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Useful toe treading
by Taiwan?
By J. Michael Cole 寇謐將
In a recent article in the Web-based journal of international affairs The
Diplomat, Cain Nunns makes some interesting observations about the harm that
Taipei’s claim to the South China Sea is causing to its already fragile
diplomatic relations.
To briefly summarize his argument, the claim that the entire South China Sea
belongs to the Republic of China (ROC) — made, according to Nunns’ count, nine
times by President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration over the past 18 months —
is a preposterous attachment to the ROC Constitution of 1947, which came into
force before Chinese Communist Party forces had the chance to kick Chiang
Kai-shek (蔣介石) across the Taiwan Strait.
Nunns argues that, in addition to needlessly alienating regional claimants at a
time when Taipei can ill afford to do so, the claims are identical to those made
by Beijing, an overlapping phenomenon that could be part of Ma’s efforts to blur
the lines between Taiwan and China under “one China.”
Valid though such points may be, they fail to account for the fact that when in
power from 2000 until 2008, the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
maintained the claims to the contested series of islands in the South China Sea.
While the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) administration may not have been as intransigent
and insistent as Ma’s in terms of government rhetoric, it was under the DPP’s
watch that Taiwan built a 1,198m airstrip, with full backing from the military,
on Taiping Island (太平島), the biggest atoll in the Spratly Islands (Nansha
Islands, 南沙) chain. Upon its completion, Chen visited the island in 2008,
sparking protests from Vietnam and the Philippines.
Surely, an administration that supports Taiwanese independence and in suitable
conditions would have adopted a Taiwanese constitution to replace the one whose
strictures no longer apply to current realities, would have immediately
abandoned all claims that continued to attach Taiwan to the ROC.
That it did not points to the possibility that the claims to the contested
islands — and the rich natural gas resources that may be present underneath them
— exist not only for parochial purposes, but also for more practical reasons.
It is possible that Chen was using those claims as a bargaining chip with
regional powers, perhaps as a means to participate in ASEAN or other regional
mechanisms that served as a forum to resolve the multi-faceted conflict. Chen’s
proposal of a Spratly Initiative, whereby claimants would shelve their disputes
and cooperate in developing the region, points to such a strategy.
That this did not succeed is as much the result of mishandling the initiative as
it is that political conditions were not ripe for such a gambit.
However, should the Ma administration’s claims to the islands also be based on
pragmatic considerations, now might be a more opportune time to renew that
initiative. The regional context since 2008 has changed dramatically, and while
relations between Taiwan and China have, at some levels, improved, Beijing’s
relations with other regional powers have deteriorated significantly.
China has repeatedly clashed with Hanoi and Manila, and even adopted
uncharacteristically belligerent rhetoric on some occasions. The possibility of
clashes in the South China Sea between the People’s Liberation Army Navy and
those from Vietnam or the Philippines is probably the highest it has ever been.
Similar adventurism by China in the East China Sea, resulting in heightened
tensions with Japan and South Korea, has done little to help Beijing’s image in
the region.
All of a sudden, the image of the “peaceful rise” so meticulously cultivated by
China over the past decade no longer worked. The resulting apprehensions
provided the perfect opening for the US to re-engage Asia, a move that while not
entirely altruistic, nevertheless served the purpose of rebalancing the region
at a time when a sole rising hegemon threatened to hold sway over all.
Although Taiwan has for the most part been left out of the US “pivot,” the
renewed passions for multilateralism sparked by a reinvigorated US in the region
could make it easier for Taipei to propose a new Spratly Initiative. Rather than
abandon all claims, as Nunns proposes, Taipei could again offer joint
development and exploration of the area, perhaps even through a commitment to
finance a substantial share of the costs associated with the project.
Taiwan could also clearly state its intention to resolve the dispute through a
multilateral framework, which would set it apart from China, which continues to
oppose such a mechanism and would rather deal on a bilateral basis to ensure it
has the upper hand in negotiations.
At a time when small regional powers feel threatened by an overbearing and
overconfident China, those countries might be more receptive to a hand extended
in friendship by Taipei. The benefits to Taiwan could be sizable, from the
demonstration that it can be a responsible stakeholder for regional stability to
perhaps gaining a seat at a multilateral organization. Given Taiwan’s isolation,
that prospect alone would be worth the effort.
Two things are certain, though: If Taiwan simply abandons all claims to the
islands, no such outcomes will ever be possible; and if the Ma administration
uses the claims as a means to push Taiwan further into China’s sphere of
influence, Taiwan will face the prospect of further isolation.
J. Michael Cole is deputy news editor at the Taipei Times.
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