John Tkacik On
Taiwan: US¡¦ commitment to Taiwan is firm
By John Tkacik
In a way, 30 years is not a long time, at least not in US-China policy. Despite
the bureaucratic forces tugging and pushing at it, it retains an admirable
consistency that is often misunderstood. The August 1982 Taiwan Communique is a
textbook example of this.
In late May 1982, as the negotiations for the ¡§Taiwan Arms Communique¡¨ were
secretly under way, I was dispatched on routine consultations to Beijing and
Taipei as the US Department of State¡¦s Taiwan Coordination Staff economics
officer. Now, I had no part in any of the communique negotiations. In fact, no
one openly admitted such talks existed, although it was the subject of press
speculation at the time. What I knew, I had read in the newspapers. However, the
morning I departed on my trip, I called on China desk director Bill Rope to
discuss consular issues related to China. Rope gave me a paper to take to our
deputy chief of mission in Beijing, Chas Freeman.
It read: ¡§It is not the long-term policy of the US to sell arms to Taiwan and
the US will gradually diminish and ultimately cease arms sales to Taiwan.¡¨
Nothing else, just one typed sentence on a sheet of white paper. It unsettled me
because I had handled the Taiwan desk¡¦s political-military oversight of US arms
sales in the aftermath of the 1979 de-recognition of Taipei. I did not
understand how it could be possible legally to ¡§cease¡¨ arms sales to Taiwan
under any circumstances.
There was little I could do about it. I delivered the note to Freeman in
Beijing. However, the following week in Taipei, I conveyed my misgivings
directly to American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) director Jim Lilley.
¡§Don¡¦t worry about it,¡¨ he reassured me.
On June 14, 1982, a few days after I returned to Washington, the Washington
Times newspaper carried a column by Ralph de Toledano headlined ¡§State¡¦s China
Policy¡¨ which quoted the phrase ¡§the US will gradually diminish and ultimately
cease arms sales to Taiwan¡¨ in a tone of utmost disapproval. De Toledano
asserted that then-US secretary of state Alexander Haig had been lying to
then-US president Ronald Reagan about his talks with the Chinese and charged
that Haig ¡§has been taken over lock, stock and barrel by the Red China Lobby in
the State Department and is using all his powers of persuasion to win over
President Reagan.¡¨
De Toledano¡¦s column had some effect.
That very evening, Reagan wrote in his diary at Camp David: ¡§The Al H. situation
is coming to a head. I have to put an end to the turf battles we¡¦re having & his
almost paranoid attitude.¡¨
On June 18, the president¡¦s diary reads: ¡§Barry Goldwater came to see me. He¡¦s
upset by rumors that I¡¦m going to dump Taiwan. I convinced him there is no way
I¡¦ll ever do that.¡¨
On the evening of June 23, according to the diary, Reagan met with Haig, who
pronounced he was ready to resign ¡§over policy.¡¨ What policy? Reagan fired Haig
on June 25. His diary said Haig insisted ¡§his differences were on policy and
then said we didn¡¦t agree on China or Russia.¡¨
Reagan editorialized: ¡§Actually, the only disagreement was over whether I made
policy or the Secretary of State did.¡¨
A year earlier, on June 16, 1981, the final day of Haig¡¦s first trip to Beijing
as secretary of state, Reagan declared to reporters that ¡§the Taiwan Relations
Act could be carried out as the law of the land.¡¨
Haig recalled in his memoir, Caveat: ¡§This statement puzzled me. The timing
suggested that the President felt that, in carrying out his instructions, I had
somehow got out in front of him on our China policy.¡¨
Haig¡¦s Chinese hosts were miffed and, as Haig boarded his aircraft, a Chinese
vice minister drew him aside and ¡§earnestly¡¨ asked ¡§who makes American foreign
policy? Why are there always such surprises?¡¨
From then on, Haig apparently felt obliged to show Beijing that he, not the
president, made policy. In October 1981, after Reagan¡¦s cordial but non-eventful
meeting with then-Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang (»¯µµ¶§) in Cancun, Mexico,
then-Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua (¶ÀµØ) delivered a separate ultimatum to
Haig: The US must specify a period during which it intended to sell arms to
Taiwan; undertake not to exceed the levels of the former US president Jimmy
Carter years; and commit that sales would decrease year over year, and then
cease. Or else.
At once, Haig mobilized the State Department to formulate an agreement to meet
China¡¦s demands in a decision memorandum for the president that would get the
ball rolling.
At the time, Jim Lilley oversaw China policy for the Reagan National Security
Council (NSC).
