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EDITORIAL: Exchange
offices could be a blessing
Much has been said in recent days about plans between Taipei and Beijing to
establish branches of the semi-official agencies in charge of cross-strait
negotiations in their respective countries, with critics comparing the move to
allowing an enemy into oneˇ¦s house.
Building upon years of cross-strait dialogue on trade, culture and tourism, the
agencies that have served as the platforms for negotiations since 2008 ˇX the
Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the
Taiwan Straits (ARATS) ˇX are looking to build a permanent presence in each
otherˇ¦s country. This is not an unusual move and it makes sense in the context
of the ongoing liberalization of cross-strait ties.
However, as the Taiwan Solidarity Union warned on Monday, the presence of ARATS
offices in Taiwan comports risks, and could certainly facilitate intelligence
gathering and united front work in the country, much like the Xinhua news agency
office in Hong Kong served as a base for Chinese spies in the years prior to the
handover from Britain in 1997.
That said, there might also be advantages to having ARATS offices in Taiwan. For
one thing, intelligence gathering and united front work have been taking place
in Taiwan without the presence of such offices. We already know that Chinese who
want to visit Taiwan on an individual basis must apply with Chinaˇ¦s Ministry of
Public Security, which creates a perfect opportunity for recruitment and
direction by Chinese handlers. It is also known that minders in the employment
of the state regularly accompany Chinese tour groups in Taiwan, where they can
also engage in collection.
Meanwhile, the number of Chinese businesspeople and students who come to Taiwan
continues to grow. Even if only a small fraction of that number conducts
espionage on behalf of China, it is enough to overwhelm Taiwanˇ¦s finite
counterintelligence capabilities.
If, as one would expect, ARATS offices become spiesˇ¦ nests in our midst, it
might become easier for Taiwanese agencies, not to mention foreign intelligence
agencies that operate on Taiwanˇ¦s territory, to identify and monitor Chinese
spies in the country. As with embassies, consulates and semi-official agencies,
the ARATS offices would serve as a center of gravity for spy activity. As the
only Chinese with a permanent presence in the country, a number of its officials
would inevitably serve as handlers and conduits for intelligence collected for
transmission back to Beijing.
By closely monitoring what goes on at the offices, who visits them and who
leaves, it would be possible for Taiwanese intelligence agencies, foreign
governments and journalists to see patterns and draw what is known as a link
chart of possible Chinese agents in Taiwan (ARATS officials will likely receive
immunity and so on, but there is nothing that says Taiwanese intelligence would
be barred from monitoring them, much like foreign diplomats in other countries).
Rather than seek to accomplish the impossible by monitoring every single Chinese
who enters the country, counterintelligence officers can simply focus on the
semi-official missions to determine the kind of intelligence gathering that
Chinese are engaged in.
Another benefit for counterintelligence officers would be the fact that, unlike
Chinese tourists, who can only stay in the country for a short period, or
journalists, who must be rotated, ARATS officials would be stationed here
permanently. It would therefore be easier to get to know them and identify those
who strictly engage in the activities they are expected to conduct under the
agreement, and those who go beyond that and recruit, direct, handle and collect
ˇX in other words, the intelligence officers.
Chinese espionage is a fact of life and a threat that must be managed. Anything
that helps us identify who the bad guys are is welcome. Ironically, ARATS
offices could do just that.
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