Its mission is to augment ties between Taiwan and the Tibet government-in-exile. It also serves as the counterpart to the Tibet Religious Foundation of the Dalai Lama, which has operated in Taipei since 1997 as the representative office of the Tibetan government-in-exile.

TT: Although the foundation claims to be a non-governmental organization, it has a conspicuous public tinge because, for example, you are the deputy secretary-general of the Presidential Office. Exactly what role does the government play in the foundation?

Wu: I myself would like to see the foundation as a quasi-official institution because it receives part of its financial support from the private sector and the rest from the government.

As you can see in its structure, Day Sheng-tong, chairman of the National Association of Small and Medium-Size Enterprises, is the foundation chairman. DPP Legislator Hsiao Bi-khim serves as vice chairwoman and I'm secretary-general.

It's similar to the Straits Exchange Foundation, which was set up because China refuses to recognize and negotiate with the Mainland Affairs Council.

TT: Will the foundation eventually take over the role of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, which would be abolished in the downsizing plan of the Organic Law of the Executive Yuan, which is awaiting final approval of the legislature?

Wu: I'd say the foundation will serve as an interim agency after the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission is abolished and before all of the commission's Tibet-related businesses are transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It's like the Taiwan Mongolia Exchange Foundation, which still exists after the visa business of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission was transferred to the foreign ministry in February last year.

If you ask me about the planned abolition of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, I think it makes perfect sense because the organization is not recognized by the Tibetan government-in-exile and has a historic burden.

TT: What are some of the accomplishments of the foundation since its establishment in January?

Wu: We're glad that the Tibetan Freedom Concert, which drew about 7,000 people, was very successful and the relations and interactions with the Tibet Religious Foundation of the Dalai Lama in Taipei are close and positive.

Another achievement, which we'd like to keep a low profile, is the direct and constant contact with the government-in-exile in Dharmsala. Actually, we've sent a delegation to the Tibetan government-in-exile to meet with their high-ranking officials, including the Dalai Lama.

In addition to inviting the Dalai Lama to visit Taiwan again, we signed an agreement to provide his government with medical and agricultural assistance.

TT: What are the odds of the Dalai Lama's third visit following his first visit in 1997 and second visit in 2001?

Wu: The odds for the Dalai Lama to visit this year are slim. One of the main reasons is that they'd like to tone down His Holiness' visits here because the Dalai Lama sent two envoys to China for negotiations last September and everything seemed to go well.

They've told us that they'd really hate to see the harmonious relationship between China and the Tibetan government-in-exile to be sabotaged by any variable, and we totally respect and understand their concern.

TT: The Dalai Lama's first visit here was branded by the Chinese authorities as an "alignment of Taiwan and Tibetan independence" agendas and his second visit took place after the DPP took office. Do you think the transfer of power serves as a catalysis in His Holiness' visits here or the other way around?

Wu: The DPP's coming to power definitely is conducive to the amelioration of the Taiwan-Tibet relationship because the DPP-led government has forsaken the obsolete KMT thinking that Tibet is governed by the ROC and part of China.

On the day of the foundation's establishment in January, President Chen made a shocking announcement that previous presidents dared to say. That is "Tibetans are not Chinese." This historic statement not only moved the souls of many Tibetans but also encouraged the Dalai Lama to compliment the president as "courageous."

So, yes, the interaction between the DPP-led government and the government-in-exile has been on good terms since the transfer of power and we hope it'll become better in the future.

TT: Tibet is no longer considered part of China but instead as a foreign country after the legislature passed the draft amendments to the Statute Governing the Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area in February last year. That definition, however, is different from the Dalai Lama's ideal situation.

Wu: Yes, indeed. However, the amendments focus more on the fact that the ROC no longer governs Tibet and Mongolia than on the fact that Tibet is not part of China.

The government's stance on the Tibet issue is clear. We totally respect and support the Dalai Lama's peaceful way of pursuing a high degree of autonomy in Tibet. Any military, political or societal means to suppress, abuse or discriminate the Tibetan people shouldn't be allowed.