In an oral history 16 years later, Lilley explained that when he came on board
at the Reagan White House in February 1981: ¡§I was more concerned that the State
Department had fallen into the hands of people who were too much ¡¥pro-PRC
[People¡¦s Republic of China],¡¦ we saw our job [at the NSC] as holding the fort
against an encroachment of the ¡¥pro-PRC¡¦ group and, somehow, to carry out what
Reagan wanted.¡¨
As Haig¡¦s paper on Huang¡¦s October ultimatum was in hasty draft, Lilley
recalled: ¡§A good friend of mine, an FSO [Foreign Service Officer] at the State
Department, called me up and said: ¡¥This memorandum is coming to the President,
it¡¦s bad news. See what you can do.¡¦¡¨
Lilley raced to get a copy of the document before it slid into Reagan¡¦s inbox,
but was too late. Haig had taken the memo directly to the president, bypassing
the NSC. It said that the cessation of arms sales to Taiwan by a ¡§date certain¡¨
was a ¡§commitment made to the Chinese communists¡¨ by the Carter administration.
Lilley made a thorough search of the archives, but he ¡§couldn¡¦t find any record
of such a commitment. We talked to former US national security advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski, and we talked to anybody else who might have knowledge of this
matter. Finally Carter himself was contacted, and he said: ¡¥I never made such a
commitment. I can tell you that I wouldn¡¦t have made it.¡¦¡¨
This was fortunate. Four months after the Dec.15, 1979, ¡§normalization¡¨ with
Beijing, the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which mandated
continued arms sales to Taiwan. Moreover, the TRA mandated the continuation of
the US-Taiwan mutual defense treaty for a year beyond ¡§normalization¡¨ and
mandated the continuation in force of all US treaties with Taiwan ¡X something no
other nation recognizing Beijing had done or would do.
After Reagan fired Haig in 1982, Lilley remembered that, as the new director of
the AIT: ¡§I was brought back to Washington for consultations¡¨ and ¡§was pushed
very hard to see whether Taiwan would agree to a ¡¥cessation¡¦ of arms sales.¡¨
Upon returning to Taipei, he wrote a message to the Department of State saying
¡§this is the wrong thing to do, both in terms of the security of Taiwan and the
Taiwan Relations Act¡¨ and ¡§we couldn¡¦t do this.¡¨
Meanwhile, according to Lilley, the president insisted that he would not
terminate arms sales and said that ¡§we¡¦ll risk a ¡¥downgrading¡¦ of relations with
the PRC¡¨ if it came to that.
Chinese negotiators had hit a brick wall and rationally decided to take the
money and run.
¡§They dropped all references to the termination of such arms sales to Taiwan,¡¨
Lilley said.
It was either that or no communique.
On July 14, 1982, while Beijing scratched its head on whether to continue with
the communique, Reagan pressured the Chinese government.
He delivered ¡§six assurances¡¨ to Taiwan: The US would not agree to ¡§cease¡¨ arms
sales; not mediate between Taipei and Beijing; not revise the TRA; not push
Taipei to negotiate with Beijing; not consult with Beijing on arms sales to
Taiwan; and ¡X significantly ¡X the US had not changed its ¡§long-standing¡¨
position on the matter of ¡§sovereignty over Taiwan.¡¨
In his oral history, Lilley described Reagan as angry about Haig¡¦s communique
negotiations: He admonished NSC Asia director Gaston Sigur.
¡§Listen, this issue hit me at the last minute. I don¡¦t like it. I want you to
understand that my intention is that in the implementation of this communique,
we will maintain a balance. If China becomes belligerent or builds up a power
projection capability which brings insecurity or instability into the area, we
will increase our arms sales to Taiwan, regardless of what the communique says,¡¨
he said.
The day the communique was published, Aug. 17, 1982, Reagan issued a short,
four-paragraph confidential presidential directive, initialed by both his new
secretary of state, George Shultz, and then-US secretary of defense Caspar
Weinberger. It read: ¡§As you know, I have agreed to the issuance of a joint
communique with the People¡¦s Republic of China in which we express US policy
toward the matter of continuing arms sales to Taiwan.¡¨
¡§The talks leading up to the signing of the communique were premised on the
clear understanding that any reduction of such arms sales depends upon peace in
the Taiwan Strait and the continuity of China¡¦s declared ¡¥fundamental policy¡¦ of
seeking a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue,¡¨ he said.
¡§In short, the US¡¦ willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned
absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of
the Taiwan- PRC differences. It should be clearly understood that the linkage
between these two matters is a permanent imperative of US foreign policy,¡¨ he
said.
¡§In addition, it is essential that the quantity and quality of the arms provided
to Taiwan be conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC. Both in
quantitative and qualitative terms, Taiwan¡¦s defense capability relative to that
of the PRC will be maintained,¡¨ he said.
The next day, Aug. 18, assistant secretary of state John Holdridge personally
appeared before a congressional committee to announce the approval sale of 250
new F-5E/F air force jets to Taiwan.
It has been 30 years since that last US-China ¡§communique¡¨ and the US¡¦
commitment to make ¡§available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense
services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability¡¨ remains firm. I trust it will remain so 30
years from now.
John Tkacik is a retired US foreign service officer. He directs the ¡§Future
Asia Project¡¨ at the International Assessment and Strategy Center in Alexandria,
Virginia.
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