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Learn from Hong
Kong’s sad fate
By Paul Lin 林保華
The provisional title of this article, “The sensitive issue of China-Hong Kong
relations” would not be considered “politically correct” in Hong Kong. After
1997, when the British handed the territory back to China, Beijing decreed that
a number of political terms would be used regarding the territory. For example,
China-Hong Kong relations were to be known as “relations between Hong Kong and
the interior,” because juxtaposing China and Hong Kong smacks of sympathizing
with Hong Kong independence. Nor could one talk of the 1997 “transfer of
sovereignty,” because in Beijing’s eyes, Hong Kong has always been a part of
China: One could only speak of a “return.”
Even if the media in Hong Kong do not have to enforce these rules, such
terminology is becoming ever more common. This is how Hong Kong is slowly
becoming linguistically “Sinicized.” I beg your pardon — I should perhaps have
said “interiorized.” This is one of the deep-seated causes of the tension that
has broken out in Hong Kong of late between locals and visitors from the
“interior.”
One issue that has recently highlighted these tensions concerns the introduction
of the Hong Kong-mainland China driving scheme, allowing drivers registered in
China to drive into Hong Kong. Many are concerned that Chinese drivers will not
follow traffic rules, and some are also worried that it will lead to the
adoption of China’s system of driving on the right. This last fear has led to
criticisms that Hong Kongers are relics of British colonialism, though Japanese
also drive on the left. Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan (王岐山) dismissed these
concerns by saying that Chinese motorists would observe traffic regulations when
they are in Hong Kong, and the government of the Special Administrative Region
dared not refuse to accept them. Some Hong Kongers fear this is the beginning of
the end.
Although some suspect these tensions are born of discrimination against Chinese,
or even motivated by Hong Kong independence sympathies, politicians in the
pan-democracy camp dare not speak out about the subject, and it has been up to
the younger generation to broach it. On Feb. 1, a group of young Hong Kongers
clubbed together to run the infamous “locust” advert — the insect being used as
a metaphor for the mainland Chinese overrunning the territory — accompanied with
the phrase “Hong Kongers have had enough.” This opposition to Sinicization and
the attempt to preserve Hong Kong’s history and culture is a social movement
that originates with the younger generation and has nothing to do with political
parties.
On the night of Jan. 14, when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lost the
presidential election, I was there and I saw all these people who until then had
been just names in the newspaper. It was a moving experience. The younger
generation in Taiwan today lack an awareness of the importance of autonomy.
Surely they will not end up just like the people in Hong Kong today, and only
wake up to what is happening after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has
succeeded in taking over?
Online commentators and the press in Hong Kong are keen not to be seen as
looking down on people from China, so whenever they need to criticize Chinese
they refer to China as “the great power.” For example, a Chinese woman who had a
go at a customs official in Hong Kong was reported in the media as being “a
woman from the great power” doing such and such. Even though this does make some
Chinese a little uneasy, the term recognizes China’s status as a great power, so
in another way they are quite happy with it. This has the effect of mitigating
their anger toward Hong Kong, and stops the tension becoming any worse than it
already is.
A similar thing has happened in Taiwan. Some time ago President Ma Ying-jeou
(馬英九) declared that China was to be referred to as “the mainland” (大陸) in
official correspondence. It is difficult to know whether that was done following
a directive by the CCP’s Publicity Department or whether they just think the
same way. From this we get words like “mainland Chinese tourist” (陸客), “mainland
Chinese spouse” (陸配) and “mainland Chinese investment” (陸資). This last term is
different from the one used in Hong Kong to mean Chinese investment, which just
goes to show how dubious these terms are.
If Taiwan accepts China’s linguistic standardization, and loses the right to
determine the names of things, then the loss of sovereignty will be preceded by
the loss of our culture. For this reason we need to push harder for a “Taiwan
consensus,” the issue being how to flesh it out to make it more substantial,
rather than to continue arguing back and forth with the Chinese Nationalist
Party (KMT) over the “1992 consensus.”
Paul Lin is a political commentator.
Translated by Paul Cooper
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