TT: Last year was considered an important year for the Tibet government-in-exile because the Dalai Lama sent two envoys to Beijing in September and held negotiations on the Tibet issue went well. The Dalai Lama has also said that the best way to solve the Tibet problem is to sit down and talk. Do you think the Dalai Lama is overly optimistic about the Tibetan issue or that the Chinese government will eventually make substantial concessions in this regard?

Wu: I doubt that the Chinese government will make substantial concession in the thorny and controversial Tibetan issue. Although talking may help on the negotiation table, I don't think China has any sincerity in solving the Tibetan problem.

However, we can empathize with the dilemma the Dalai Lama is facing. On the one hand, we hope that the negotiations would actually produce positive results. On the other hand, it's highly unlikely that China will give in.

TT: The Dalai Lama has made it clear that he is pursuing autonomy, not independence. In other words, he does not mind that Tibet being a part of China but the premise is that Tibetans have to enjoy a high degree of autonomy. His ideal, however, has not yet received any substantial response from China. What do you think is the biggest hurdle to solve the Tibetan problem and what is China afraid of?

Wu: The Tibet problem is similar to the Taiwan problem, with several differences. One of the similarities is if Tibet was allowed a high degree of autonomy, the Chinese government would risk itself in losing its grip on the area, which has fallen under its tight control.

I don't think it'd be happy to release its military and political grip of the area. Besides, from the viewpoint of military strategy, China needs Tibet to serve as the buffer zone between itself and India.

Nothing's wrong with referendums

By Hung Mao-hsiung

Some people here in Taiwan only have a halfbaked understanding of referendums. As soon as they hear the word referendum, they begin to fret as if they see great disaster coming. The holding of referendums is a fundamental right -- in the most symbolic sense, it shows that sovereignty rests with the people. It is also the method that best reflects the will of the people.

The unnecessary conflict about referendums in Taiwan is the result of politicians lacking an understanding of democracy and of being paranoid about China, as well as the deliberate distortions and manipulations by unificationist media.

The formerly socialist countries in eastern Europe left their one-party dictatorships behind them at about the same as Taiwan. However, these countries have used the referendum to show the identity and will of the people in serious, solemn and impartial ways, and they have been generally supported by other European societies.

In this country, however, we are hesitant, unable to make our minds up. We see ghosts everywhere and bring humiliation on ourselves.

The referendums held in eastern European nations over the past few years which have attracted the most international attention follow three models, all worthy reference points for Taiwan.

First, there are consultative referendums. Poland's communist government lost the public's trust as a result of the challenge posed by the Solidarity trade union when it won freedom of association in 1987. To solve the crisis brought on by the risk of its imminent collapse, the Communist Party proposed a package of political and economic reforms, to be decided by voters in a referendum, making Poland the first communist country to hold a referendum. This shows us that even though the Polish Communist Party had dictatorial powers, it still wanted to hear what the public thought and understand public opinion.

Second, there are "declarational" referendums. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav republics held referendums to decide the future of their nations. Ignoring the Kremlin's threats, the three Baltic states all held referendums around 1990. The Supreme Soviet in their respective parliaments then passed resolutions to declare independence. Without fearing the opposition of the federal government in Belgrade, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia, four republics in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, held refer-endums to declare the legality and legitimacy of their independence.

The eight central and eastern European nations about to join the EU next May are all holding referendums on joining. Handling the referendums with caution and solemnity, their people are making a historic choice, showing that they want to become integrated in European society.

Third, there are constitutional referendums. Following the peaceful transformation of the communist regimes in central Europe, almost every country created a new Constitution (apart from Hungary, which has made major changes to its Constitution from the communist era). Before officially promulgating and imple-menting their new constitutions, each country gave its people the chance to fully understand the contents and make suggestions. They then held referendums before their parliaments approved the new constitutions.

Examples set by others might help us overcome our own short-comings. We can use the referendum experience of the eastern European countries to correct the erroneous opinions of those politicians opposed to holding referendums here.

First, the eastern European countries had no referendum laws when they held their referendums. Who could have guessed that the legal foundation for direct people's power, asking for the people's opinion on major national policies, already was as clear as could be?

