacy and economics.¡¨
Twenty-first century China is practicing Sun Tzu¡¦s (®]¤l) Art of War of 2,500
years ago, namely: ¡§To win 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of
skill,¡¨ but ¡§to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill,¡¨ ie,
using deception, dividing the enemy, encircling and attacking when
overwhelmingly superior but evading when weak, taking the enemy¡¦s country whole
and intact instead of destruction.
The second method is maintaining peace with China through the balance of power
by hard and soft US power, as ¡§China¡¦s long-term comprehensive transformation of
its military forces is improving its capacity for force projection and
anti-access and area denial,¡¨ according to Gates¡¦ report. The US should
strengthen its military capability and alliances, and demonstrate its will and
ability to maintain peace and security in the Asia-Pacific.
The US must revive its manufacturing industry, increase employment, cut its
unsustainable national debt (over US$14 trillion as of last month), trim the
enormous debt to mercantilist China (US$1.16 trillion at the end of last year,
according to the US Department of Treasury, but about US$2 trillion by Federal
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke¡¦s estimate), which endangers the US economy and
increases Beijing¡¦s ability to dictate US policy.
The US should expand its soft power by strengthening its idealistic foreign
policy tradition of what US President Barack Obama has called universal human
values, namely, liberty, democracy, human rights and US credibility.
Alexander Young is a professor emeritus of international
relations at the State University of New York.
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