As Japan-US alliance
evolves, we must adapt
By Lai I-chung ¿à©É©¾
The Japan-US alliance announced its new direction, ¡§Toward a More Robust
Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities,¡¨ on Oct. 3, following the Security
Consultative Committee (2+2) meeting. The primary task is to make changes to the
Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation by the end of next year, amending
the guidelines for the first time since 1997. From the conclusion of the
meeting, significant changes are to be expected in Japan¡¦s security policy in
the near future, and Taiwan must be prepared for these changes.
There were five key issues at the meeting this time: new guidelines for defense
cooperation, enhancement of Japan¡¦s ballistic missile defense (BMD)
capabilities, bilateral and multilateral regional military cooperation,
realignment of the US military base in Okinawa and deployment of new weapons.
The guidelines for defense cooperation were initiated in 1978 as a direct result
of increasing tensions in the Cold War. At that time, the situation in Iran was
precarious, and the Soviet Union was about to invade Afghanistan. The US
responded by accelerating the normalization of diplomatic relations with China
on the one hand and strengthening military cooperation with Japan on the other.
The guidelines were proposed based on Japan¡¦s ¡§purely defensive defense,¡¨
confirming the tactic of the US being the ¡§spear¡¨ to Japan¡¦s ¡§shield.¡¨
The Japan-US alliance amended the guidelines for defense cooperation again in
1997 to adapt itself to the post-Cold War era. In the face of the disappearance
of the Soviet threat and the appearance of the nuclear crisis in North Korea and
the crisis in the Taiwan Strait, the US and Japan reconfirmed the importance of
the alliance.
During this period, the focus was on expanding the influence of the Japan-US
alliance. Japan had even changed its long-term principle of ¡§purely defensive
defense.¡¨ The Japan-US Security Treaty highlighted Article 6 regarding ¡§the
maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,¡¨ instead of
Article 5 regarding armed attacks against either party. Based on this, the
Japanese government later passed the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace
and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan in 1999.
After the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the US, Japan used the ¡§war on terror¡¨ as
an opportunity to further expand its influence in the alliance. Consequently,
the alliance made a joint statement on globalization at the 2005 Security
Consultative Committee meeting.
Since Japan expects to complete the amendments to the National Defense Program
Guidelines by the end of the year, and is set to hold a Japan-US summit in the
first half of next year, the alliance is likely to launch the new guidelines for
defense cooperation at the summit. And this time, the content of the 2+2 meeting
shows that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe¡¦s administration might push for
the constitutionality of Japan¡¦s ¡§right of collective self-defense¡¨ through a
reinterpretation of its constitution and new guidelines.
By doing so, Japan will largely reduce restrictions on security and defense
affairs and increase the chance for military cooperation with neighboring
states. Meanwhile, it will adopt a more proactive attitude in terms of
¡§deterrence capability¡¨ and ¡§proactive defense,¡¨ and may even change its ¡§rules
of engagement¡¨ for military offenses. Taiwan must keep abreast of these changes
and adjust its national security policy accordingly. After all, consolidating
its relationship with the Japan-US alliance is considered the absolute principle
for the nation¡¦s strategy with other countries.
Lai I-chung is vice president of Taiwan Thinktank.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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