Second, the pursuit of independence and sovereignty was the common will of a majority of the people in the Baltic states and the Yugoslav republics. In the same way, the wish of these states to become members of NATO and the EU was also a matter of national consensus. However, using referendums to demonstrate the people's will actually displays an even deeper symbolism and legitimacy.

There is a national consensus that Taiwan should join the World Health Organization. What is so wrong with holding a referendum on the issue?

Third, holding referendums is a people's basic right and it should be protected and respected. We never heard of any international opposition when these eastern European nations held their refer-endums. On the contrary, the international community encour-aged the people of these countries to vote.

For example, during a recent visit to Poland, US President George W. Bush called on the Polish people to support a referendum to enter the EU. The Warsaw media would never deli-berately leak information saying that the government in Washington is concerned over Poland holding a referendum.

Fourth, the Baltic states and the Yugoslav republics fearlessly and confidently held their refer-endums even before they had left the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav federation.

Taiwan and China are individually independent and have no jurisdiction over one another. It is difficult to understand why a minority of politicians here have to make up excuses for obstructing a referendum. Looking at it from this angle, the above arguments clearly explain why these politicians and media are suspicious of referendums.

People of Taiwan, you should have awoken by now. Don't let these people with ulterior motives trick you with their shocking and sensational statements.

Hung Mao-hsiung is an international relations research fellow at National Chengchi University and a member of the Northern Taiwan Society.

The only choice to make

We learned yesterday that President Chen Shui-bian intends to embark upon a round-the-island trip to promote the DPP government 's achievements as a forerunner to the campaign for the presidential election next March. Our immediate reaction was one of puzzlement. "What achievements?" became a common refrain heard around the newsroom. Shortly, we expect it to be heard all around Taiwan.

And we hardly think we fall into the category of biased unification-supporting media, whose mem-bers were all trained by the KMT, who were censured by the DPP's Hong Chi-chang yesterday, since it is no secret that we hope that there is a special circle of hell reserved for unification supporters. But poring over Chen's record with the exegetical fervor of Talmudic scholars as we might, the "concrete achievements" which Hong spoke of prove elusive.

What we remember in the last three years has been the economy dipping, not Chen's fault but not sufficiently refuted by the DPP at the time, the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant fiasco, utterly mis-managed by the DPP, despite their many years of manipulating popular support when in opposition, the farmers and fisherman's associations turnaround, still to be resolved, the embarrassing backpedaling over Chen's "one country on each side" of the Taiwan Strait remarks, half-baked privatization, hubris over SARS -- about the only thing we could come up with as an unequivocal plus was that China hasn't invaded yet.

Even Chen yesterday was limited to saying that Taiwan's economy hadn't done as badly as others. What a slogan!

Given this lackluster performance, the best we can hope for is that Chen doesn't say anything too embarrassing. What is more to the point is that if Chen must be the DPP's candidate in the next election -- as the incumbent he could hardly be otherwise -- how his campaign can possibly be rescued from the mediocrity tending toward failure of his performance in office. A strong running mate might be an advantage, someone perhaps like Chen Ding-nan, a running mate anyway who does not embarrass us with asinine stupidities about Taiwan being like Hello Kitty in its exercise of "soft power."

If the green camp hopes to focus on Chen's achievements for its election campaign then it is in trouble -- it might as well try to breath in a vacuum. There is only one reason to vote for Chen and that is that he is not about to sell out Taiwan to China, the all-but-expressed intention of his blue-camp rivals with their love of the "one China" policy. For the green camp the campaign has to be negative -- this is sad but inevitable.

What Taiwanese have to be asked to make is what is known in the rich lexicon of American politics as a clothes-peg vote, a vote that stinks so badly you need a clothes-peg on your nose as you make it. Chen might be vacillating, he might lack direction, but at least we know he is not going in one particular direction -- into China's crushing embrace. That is where the blue camp would lead us, bringing all the loss of liberties now threatening the people of Hong Kong to the people of Taiwan.

