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US Congress needs to
act on TRA
By Peter Mattis
On Thursday last week, the US House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing
called ¡§Why Taiwan Matters¡¨ to vent Congressional concerns that the
administration of US President Barack Obama is failing to provide enough support
to Taiwan. While the Republican majority may have welcomed the opportunity to
score political points against the administration and voice support for
Taiwanese democracy, the panelists raised a much more important question: Is the
US honoring its commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)?
The hearing marks rising concern in the US Congress about the administration
letting US commitments to Taiwan silently default through inaction. Last month,
45 US senators petitioned the US Department of State to act on arms sales to
Taiwan. In April, Senator Richard Lugar sent a letter to US Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton urging her to move the Department of State on Taiwan¡¦s
outstanding letter of request for F-16s, lest Taiwan¡¦s air force lose all
credibility.
Testifying before the committee, Randall Shriver, a former Defense and State
Department official, said that the US response to China¡¦s military buildup
across the Taiwan Strait was ¡§insufficient,¡¨ leading him to question ¡§if the TRA
is honored.¡¨
The US Congress passed the TRA in 1979 to ensure that Washington maintained ties
with Taipei irrespective of normalizing relations with Beijing. The TRA requires
the US to ¡§make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services¡¨
as Taiwan requires to ¡§maintain sufficient self-defense capability.¡¨ As Chinese
military modernization continues apace and more missiles are placed across from
Taiwan, Shriver¡¦s question is not an idle one.
In addition to the TRA, the administration of former US president Ronald Reagan
clarified US commitments to Taiwan after the Third Joint Communique seemingly
committed Washington to ending arms sales gradually at China¡¦s request.
Then-assistant secretary of state John Holdridge told Congress that future sales
to Taiwan would depend on Beijing¡¦s ¡§fundamental peaceful policy for seeking
resolution to the Taiwan question.¡¨ If Beijing committed to peace and did not
threaten Taiwan, only then would the US reduce sales.
US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently made the situation worse, despite
his rhetoric of a stable US security commitment to Asia. Gates said Washington
tries to balance its TRA commitments with ¡§Chinese sensitivities,¡¨ contravening
past US commitments to Taiwan. The panelists frequently cited Gates¡¦ remarks,
even though defense officials have since tried to walk them back.
Shriver and his fellow panelists testified that the US¡¦ declining concern for
Taiwan goes back at least to the administration of former US president Bill
Clinton and cannot be laid on Obama. However, the problem is that the US¡¦
ability to support its commitments to Taiwan may be approaching a point of no
return.
For example, on arms sales, president of the US-Taiwan Business Council Rupert
-Hammond-Chambers testified that if the F-16 sales do not go through by the end
of this year, then the required lead time for manufacture plus the projected
closing of the F-16 production line could add further delays to delivery. He
further suggested the current delays have stopped the US arms sales process for
Taiwan, killing whatever institutional routine could help press future weapons
sales forward.
If the US is unwilling or unable to sell F-16s to Taiwan, what hope is there
that the US would provide F-35s to Taiwan? Given the steadily rising costs of
the F-35 program, could Taiwan afford to buy the F-35s in sufficient numbers to
replace its rapidly aging fighter aircraft?
The answer almost certainly is ¡§no.¡¨ US concerns that Beijing may walk away from
any one, if not all, of the upcoming discussions or official visits with the US
suggest Taiwan policy is sublimated to the concerns of the US-China
relationship. Taiwan, simply put, is treated as another issue to be managed, not
as a relationship of its own.
The ever busier schedule of US-China relations puts pressure on US diplomats to
play nice with Beijing to ensure the next meeting goes forward, but with the
schedule so full, there can never be a good time to sell weapons to Taiwan ¡X a
point Shriver called the ¡§tyranny of the schedule.¡¨
Without an institutionalized process for the arms sales to Taiwan with its own
bureaucratic momentum, future sales, like the ones languishing today, will
depend on the whims of the sitting US administration to find a good time.
Similarly, a routine process would either acclimatize Beijing to US policy or
perhaps slow the buildup of forces across the Taiwan Strait to reduce US arms
sales.
To combat this lethargy in the US¡¦ Taiwan policy, panelist Nancy Bernkopf Tucker
recommended more active and aggressive Congressional oversight of the US¡¦ Taiwan
policy, comparable with the early years of the Reagan administration. However,
many Congressional members present at the hearing said that the administration
failed to appear to justify apparent inaction in the US-Taiwan relationship. If
oversight is to become more active, then Congress must do more than complain.
Compelling foreign policy action from Congress is difficult and often requires a
political high-wire act, but nothing less will do for Taiwan.
Peter Mattis is a graduate of the security studies program at Georgetown
University with experience on China-related issues.
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