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2012 ELECTIONS:
INTERVIEW Political analyst foresees troubles ahead
Following President Ma Ying-jeou’s re-election on Saturday, political analyst
Nan Fang Shuo sat down with the ‘Liberty Times’ (the ‘Taipei Times’ sister
paper) staff reporter, Tzou Jiing-wen, to discuss how Beijing will now apply
more pressure and seek to reinforce the basic structure of the ‘one China’
framework, ensuring Taiwan is unable to escape the framework whoever becomes
president in the future
Political commentator Nan Fang
Shuo speaks during an interview with the Liberty Times yesterday.
Photo: Liao Chen-huei, Taipei Times
Liberty Times (LT): How would you
interpret the results of Saturday’s election?
Nan Fang Shuo (南方朔): Everyone will probably look at the margin by which
Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) won the election, but I would compare his final vote count on
Saturday with what he got four years ago. Looked at that way, Ma actually lost
about 1 million votes [Ma won by 2.2 million votes in 2008, while wining by
760,000 on Saturday] and [Ma’s Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lost] 17
legislative seats as well. Yes, Ma won the elections, but only by a very slim
margin.
What I’m more worried about is that the government needs to enjoy the support of
the majority of people to make big reforms. If this government only won the
elections by a small margin, then it is less likely to be able to push through
larger reforms or making large adjustments.
The 50-50 division of support for the political parties [KMT and Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP)] that has been talked about used to be more conceptual,
but after this election, it really is a 50-50 [split along the lines of support
in] the public.
In this kind of society it is hard to form a consensus, which can cause elements
of internal division to grow, leaving the government with just one undivided
power, its administrative power. He (Ma) might think that administrative power
will make it easier to implement the policies he finds easiest to do and set
aside the harder things. However, such an approach can only lead to trouble.
Therefore, I am worried that it will be extremely difficult to re-adjust
national [policy] direction and deepen political reforms over the next four
years.
Also, in this sort of society, it is easiest to follow the basic international
trends: International bodies present a set condition and it becomes easier to do
everything within those confines. However, it becomes very difficult to exceed
these given condition and all society is forced to follow the international
situation. Has this kind of situation not already appeared in Taiwan?
LT: Are you referring to the growing influence of China over Taiwan?
Nan Fang Shuo: Exactly. After the elections, I saw the headlines of a
certain paper, and to be frank I felt uneasy seeing the title, which read:
“We’ve Won, the ‘1992 consensus’ has won.”
This shows that it [the consensus] is the one thing it [the Ma administration]
is most smug about, and from this election we have also seen that the deciding
factor at the end was the “stability card” that the “1992 consensus” offered.
The reason I am worried is that I do not think that cross-strait relations over
the next four years will be as stable as before. Everyone knows Beijing and
Taipei have their own different understandings as to what the “1992 consensus”
means. Putting aside the debate as to whether the “consensus” exists or not, it
is itself inherently controversial, and yet we have seen businesspeople who are
not clear about the situation come forward and talk about it.
If you were in Beijing’s shoes after this election, wouldn’t you be worried that
the situation in Taiwan could change in a moment; we [the Chinese] put a lot of
effort into this “1992 consensus,” but now the KMT is being sly and dishonest.
So I’m going to take advantage of the fact that Taiwan now is very weak and use
the many goals and policies bundled into the “1992 consensus” and seek their
implementation during the four years when you [Ma] are in power. Now that you
have no more bargaining chips, and your business and cultural sectors are
leaning evermore toward us [China] in the end you will have to accept many of
the conditions that I [China] propose.
Just a few days ago, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) delivered a New Year’s
speech, including Taiwan and Hong Kong within the address, and he said something
that was very interesting.
Hu’s conclusion was peaceful unification and to have two systems under one
nation. In other words, its direction is certain and I feel that over the next
four years China will seek to strengthen the implementation of it Taiwan policy.
Even if the [Ma] government wanted to resist, the chokehold [of the Chinese on
Taiwan] would only grow tighter.
In fact, Ma does not have the final say on whether we have peace; Beijing is
calling all the shots, and if we want to resist that, then cross-strait
relations would become more unstable.
