20050728

First tourists from China hit London

FINAL FRONTIER: Despite the bomb threat, doubtful food and pouring rain, the first coachload of ordinary Chinese tourists allowed into Britain were impressed

THE GUARDIAN , LONDON

The commentary on board the coach carrying Britain's first-ever delegation of official Chinese tourists on Tuesday was possibly suffering a little in translation. At the front, a Mandarin-speaking Blue Badge Guide was running through the sites. At my elbow, Jiang Jiqiang from the Beijing Youth Daily was translating: "She said Queen is 79. She say she is old lady. She say she looks like her mother."

On the Embankment, he first points out County Hall.

"Mrs Thatcher she closed this castle. Shut." And then a CCTV camera. "Many cameras!" he says. "Many terrorists!"

Which wasn't quite the message that Visit Britain, the body responsible for promoting the UK overseas, was hoping this group would take back home. They were supposed to be enjoying what Lord Marshall had told them at a special breakfast at the Victoria and Albert Museum: "Britain -- the brand."

To back the point up, each visitor had been given a goody bag representing this image of a modern, go-ahead Britain: a Harrods carrier bag, a can of London Pride beer, a cuddly lion, a CD of Chicago -- The Musical and a mug.

A Chinese tourist takes pictures during a cruise on the River Thames in central London on Monday. The first Chinese visitors to travel to Britain on Approved Destination Status visas arrived in London on Sunday. Previously, mainly students and business delegates were allowed to travel to the UK.

But they were carrying a certain burden of expectation on their shoulders. Until now, it has only been possible for Chinese visitors to come here on a student or business visa. But six months ago the UK was granted approved destination status by China, and the first group of tour operators, journalists and holidaymakers arrived yesterday for a week-long jaunt to London, Stratford, Manchester and Edinburgh. In the second week running in which visitor numbers to the capital fell, there was no mistaking the excitement that the trip was generating.

"It's brilliant, really brilliant." says James Bradbury, the manager of Madame Tussauds. "We've done a lot of research into China. It's our No. 1 emerging market. You can't overestimate how important it will be. We already have an attraction in Hong Kong, so we know who they like. It's why we moved Victoria next to David Beckham. We did that today especially for them."

Even the most conservative estimates predict that the current 95,000 Chinese visitors who come to Britain each year will double by 2010. And it's thought that by 2020 they will be in the top five nationalities visiting Britain, right up there with the Americans and the Japanese.

Which is why it wasn't merely a waxwork model of Victoria Beckham that had been laid on: The real, live, Duke of York was hosting a gala dinner for the group at the Tower of London, catered by the chefs from Hakkasan, the capital's only Michelin-starred Chinese restaurant.

"What we really need to do though is to update the country's image," says Travis Qian of Shanghai's Visit Britain office. "At the moment, most people have this very old-fashioned idea of sticks and bowler hats. They have the idea that it is very imperial."

Jiang Jiqiang's recounting of the pre-Duke briefing seems to back this up: "They say, don't take the photo! Don't shake the hand! Don't embrace! Forbidden everything!"

He wasn't the only one to have noticed a certain inconsistency in "Britain -- the brand." At lunch, at the Phoenix Palace restaurant near Madame Tussauds, journalist Ma Tianguo starts asking some potentially tricky questions: "So, how is your country so democratic if you have a monarchy?"

"Well, Ma," I say, "we have what is called a constitutional monarchy. You see the Queen doesn't really have any power."

"Can you tell me please the difference between `vote-rigging' in Chinese elections, and `appointing a governor' as the British did in Hong Kong? Excuse me to ask, but is this what you call double standards?" he asks.

He does, however, point to similarities between Britain and China that he thought would help to warm relations between the two countries.

"Our press is pretty free," he says. "We are like you. We don't write bad articles about the president like you don't like bad articles about the Queen."

But the holidaymakers, who had paid £1,200 (US$2,100) for the trip -- equivalent to the annual salary of an average Chinese worker -- were also saying the sort of things that chief executives of British tourist attractions dream about.

"I am very lucky dog to be here! This is American English. It means I am very lucky lady indeed."

"Very helpful and kindly and warm-hearted. For example, yesterday, when we arrived at the hotel and were waiting for the lift, a woman, she pressed the button for me! And then when I entered the room, the lights had no power, and a man came to put them on!"

China's continued military expansion has not only increased tension across the Taiwan Strait, but has also made Japan, the US and other nations nervous. The US, as the world's policeman, is especially troubled, for it is responsible for maintaining security in the Asia-Pacific region. If Taiwan's position became endangered, the US could not easily ignore the situation.

