|
An ECFA is a threat to Taiwan’s status
quo
By Lai I-chung 賴怡忠
Saturday, May 08, 2010, Page 8
Recently, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) mentioned in an interview with CNN that
Taiwan would not ask the US to go to war on its behalf. On the surface, this
shows a recognition of Washington’s difficulties and a promise not to make
excessive demands of the US. If we dig a little deeper, though, other issues
start to become clear.
If we take a close look at the government’s handling of national security and
cross-strait policies, we cannot exclude the possibility that it is actually
offering “political gains” to Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), a strategic
move to secure the signing of an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA)
between Taiwan and China by the end of next month.
Ma mentioned US intervention in any possible conflict twice during the
interview. The first time, he said that Taiwan did “not ask the US to get
involved”; the second time, he said that we would “never ask Americans to fight
for Taiwan,” adding that this is something that is “very, very clear” to further
highlight his statement, as if Taiwan well understood the difficulties of the
US.
However, if China really were to attack Taiwan, the US is unlikely to make a
unilateral decision to get involved unless Taiwan were to request that it do so.
When Ma said that Taiwan would not ask the US to fight for it, he was also
hinting to the outside world that Taiwan had no intention of seeking US help
even if a war were to break out in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan-US military
cooperation is based on defense against a Chinese military invasion, so his
assertions have repercussions that go to the very core of this alliance.
If Taiwan were “never” to ask the US to help defend it, and Taiwan-US military
cooperation under Ma’s rule is limited to arms procurements only, the outside
world may well ask: Is this cooperation, above and beyond arms deals, still
necessary? Should the software and hardware integration stop? Should the
government stop inviting US experts to participate in future Hankuang (漢光)
military exercises? Should the US Pacific Command scrap its operation scenarios
for a war in the Strait?
All these are based on the premise of US intervention, but Ma said he would
never seek US help.
Since Ma took office in 2008, he has lowered the budget allotted to the Navy and
Air Force, turned the annual Hankuang drill into a biennial drill and changed
its strategic mission from defense against China to disaster relief or other
unconventional threats.
Obviously, his recent statements have also weakened Taiwan’s defense capacity
against China. From Hu’s claim that unification is a cross-strait issue that
brooks no foreign interference, I strongly suspect that Ma made the statement on
security and political affairs to show his sincerity to China, hoping that
Beijing will cooperate with him and sign the ECFA, as hoped, next month.
This is just like his statement describing the Taiwan Strait as “one China, two
areas” in August 2008 to make way for the visit of China’s Association for
Relations Across the Taiwan Strait Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林), and his proposal
of “one China, respective interpretation on the premise of the one China
principle” in October last year in exchange for Beijing’s cooperation on an ECFA.
Looked at in this light, we can see that the government’s push to sign an ECFA
is not only a great risk to Taiwan’s economy, it may also alter the status quo
in the Taiwan Strait.
Lai I-chung is an executive committee member of the Taiwan
Thinktank.
|
