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Redefining
cross-strait relations
By Liu Shih-chung 劉世忠
Faced with the complexity of cross-strait relations in their campaigning for
January’s presidential election, the pan-blue and pan-green camps have attempted
to differentiate their China policies in the simplest language possible to
attract voters.
On Aug. 23, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) released the highly
anticipated National Security Strategy and Cross-Strait Economy and Trade policy
elements of its 10-Year Policy Platform. As expected, maintaining stability was
the primary focus. DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) even borrowed the
discourse of her primary election opponent, Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌), by calling on
the public to reach a “Taiwan consensus” through democratic means, based on the
party’s 1999 “Resolution on Taiwan’s Future.”
Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan (賴幸媛), who has wavered back
and forth on the issue, listed 18 questions for Tsai.
President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) of the pan-blue camp and some media outlets
repeated much of what they said during the 2008 presidential campaign, namely
that cross-strait relations would become fraught with uncertainty if Tsai did
not accept the “1992 consensus.” In response, Tsai has chosen clear tactics and
strategic obfuscation, highlighting the government’s China-centric strategy by
focusing on the need for regional multilateral balance and hedging against
danger.
Tsai has denied the existence and reliability of the “1992 consensus,” while
indicating that as president she would work to build a new basis for political
dialogue. From the perspective of campaign strategy, it is only natural for Tsai
to maintain a more cautious approach than Ma, while also leaving room for future
talks about cross-strait peace, stability and a new framework for relations.
That allows her to focus on attacking Ma’s domestic performance over the next
four months. Still, the question is whether Tsai would be able to resist
pressure from China and the US, or if she would be forced to offer more
unambiguous strategic assurances or even accept a different foundation for a
future political dialogue. This is probably the greatest challenge she faces.
Both the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
have warned Tsai that cross-strait relations would be at risk if she does not
accept the “1992 consensus.” It remains unclear how this will affect the
attitude of crucial swing voters. After all, domestic issues remain the key
factor when it comes to voter behavior. In addition, we have yet to see any
concrete economic benefits from the government’s implementation of the Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and 14 other cross-strait agreements.
If the KMT overplays the “Chinese threat,” it might even create the impression
that it and the CCP are working together to interfere in Taiwan’s elections.
The KMT and the DPP are not the only two players in this cross-strait
zero-sum-game: US President Barack Obama is in a difficult situation and
questions about his leadership continue to be asked in light of his inability to
handle the national debt and domestic unemployment, making his re-election
uncertain.
This situation does not allow for any diplomatic mistakes. The higher up one
gets in the US administration, the fewer officials care whether the “1992
consensus” is real or not — the key issues as far as they are concerned are
“stability” and “peace.” Even if Tsai manages to convince them of the absurdity
of the “1992 consensus” during her trip to the US this month and of her
determination to build a “Taiwan consensus,” US experts familiar with the
standoff between the pan-blue and pan-green camps will still want her to give
certain concrete strategic assurances, or propose a new political foundation to
restart dialogue with Beijing.
It is likely that Tsai will use her negotiation skills to delay such commitments
until after the election, but the KMT and Beijing will work with Washington to
pressure her, and could even take action prior to the election to help Ma.
China is also having problems. If Tsai wins the election without accepting the
“1992 consensus” or proposing any alternative plan, would Beijing unilaterally
end cross-strait dialogue between Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation and
China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits? At that point Tsai
would enjoy democratic legitimacy from her victory and Beijing would be blamed
for undermining cross-strait relations.
The fact is that pragmatists in Beijing are taking Tsai’s unchanging
cross-strait policies seriously and they understand that she will never accept
the “1992 consensus” or propose an alternative plan during the election
campaign. These pragmatists have already communicated with the DPP through the
pan-green camp’s think tanks because they are thinking of ways to deal with a
future Tsai administration. This is something to which leaders in the KMT, DPP,
Beijing and Washington should give more thought.
Liu Shih-chung is a research fellow at the Taiwan Brain Trust.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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