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Ma must learn to make
decisons
By Lin Cho-shui 林濁水
People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) claims that cooperation
between the PFP and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) for the presidential and
legislative elections in January failed because of the way in which President Ma
Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) team handles issues. Soong said talks reached a dead end
because Ma’s team did nothing when it had the chance to seal a deal.
Of course the reason for the failure is not that simple. There are too many
examples of how Ma has wasted opportunities because of his hesitant approach to
crisis management: the flooding caused by Typhoon Morakot, the misconduct of
former representative to Fiji Victor Chin (秦日新) and the handling of falling
banana prices are just a few examples.
However, it would be wrong to assume that Ma is always mild and indecisive.
Although he is often indecisive in emergencies, Ma tends to make rash, poorly
thought-out decisions when it comes to long-term national policies, which
require more thought and consideration.
The earliest example of this was in 2008, before Ma had fully grasped the
implications of domestic and international economies and Taiwan’s dependence on
other countries in the international production chain. It was then that he
decided that the Taiwanese economy could be immediately transformed by relying
on China, without giving any thought to the effects of the financial crisis on
Wall Street. That is why he proposed the much ridiculed “6-3-3” policy during
his presidential campaign.
Next, Ma naively thought that opening up direct cross-strait links would have a
massive effect and that he would be able to take advantage of China when it
offered to forgo certain benefits relating to the signing of the Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). That is why he set a deadline for
Taiwanese officials to complete the agreement, which placed the nation at a
strategic disadvantage and weakened its position in negotiations.
As a result, flag-of-convenience ships, which account for 97 percent of
Taiwanese sea transport across the Taiwan Strait, were excluded from
cross-strait links, causing gravel ship owners to protest. In addition, Chinese
tourism to Taiwan has been monopolized by Chinese travel agencies, causing the
number of Chinese tourists to drop drastically.
The government compounded these mistakes during the ECFA talks, with the result
that the petroleum, upstream textile material, advanced precision machinery and
LCD panel sectors were all excluded from the “early harvest” list, angering
those business owners.
The government’s superstitious belief in the “Chinese tourism effect” has led to
more airports being opened to international flights. At present, almost none of
these are used and the situation is even worse than during the expansion of
domestic airports under former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁).
On Aug. 11, Minister of Economic Affairs Shih Yen-shiang (施顏祥) proposed a new
target, called the “54321 goal”: economic growth of above 5 percent, an
unemployment rate of below 4 percent, income growth of above 3 percent, consumer
price index growth of less than 2 percent and total private investment of more
than NT$1 trillion (US$34.2 billion). It is clear that this is another promise
that will not be kept.
The same situation can be seen in cross-strait politics, military affairs and
diplomacy. As soon as he took office, Ma proposed a push for cross-strait peace
negotiations and a military confidence-building mechanism. In less than a year
he gave up on it, realizing that such a proposal generated little interest.
A report by the Ministry of National Defense even said that a peace agreement
was unfeasible and inappropriate. China’s failure to respond to Ma’s diplomatic
truce has caused Taiwan a lot of trouble. In particular, Taiwan’s participation
in international non-governmental organizations has come under even greater
pressure than during Chen’s time in office.
The situation is no different when it comes to government and judicial reform.
When the Japanese government merges towns and villages or when it launched a new
trial hearing system, it undertook a decade of careful planning and only moved
to implementation after amending all related regulations. Ma, however, is in
such a rush that he carries out changes without putting any complementary
measures in place. This has led to many negative consequences, the careless
passage of the Fair and Speedy Criminal Trials Act (刑事妥速審判法) being just one
example.
Another is the rushed upgrading of the four new special municipalities, which
has thrown local administration into complete disarray. Not long ago, New Taipei
City (新北市) Mayor Eric Chu (朱立倫) tried to visit borough chiefs in the
municipality’s different districts, but most of them boycotted the meetings.
Attendance was only 20 percent per district; in Sinjhuang (新莊) District, only 16
of 84 chiefs showed up.
Ma’s crisis management and handling of urgent situations is always hesitant, as
a result of which he invariably misses the best opportunity available. However,
he also makes rash decisions on important reforms and long-term policies, which
require sophisticated planning and organization.
Ma’s decisionmaking style is both distinctive and bizarre. The result is that
crises can quickly get out of hand and well--intentioned policies can develop
into a crisis.
That his style is so different suggests that it has been cultivated over a long
period. It is not easy to change a style that is the product of 60 years of
experience, but that is what must happen if the suffering of the public is to
come to an end.
Lin Cho-shui is a former Democratic Progressive Party legislator.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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