The Sino-Japanese relationship has been marked by attacks on each other's territory, with China's Yuan Dynasty mounting unsuccessful invasions in 1274 and 1281. While this history is difficult for the Japanese to forgive, Chinese nationalists have used Japanese's invasion of China during World War II as a way of putting pressure on Tokyo and extorting aid.

China's strengthened military serves not only to discourage any move toward formal independence by Taiwan, but also to threaten Japan. China continues to believe that Taiwan's sense of identity has not completely rid itself of Japanese colonial influence. It has even accused Japan of fanning the flames of Taiwan independence, using this as a way of hinting at its sense of historical injustice at Japan's hands. But Japan is a powerful nation in its own right, and economically at least China is beholden to Japan, so that it dare not adopt too harsh an attitude. Instead it has taken out its sense of historical injustice on Taiwan.

In his video conference with foreign correspondents in Japan on Tuesday, President Chen Shui-bian reminded the Japanese of the danger of China's military expansion. But he neglected to mention that China sees Taiwan as being linked politically, historically and militarily to Japan, and that its hatred of Taiwan is psychologically linked with its feelings for Japan. In China's eyes, Taiwan is Japan's "running dog." The use of this accusation by Chinese nationalists facilitates their task of scaring off Japan from any attempt to assist Taiwan. Of course, many Chinese people know that the charge is untrue, and understand that Taiwan's desire for self-determination has nothing to do with Japan's position.

The US, however, seems to clearly understand the close security relationship between Taiwan and Japan resulting from historical and geopolitical factors. That's why it draws Japan closer into the maintenance of security in the Strait as part of the US-Japan security treaty.

"God helps those who help themselves," the saying goes. One could also say that a state must be determined to defend itself in order to expect its neighbors to help. A state lacking that determination will be doomed, for what state will put its people in harm's way for a state that is ready to surrender? The arms procurement bill, so long delayed by the legislature, is really a test of the Taiwanese people's will to defend themselves. If the bill is passed, it will substantially improve the nation's ability to defend itself. And it will also tell the international community that the Taiwanese people are determined to continue moving toward greater autonomy.

At the same time, the pan-blue camp's obstructionism highlights the lack of a central guiding idea in Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and People First Party (PFP) positions. The priority of the past KMT government's diplomatic activities was to purchase advanced weaponry. We must not forget that F-16 fighter jets, French Mirage fighter jets and Lafayette frigates were purchased during the KMT era. Now, with a new government, they have changed their minds and instead make it their top priority to block anything the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government tries to do to improve the nation's military capabilities.

The KMT's fickle ways only prove that the party lacks a clear and constructive political plan. How could such a party gain the public's trust?

Peace in the Pacific is in the hands of the Taiwanese people. However, the current drift of thought and policy may imperil both the nation's ability to determine its own destiny and the long-term stability of the region.

Taiwan finds itself in a potential dynamic of decline. In the current dynamic, a rising China attracts direct foreign investment that used to go to Taipei. China's economy charges ahead at a rate twice as fast as that of Taiwan, and China translates this economic advantage into a military build-up while gaining diplomatic leverage in capitals across the world. Pressure may build and lead Taiwanese leaders to observe these developments and decide that an arms race is futile.

They will hope that Washington will be the ultimate guarantor of stability in the region. In such a situation, which could come to fruition within 10 years, Taiwan will have fewer options for its future, and a national security policy based on wishful thinking.

It is time for Taipei to break out of the current dynamic of decline, to preserve options for its own future and ensure the peace and stability of the region and perhaps the world. I offer some thoughts on a new strategic vision to achieve these ends.

First, a look at the motivations and capabilities of China should be the starting point for a new Taiwanese security strategy. While one of China's prime objectives is preserving its "territorial integrity," the other values that seem to be at least as important are economic development and international prestige and acceptance. This is the pressure point upon which Taipei can focus when building a new security policy.

The political decision in Beijing on whether to take hostile action against Taipei will always include a calculation of the cost in terms of economic development and international prestige. If Beijing cannot win a conflict quickly, it runs the risk of disrupting trade and investment flows.

If Beijing resorts to the use of missile attacks on civilian populations or blockades that last for weeks and months, it is liable to look like the bully in international public opinion. If Beijing's forces face the prospect of suffering military defeat, even briefly, the loss of face to any regime in Beijing may be too great to bear.

Taking advantage of these strategic weaknesses will ensure a security posture that allows Taiwan to have freedom of action in its political dealings with China. A new strategic vision requires bold political and military initiatives.

Taiwan could consider a pledge to never launch an attack against a civilian target in China under any circumstances. Such a pledge in peacetime might help further dialogue, and in time of conflict, put Taiwan in a position to win the world's sympathy and put Beijing in the role of aggressor.