Beijing is well aware of the slyness of the Ma administration, and Beijing is
not that stupid.
In future, Beijing is unlikely to allow any reinforcements of the Republic of
China’s [ROC] character as a nation by joining this or that [international
organizations]. The Ma administration was under pressure from the DPP and had to
maintain the stance [that the ROC is a sovereign independent nation], because if
it backtracked on that position it would have lost the elections.
However, now that the Ma administration is no longer facing the pressure of
running for re-election and Beijing is on alert. Beijing is sure to reinforce
the basic structure of its “one China” framework, and in the future no matter
which party the president is from, there will be no escaping it.
As such, we can expect more pressure from Beijing over the next four years, and
however hard Ma resists it will be tough going, because without Beijing, Ma
would be hard-pressed to have any political achievements.
Cross-strait relations will not be as stable as Ma has said, and there is always
the possibility of rising tensions.
LT: It seems that the Beijing’s [“one China”] framework will have a high
possibility of being “nailed down” in the future?
Nan Fang Shuo: How is the KMT going to continue being sly? They have
people going to Beijing very often, telling Beijing that: “We can’t say ‘one
China’ in Taiwan, we won’t get votes. We’ll just say: ‘Each side with their own
interpretation.” That’s how he pleads with people.
The government officials in Beijing in charge of Taiwan affairs think that as
long as nothing -happens across the Taiwan Strait, they would turn a blind eye
to the issue. That’s how we slipped away in the past.
However, after this election, with the gap closing between the two parties, I
think Beijing would feel that if they don’t solidify the framework, it will one
day become very problematic, so they will start building it now.
LT: We thought in past that using economics to influence politics was only a
slogan, but we saw with our own eyes the actual effects of such a strategy in
this election. What are your views on this trend?
Nan Fang Shuo: Taiwan is in essence a commercial society. I don’t feel
Taiwan is a particularly strong society in terms of subjectivity, so the
“economic voters” among the populace would in the end have some effect, because
the corporation owners and tycoons would have more influence.
I’m more worried that these corporate businesspeople don’t have a strong
self-identity and would always follow the “trend,” going wherever there’s money
to be made. The influence of businesspeople on governments, whether on foreign
or domestic policy, would grow more. I feel that when a society begins to
change, businesspeople would exert a great amount of influence based on their
profits and in this election we saw that happening.
LT: Does a society where businesspeople [harbor the notion of] having no
homeland signal that Taiwan is following in the steps of Hong Kong?
Nan Fang Shuo: That would depend on the definition of sovereignty
embraced by society. My concept is that the final decision on cross-strait
relations should be decided by the DPP, because it pays more attention to the
issue of sovereignty and would consider the interests of the majority. This is
what I said in Beijing as well. Beijing should not be fighting to win over the
KMT; the DPP’s words are what count, the KMT’s don’t, because the majority of
Taiwan’s people would not agree.
LT: Under such a fragile power structure, would issues such as the wealth
gap, justice and equality over which we have long been concerned be even more
problematic?
Nan Fang Shuo: I’m afraid they will. Because of the strong support the
KMT receives from businesspeople, it will find it hard to levy more taxes on
businesses. I am afraid that if the government doesn’t get the support of
businesspeople, it might resort to printing money and Taiwan’s finances would
worsen.
LT: The primary oversight of government is the responsibility of the party in
opposition. What suggestions do you have for the DPP?
Nan Fang Shuo: I always had something to say about the DPP. There are
really very few people like Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) in the DPP. Most party members
who have started out in public service have a very insular outlook, and when
thinking about problems that are on a higher level, they’re just simply not
there yet. Others who are educated have become very radical, perhaps from being
oppressed in the past.
If the DPP really wants to change, then it needs to change the structure of its
very top leadership.
They need a leadership that is educated, more genteel, experienced in
international affairs and knows how to handle situations — both tense and every
day. If the DPP can find people like that, then it would public perception would
quickly change. It is vital that the DPP do everything it can to expand its
membership among the highly educated.
Translated by Jake Chung, Staff Writer
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