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The problem with Ma’s
‘one China’ concession
By Lin Cheng-yi 林正義
Back in 2000, when Taiwan experienced its first change of government, former
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) chairman Su Chi (蘇起) realized that the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) would not accept the “one China with different
interpretations” idea or Beijing’s “one China” principle.
As a result, he came up with the so-called “1992 consensus,” which diluted and
blurred the lines of what “one China” means.
It refers to a tacit understanding supposedly reached between the Chinese
Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that both sides of
the Taiwan Strait acknowledge that there is “one China,” with each side having
its own interpretation of what “one China” means.
The DPP has never accepted the “1992 consensus,” and the party is even more
against the “one China” framework proposed by former KMT chairman Wu Poh-hsiung
(吳伯雄) during his recent meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) in
Beijing.
By replacing the so-called “1992 consensus” with the “one China” framework, the
KMT implies that it will abandon the idea of the “1992 consensus” because they
believe that it does not go far enough and that an even stronger political
stance such as the “one China” framework is required to satisfy Beijing’s
political demands.
The KMT has tried to say that it has not discarded the “1992 consensus,” while
also saying that the terms “1992 consensus” and “one China” framework can be
used interchangeably.
However, Wu’s proposal of a “one China” framework in Beijing implies a
fundamental change on behalf of the KMT, which, since President Ma Ying-jeou
(馬英九) was re-elected in 2008, has said that it would only use the “1992
consensus” as a basis for cross-strait relations.
Before the proposal of the “one China” framework, the “1992 consensus” allowed
Ma to reach 18 functional agreements with former Chinese president Hu Jintao
(胡錦濤). There is absolutely no reason to believe that Ma would be unable to come
up with other functional agreements with Xi if he insisted on continuing to use
the “1992 consensus.”
Ma chose to give up on the “1992 consensus” being used as a basis for talks with
China and instead made an even bigger political concession with the “one China”
framework, which seriously restricts his flexibility. The “one China” framework
is even closer to Beijing’s policy than either “one China with different
interpretations” or the “1992 consensus,” while also being further away from
mainstream political opinion in Taiwan. It will damage Taiwan’s long-term
national interest.
The proposal of the “one China” framework has made Xi trust Ma even more, but it
has increased the lack of trust between the KMT and the DPP. It also means that
Taiwan’s two biggest political parties will have a harder time finding common
ground when it comes to cross-strait policy and cooperation between the KMT and
the CCP against the DPP will become even stronger.
Ma’s lack of strength when it comes to the “1992 consensus” shows that he is
incapable of resisting political pressure from Beijing. Ma should know that
Beijing wants to use a clearly defined “one China” to “frame” Taiwan the way it
wants.
When Wu accepted the “one China” framework on Ma’s behalf, political differences
within Taiwan were made even harder to reconcile than the differences that
resulted from the use of the “1992 consensus.”
Lin Cheng-yi is a research fellow at Academia Sinica’s Institute of European
and American Studies.
Translated by Drew Cameron
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