The new strategy should be to intercept and defeat any and all aggressors in the air and on the seas. If troops land and establish beachheads in Taiwan, it will likely be too late for help to arrive from the international community. In any conflict, Taiwan needs to be seen as the plucky underdog defending itself against great odds, and inflicting such losses that any aggressor would quickly lose face -- first, because of its clear aggression and second, for its inability to quickly prevail.

In terms of military posture, Taipei could consider a true revolution in military strategy by shifting to a professional military almost entirely focused on air and sea defense. The strategic need for the defense of Taiwan is to raise the costs of aggression by China to unacceptable levels and to gain the world's sympathy in a conflict. This means that Taiwan's armed forces must be restructured.

The Taiwanese navy could acquire new fleets of the most advanced diesel/electric submarines, minesweepers and minelayers and waves of high-speed torpedo boats. The goal of naval force structure should be the ability to break blockades and defeat seaborne invasion forces. Force levels would need to increase to meet the increase in capabilities.

The Taiwanese air force should focus on hardening and dispersing airfields to withstand attack, developing early-warning radar, increasing the number of fighter squadrons and acquiring a new generation of attack helicopters that are equipped to attack submarines and landing craft.

The Taiwanese army could be restructured to become an entirely "special forces capable" force. The army could reduce its numbers while greatly improving its mobility and lethality. The new army would train along the lines of US special forces such as the Green Berets or Rangers. Their missions would shift from static defense to disruption of enemy military installations during an invasion and rapid strike capability against any initial beachheads made on Taiwanese soil.

Such a military restructuring would allow for the end of conscription and the total professionalization of the military. Such a plan could enhance support for the mission of the military as its defensive role would be clarified by structure and doctrine. This plan could give a boost to the economy by allowing tens of thousands of young people to enter the job market rather than being conscripted.

The goal of this and any national security strategy should be for options to remain open for the future of the free and democratic people who call Taiwan home. This new national security strategy could place Taiwan in an enhanced diplomatic position, lead the way for peace in the Taiwan Strait and improve capabilities so that some forces in Beijing will not be tempted to miscalculate and introduce military pressure into an already sensitive situation, thus preserving peace in the Pacific.

Scott Bates is a senior fellow at the National Security Center for National Policy in Washington.

There have recently been reports of a new discourse within the pan-green camp, which might be termed the "three-part theory of the Republic of China (ROC)."

It runs as follows: First, that the Republic of China is a sovereign and independent state; second, that sovereignty is vested in the people of Taiwan; and third, that any decision about Taiwan's future can only be made by the people of Taiwan.

There are various signs that this theory will become the dominant note in the government's future policymaking.

If we give close scrutiny to this theory and its logic, we see that although the theory has a superficial cohesion, the logic is actually full of holes -- and it could easily serve as a tool with which Beijing could attack Taiwan.

Everyone knows that in the last few years the pan-blue and pan-green camps have been arguing over the merits of "one China," and how each side can have its own interpretation.

But ultimately, given the difference in size between China and Taiwan, whenever "China" is mentioned, it will be regarded by the international community as a discussion about the People's Republic of China (PRC).

This has a very negative impact on recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty and its continued existence.

It encompassed a territory that included all of China, as well as the territories of Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang.

If, prior to entering into substantive dialogue with China, we in Taiwan push ahead with the "three-part theory of the Republic of China," this could easily allow China to catch us in a net of our own making.

First they would agree that the ROC is indeed a sovereign entity and that Taiwan is part of the ROC under the current Constitution.

Then Beijing would go on to agree that sovereignty is vested in Taiwan's 23 million people.

But Beijing would add that it is also vested in China's 1.3 billion people, as the Constitution of the ROC includes the territory where they live.

It would then add that UN Resolution 2758, made in 1971, indicated that the PRC superceded the ROC, and that, therefore, the ROC was now a part of the PRC, that the Taiwan issue is a domestic issue of the PRC, and that the future of Taiwan should be decided by the people of the PRC.

There is another risk if the government continues to praise the merits of this new ideological formulation, despite the infinite danger it presents of allowing Beijing to achieve its ultimate goal of realizing "one China."

Praising the formulation will fan the flames of "China fever" in Taiwan and give legitimacy to Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan's and People First Party Chairman James Soong's pilgrimages to China.

In other words, this "three-part theory of the Republic of China" is nothing more or less than an indirect route to accepting "one China."

I believe that we must avoid letting the "three-part theory of the Republic of China" become the basis of our policymaking at all costs, and must not make any related policy announcement in the National Security Strategy Report.

The Taiwan issue will then be played out according to China's rules and Taiwan's security will be hopelessly compromised.