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The diplomatic games
they play
By J. Michael Cole 寇謐將
Several Taiwan watchers reacted in anger earlier this month when the
Presidential Office said it would turn to the European Parliament for help over
the “Taiwan, Province of China” name controversy at the WHO. Why, several asked,
would President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration not turn to its oldest ally,
the US, for help on the matter and seek succor instead from the Europeans, whose
assistance could be expected to bring but the most marginal of results?
It would be easy to assume that Ma’s decision was in fact based on the
expectation that the EU would do nothing that risked causing anger in Beijing.
By so doing, Ma, who is seeking re-election in January, would meet expectations
at home that he do something to redress the slight, while ensuring that the
outcome wouldn’t undermine relations with Beijing, which remains the core of his
current and future policy.
While there may be some validity to this contention, the context in which the
controversy emerged provides alternative explanations. Ma very likely wanted to
seek assistance from the US on the matter, but may have been dissuaded by
Washington, or US officials in Taiwan, from doing so. The reason is simple: Just
as the crisis risked boiling over, General Chen Bingde (陳炳德), chief of general
staff for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), was arriving in Washington on a
groundbreaking visit to mend military-to-military ties amid fears of China’s
“rise.” The last thing Washington wanted at this sensitive juncture was for a
name flap at the WHO to interfere with what the Pentagon and other US agencies
saw as a very important visit. Given China’s propensity to call off meetings in
retaliation for support of any kind for Taiwan, we can assume that any
intervention on Washington’s part at the WHO could have derailed the whole
visit, which was months in the making and necessitated well-calibrated
preparations.
Rather than always assume the worst from the Ma administration, we should pay
more attention to the environment in which it operates and the immense
challenges it faces in terms of its relationship with the US. History is replete
with precedents in which larger political imperatives prevented governments from
adopting what otherwise looked like what should have been “rational” and
“logical” policies. Britain’s and India’s official silence when the PLA invaded
Tibet in the early 1950s is such an example, with both governments forced to
take the crisis in Korea, among others, into consideration.
Which brings us to another issue over which the Ma administration has faced
heavy criticism: arms sales.
Over the past three years or so, Ma has made several headline-grabbing calls on
Washington to release the 66 F-16C/D aircraft requested by Taiwan — so often, in
fact, that a number of analysts (this author, included) have come to regard the
whole exercise as nothing more than cynical signaling for domestic consumption.
As it turns out, however, incompetence, rather than lack of will, appears to
have been the main cause for the lack of results.
Information obtained by this author reveals it is unlikely the Ma administration
was being disingenuous in its calls for the F-16C/Ds and diesel-electric
submarines. Reliable sources say there is every reason to believe that Taipei
genuinely wants them and understand clearly the downside should it not secure
the commitment from Washington. In fact, in all meetings at the senior level
with Taiwanese officials attended by sources consulted for this article, the
officials were “singing from the same song sheet.”
That said, the problems in Washington are manifest. The Taipei Economic and
Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) as a lobbying body is reportedly in near
disarray, with good officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but no
strategy. On arms sales particularly, TECRO officials have not been identifying
the right decision making nodes — US Senate and House committees addressing
armed services and foreign affairs are at the top of the list — in the system
and working them with the right message.
Incompetence notwithstanding, there reportedly are signs of progress. Taiwan is
said to have put together three-man teams composed of foreign ministry and
Ministry of National Defense officials working together on arms sales and are
predominantly used to brief staff on Capitol Hill on specific needs — such as
F-16C/Ds — as well as long-term trends.
Lack of progress on the fighter aircraft and submarines is not necessarily the
result of cynical politics. Rather, it is more likely a mixture of bureaucratic
incompetence on both sides and very difficult US-Taiwan-China circumstances in
Washington that have been heading in this direction since 2006. It could be said
that by not rattling the cage of the Taiwan Strait, Ma has been a model leader
for US President Barack Obama’s administration, and yet Washington has not
reciprocated with moves that could be helpful to his re-election campaign.
The reason? It’s all about the context.
J. Michael Cole is deputy news editor at the Taipei Times.
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