It is not that Chen must be supported, rather that China must be held at bay. This must be made crystal clear to voters, no matter what accusations of "dirty fighting" there might be. For Taiwan's liberties and democratic system this is a life-or-death struggle. The only strategy that matters is the one that works.

US policy is undermining the TRA

By Gary Schmitt

American Institute in Taiwan Director Douglas Paal has reportedly warned President Chen Shui-bian against holding referendums on major policy issues such as nuclear power or Taiwan's admission to the World Health Organization (WHO) because doing so would cross Beijing's red line on Taiwan. China believes once Taiwan holds a referendum, it will have gone too far in asserting its claim of "independence."

Paal's representations raise a number of questions. Chief among them, why is a US representative to Taipei conveying the PRC's policy toward Taiwan? The unfortunate answer is that US policy on Taiwan has drifted dangerously close to China's by viewing Taiwan's democracy and efforts at self-determination as irresponsible and provocative -- rather than normal and admirable for a country of 23 million that has moved from dictatorship to democracy.

Another question is, how can the US oppose the exercise of democracy in Taiwan? If Taiwan is not supposed to conduct referendums on the theory that it will eventually conduct a referendum on independence, what is to keep China from insisting, and the US from agreeing, that one candidate or another ought not to run, or express views about Taiwan's future?

However, the most important question of all is how will US policy on Taiwan adapt to accommodate the desire of Taiwan's people to preserve their democracy free of Chinese control? Unfortunately, US policy increasingly undermines Taiwan's efforts to gain international legitimacy -- witness Washington's weak support for Taiwan's efforts to enter the WHO and its apparent silence in the face of the WTO's effort to downgrade Taiwan's status within that body.

Not only do these policy decisions run contrary to the intent of the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), but they also encourage China's leaders to view Taiwan's separateness as temporary. As such, they reinforce Beijing's preparations to acquire Taiwan in various ways: by encouraging Taiwan's economic dependence, amassing military might along China's eastern coast and relentlessly working to isolate Taiwan internationally. All of these are designed to make Taiwan feel unification is inevitable.

Beijing, of course, also wants the US to believe Taiwan's unification is inevitable. American officials such as Paal, who judge Taiwan's efforts to gain international standing or determine their own affairs as provocative, in effect do China's bidding. And, in doing so, these officials virtually force the democratic government of Taiwan to seek opportunities to create the political and diplomatic space it needs to reaffirm its legitimate existence internationally -- creating the very crisis in cross-strait relations they are supposedly trying to avoid.

The direction of US policy toward Taiwan is not only questionable morally but is strategically untenable over the long term. It rests on a "one China" policy that is out of date with geo-political realities and the domestic dynamics in both China and Taiwan. The Cold War, which gave rise to the policy in the first place, is over and the Republic of China no longer claims to be the government of all China. Today, Taiwan is a liberal democracy, while China remains a one-party dictatorship that maintains its legitimacy by stoking Chinese nationalist visions of a "Greater China."

Attempting to placate Beijing on the issue of unification with Taiwan does not lead to lessened tensions across the Taiwan Strait. To the contrary, it boosts China's ambitions and leads them to question Washington's willingness to defend Taiwan if necessary -- a point seemingly confirmed by James Moriarty, the senior director of Asian affairs for the US National Security Council.

Moriarty, in a recent press briefing, stated that the US will "help Taiwan to the extent possible defend itself," a substantial weakening of President George W. Bush's pledge in 2001 to do "whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself."

Finally, America's "one China"policy was predicated upon Bei-jing's commitment to a peaceful resolution of differences with Taiwan. China's military modernization, which is aimed at Taiwan and complicating any US intervention, calls that commitment into question.

Allowing Taiwan to be further isolated, while leading Beijing to believe its "one China" policy is effectively our own, cannot help but create misunderstanding and, potentially, a confrontation in which we will be forced to intervene. What is needed is a revised US policy that reassures Taiwan that unification is only possible if freely chosen by the people of Taiwan, makes clear the US will resist militarily any effort by China to force unification and takes active measures to integrate Taiwan into the larger community of democratic states in Asia and the world.

Gary Schmitt is the executive director of Project for New American Century.