EDITORIAL: Taiwan¡¦s
self-defeating behavior
At a time of great uncertainty over Taiwan¡¦s ability to purchase advanced combat
aircraft from the US, one would expect Taipei to do its utmost to send the right
signals to Washington, not only that it takes national defense seriously, but
also that it would ensure that US technology does not end up in China¡¦s hands.
Struggling to convince the electorate that it is committed to national defense,
President Ma Ying-jeou¡¦s (°¨^¤E) administration in recent years made no less than
21 appeals to Washington to agree to the sale of 66 F-16C/Ds. However, there is
evidence that those sound bites aside, Taiwan¡¦s efforts to secure the sale under
Ma have been halfhearted at best. As a result, various reports have recently
stated that the deal is all but dead and that Taiwan will have to make do with
upgrades to its aging F-16A/Bs, which could include top-of-the-line radar
technology.
Now recent developments are threatening even that. Enter Ko-suen ¡§Bill¡¨ Moo
(¼}¥iµÏ), a former top sales representative for Lockheed Martin who was arrested in
Florida in 2005 for attempting to sell, among other items, an F-16 engine to a
region of China long known for its reverse-engineering of military technology.
After doing time in a US federal prison, Moo was deported to Taiwan last week,
where he promptly disappeared from radar screens.
However hard Taiwanese officials try to argue that Moo never broke any laws in
this nation, the very presence in Taiwan of Lockheed Martin¡¦s former top sales
representative for radar and C4ISR systems for Taiwan, added to his deep
contacts with the then-upper echelons of the air force, are enough to make one
pause. Even more worrying is the fact that the authorities appear to be clueless
as to his whereabouts.
Add to this the apparent lack of interest in the case by the local
Chinese-language media, and the case hardly sends the right signals to a US
administration that is growing increasingly concerned about the risks of the
transfer of sensitive military technology to China via Taiwan. Taiwanese
officials may not think the case is such a big deal, but for the US, it is ¡X and
we all know who gets to decide which weapons Taiwan will be able to acquire.
The inability of the ministries of national defense and justice, of border
officials and legislators, to explain what has become of Moo creates the
impression that Taiwanese officials are either utterly incompetent or that Moo,
given his contacts, is somehow being protected. It is hard to tell which is
worse.
If Taiwan cannot summon the courage to deal with an individual who has a
demonstrated willingness to compromise not only the US¡¦, but Taiwan¡¦s, security
by transferring advanced military technology to China, then Washington could be
excused for concluding that Taipei is no longer a trustworthy ally. Granted,
Moo¡¦s infraction was committed in the US, but we must not forget that long
before his arrest in Miami, there already were reservations about his
trustworthiness, so much so that a senior Lockheed employee attempted to have
him fired.
Moo is only one spoke in a network of individuals who over the years have
engaged in espionage on behalf of China. Several are still behind bars for
spying on the very systems Moo was working on at Lockheed. If Taiwan cannot get
such a clear-cut case right, how can we expect it to handle all the spies and
traitors who may be lurking in our midst? If Moo was willing to ship an entire
aircraft engine, imagine how much easier it would be for someone like him,
perhaps with the connivance of some corrupt officials, to ship a much smaller
aircraft radar that fits in an aircraft nose cone across the Taiwan Strait.
For the sake of the longstanding US-Taiwan alliance, it is incumbent upon Taipei
to answer one question at this critical juncture: Where is Bill Moo?
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