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EDITORIAL: Can Tsai
win the election?
As the dust finally settled around the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) presidential nominations last month, the
fight between President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen
(蔡英文) has begun.
Polls conducted by media outlets on April 27, the day the nominations were
officially announced, showed Tsai entering the race with an advantage over Ma.
With Ma long struggling in the polls, many think Tsai stands a good chance of
becoming Taiwan’s first female president.
The KMT government has committed a wide range of bureaucratic blunders and
policy missteps that have been widely criticized. Ma’s management style has also
been critiqued for being authoritarian and opaque. More importantly, despite
persistent crowing about economic numbers, few Taiwanese have felt the economic
recovery where it counts. Unemployment is still high and salaries remain
stagnant. Ma’s cross-strait policy worries many who fear the repercussions of
potential political negotiations with Beijing.
With these factors and Ma’s low popularity levels, Tsai could theoretically take
the January poll.
However, the better question may not be whether Tsai can win, but is she capable
of doing so?
Considered an “atypical” politician, the 55-year-old London School of Economics
graduate has led the DPP to a string of successes since September 2009, when the
party won a legislative by-election in Yunlin for its first electoral victory
since Tsai became its leader. Her mellow temperament and practical approach has
won over many moderates who were turned off by the nationalistic fear-mongering
of former DPP president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁).
Yet, personal appeal is not enough. Nor can the DPP rely on government blunders
and economic hardship to drive voters into its fold. Ma’s policies may be
worrying, but no one wants to relive the tensions of the Chen era. Indeed, one
realistic analysis says that to win re-election, Ma needs only to minimize KMT
mistakes and continue painting the DPP as a bunch of divided troublemakers bent
on holding the nation hostage to a hopeless cross-strait policy.
Circumstances, therefore, will not decide the presidency; Tsai will have to earn
it.
Above all, this requires that she and the party act decisively to limit
vulnerability to KMT attacks. Thanks to former premier Su Tseng-chang’s (蘇貞昌)
gracious concession after losing the DPP primary, the potential for party
disunity has been blunted. Commentators have also played up the virtues of
internal debate within the DPP as more democratic and less prone to error than
the KMT’s top-down approach.
DPP inexperience in governing is also open to criticism and this will only
increase now that political neophyte Tsai is the candidate. Here too, the party
has moved to pre-empt attacks, including on Tsai’s thin political resume, with
advocates pointing out that as a new face she carries little political baggage
and that she has balanced her inexperience with a strong support staff. By
instituting a “10-year policy platform,” Tsai has also sought to give the DPP
greater breadth as a potential ruling party.
The need for a wider policy platform, however, infers the elephant in the room —
Tsai’s China policy — which is her greatest liability given that her party
identifies with Taiwan independence. This, more than anything, will determine
her viability as a candidate.
Providing credible assurances that an elected DPP administration will not mean a
return to Chen-era gridlock will also be Tsai’s greatest test of leadership. To
accomplish this, she must convince voters that a DPP government will continue to
advance relations with China. She must also persuade the deep-green elements
within her party to hold their tongues on the sovereignty issue.
Accomplish these things and Tsai will earn the confidence she seeks.
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