How the navy can
defend Taiwan
By James Holmes
The Republic of China Navy (ROCN) needs to reinvent itself as a ¡§sea-denial¡¨
force rather than waste its increasingly outmatched fleet of major combatants ¡X
destroyers, frigates ¡X in fruitless combat against the People¡¦s Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN). Handled with skill and panache, swarms of small, stealthy,
missile-armed craft could give a PLAN force coming across the Taiwan Strait a
very bad day, delaying a cross-strait offensive long enough for outsiders to
intervene.
This appears to resonate among political leaders in Taipei. Deputy Minister of
Defense Andrew Yang (·¨©À¯ª) spoke in favor of sea denial in a talk last year at
Harvard University. This year, President Ma Ying-jeou (°¨^¤E) attended the
commissioning ceremony for two Kuang Hua VI fast attack craft. Seldom do chief
executives grace unglamorous sea-denial ships with such personal attention. It
seems prospects are looking up for Taiwan¡¦s naval strategy.
However, fundamental change comes hard for any bureaucratic institution, and
navies are more conservative than most. Elected officials must keep up the
pressure lest the navy establishment mount a rearguard action against this
transformation of the navy¡¦s strategy, materiel and culture.
Even if the transformation process advances, this leaves the question of how the
navy should use its existing fleet of major surface ships. These platforms
cannot be phased out overnight. Warships are not simply discarded. However, if
the fleet can no longer fight for command of the sea with any real prospect of
victory, what should it do?
The navy¡¦s answer has been to organize surface action groups (SAG) around four
retired Kidd-class guided-missile destroyers (DDGs) obtained from the US Navy.
Renamed the Keelung-class, these vessels represented the state of the art in US
Navy air defense in the early 1980s, before cruisers and destroyers equipped
with the ultra-high-tech Aegis combat-systems suite ¡X a combined radar, computer
and fire-control system ¡X started entering service.
Kidd DDGs made effective escorts for aircraft carriers and other ¡§high-value
units¡¨ like amphibious transports. They could also perform an assortment of
functions in a relatively ¡§permissive,¡¨ low-threat environment. For example, the
Kidd made a combat cruise during the first Gulf War 20 years ago. Among its
duties were interdicting shipping bound to or from then-president Saddam
Hussein¡¦s Iraq, finding sea mines and using its helicopters for surface
surveillance.
The Kidds were never meant to shoulder the main brunt of fighting against enemy
fleets. Yet that¡¦s seemingly how the Taiwanese navy envisions using them.
The US Navy developed the surface-action-group concept during the 1980s. The
idea was to surround a high-value unit ¡X oftentimes a World War II-era
Iowa-class battleship ¡X with a modest screen of escorts. Under this arrangement,
frigates, destroyers and cruisers provided dense, overlapping defenses against
surface, submarine and aerial attack. Nevertheless, SAGs were intended for
fairly benign threat environments, not to wage high-intensity battle.
ROCN practices precisely invert the SAG concept. In US Navy groups, highly
capable picket ships protected a major combatant that lacked defenses of its
own. Iowa-class dreadnoughts could mete out frightful punishment with their main
guns, but possessed few defenses against air or subsurface attack. Amphibious
ships pack a wallop of their own in the form of embarked Marines, but they too
are outfitted with little defensive armament.
By contrast, Taiwanese groups place the strongest ship at the center of the
formation and surround it with a screen of weak escorts, such as elderly
US-built Knox-class and Perry-class frigates and French-built Lafayette
frigates. In effect, the navy expects the high-value unit ¡X the ship being
protected ¡X to protect its own escorts. This reduces the PLAN¡¦s tactical problem
to overcoming four Keelung-class DDGs in battle.
One suspects this problem is readily soluble for Chinese naval commanders.
Two recommendations. One, ROCN commanders should rediscover the virtues of a
concentrated fleet. And two, they should deploy this fleet largely out of harm¡¦s
way. Creating a larger formation featuring two or more Kidds would tighten up
the fleet¡¦s defenses, augment its offensive combat punch and complicate the
tactical picture for the PLAN. In short, an amped-up ROCN surface flotilla would
boast the same advantages as a US Navy SAG.
Taipei should deploy the fleet well east of Taiwan in wartime. Opening a
corridor into the western Pacific would represent an enormous service to the US
Pacific Fleet ¡X lowering the costs to the US and easing a US president¡¦s
decision to order US forces into the theater. If Taiwan must survive a PLAN
onslaught long enough to matter, the ROCN can advance that goal ¡X even with
¡§legacy¡¨ warships.
James Holmes is an associate professor at the US Naval War College. The views
voiced here are his alone.
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