西方民主制度難於在中國適存

  

   西方民主制度難於在中國適存現在的大陸中國人,普遍養成一種“彈力”,其面對集體認同的壓力是可以瞬間轉變,以行動來表態,而依附群體力量來生存,故西方強調的個人自由與人權的標準,就很難在此刻發揮效果。

  由於中國人在中共統治之下,歷經各種運動與革命,人人自危,而自保的方式,就是與領導的口徑一致,其附和群眾的行為,更足以得到生存上的安全,影響所及,所謂之群體意識絕對大於個人自主。

  這些年來,中共統治的中國稍漸安逸,其經濟的繁榮,把自保的依憑發展為軍事強權,是一成不變的適存法則。故西方人引以為疑惑的中國領土完整說,就是這種群體意識的適存法則的延伸。

  大陸中國人,害怕政治改革失敗的浩劫,而作興於經濟市場的積極趕工,這是可以理解的,領導與群眾互為依存的妥協。在“民主遠離中國”的文章中,透露此微妙的氣息,他說:天安門文件的釋出,引起一陣陣的回響,但在中國大陸,這件事不甚了了。西方國家要以意識形態的民主思想,或以利誘的方法拉開中國民主化,則是不切實際的作法。中國人在大陸的活動,絕對只有經濟市場而毫無政治交易可言,其控制方式的開放政策,得到中國人民的認同,已富的人害怕貧窮,而未富的百姓亦期待富有,在兩方各有冀求之下,現階段的中共政權,不但穩定,而且還會持續發酵,其內鬥的領導佈局,應該不會有政治上的風暴。

  西方國家在面對中共政體的運作,顯得毫無招架之力,以西方民主邏輯套在應付中共的領導與群體互動框框中,格格不入。故有許多老外問我說:大陸中國人好像也很贊同中共的統治方式,但是他們為何要接受這種不合乎人權的生活?我會回答他們,理由很簡單,歷長期的災難之後,百姓有其適存的方法,因為中國內部分裂,引發的內戰,已經成為中國人的夢魘。

  要中國人變成台灣人,有相當的困難度,台灣人要成為中國人,是為了到大陸去賺錢,而少數中國人成為台灣人,亦只是因為台灣人有錢,現階段的中國大陸,只有經濟市場,沒有政治市場,誰能保證中國民主化,大陸不會大亂。

  附上北京自由作家許東明的文章(英文稿),我把重點加深,大家可以共享,翻譯這篇文稿的人為 Scudder Smith。

Democracy still far away in China

   The recent publication of confidential internal Chinese documents --“The Tiananmen Papers” -- by the American scholar Andrew Nathan (黎安友) and others, has inspired vigorous debate internationally. In terms of understanding the truth behind the Tiananmen incident, this book possesses considerable value. Up until the present time, Tiananmen has been viewed merely as a historical event, with most people turning their focus to China's economic development. Issues like people power and the possibility of democratization have received considerably less attention. In recent years, discussions among foreign China experts regarding democritization have for the most part been based on the American political scholar Samuel Huntington's theory of the “third wave of democratization ” and the earlier American scholar Seymour Martin Lipset's ideas on the connection between economic development and democratization. According to Huntington's theory, following the third wave of democratization, those countries not touched by the wave (including China), will have difficulty -- at least in the near future -- taking the road to democracy. The key factor would be the countries' economic backwardness and inability to accept Western culture. Lipset points out that economic development and democratizaton have a very strong cause/effect relationship. Level of economic development is a factor found in both Huntington and Libset's theories, and the high level of economic development in China since the beginning of reforms has prompted foreign China experts - - using Western theories -- to analyze the possibility of Chinese democratization.

   In fact, searching for the possibility of democratization in China via Western theories of democratization is very limiting. These scholars point out that the appearance of “developmental” local governments, diminshing control by the central government, and the appearance of new economic classes (middle class) might collectively give rise to democracy. Still, at best, these phenomena can only be attributable to a certain degree of loosening of authority in the political system. A transition from liberalization to democratization would require a mass concentration of collective societal power, as well as a challenge to the power structure. In China's present situation, however, along with a high level of economic development, a kind of“wealth consciousness”has supported the existence of numerous contradictions within society. Beneficiaries of the “Let some people get rich first”policy of course support the Communist Party, as well as those people living out in poor, remote localities, who also hope to become rich one day. From the vantage point of local society, advocates of democracy tend to either resort to abstract theories of democracy and freedom, or can't fully grasp the disagreements that exist within society, and thus are unable to find the common language needed to launch a movement. For this reason, motivation for local society to pursue democracy is isolated and weak. Take Falun Gong, for example. Any resistance (to the government) has been mobilized only by followers themselves -- one just doesn't see democracy or human rights supporters trying to form an even larger resistance force by calling for a show of unity with Falun Gong followers. On the contrary, some advocates for democracy and human rights even borrow elitist pseudo-science theory to attack Falun Gong as an“evil religion.”

  The method of analysis employed by these foreign China experts has also ignored the people's understanding of democratic values and their ideological background. Regarding China's future, Chinese intellectuals have -- since the introduction of reforms -- focused primarily on the two issues of nationalism and modernization, the latter probably inclusive of democratic systems. The TV series that caused a big commotion in the late 80s -- River Elegy (河殤) -- by comparing inland with coastal civilization, reflected on the question of why China was unable to complete modernization. At about the same time, a conservative“new authoritarianism,”which stressed general order and stable development, was also proposed, igniting intense discussion. In the 90s, apart from the strong nationalist agitation stirred by the“China can say no”response to the“China threat theory,”debates focused on issues such as “socialist vs capitalist,” and later, “public vs private.”The hidden forces behind these disputes were much like Chinese scholar Li Zehou (李澤厚) described: in modern China, any ethnic group's right to superiority is anathema to democratic politics. Ethnic superiority requires an authoritarian political power, even a dictatorship. To the Chinese political elite, nationalism implies freedom for the people and not for the individual person. In a nutshell, no matter whether it strives for collective nationalism or for modernization tinged with individualism, both are overridden by the infinitely exagerrated collective body.

   If no major changes take place within China over the next three to five years, democratization will remain a distant prospect, but there will appear mild reforms from within the system. In last year's US presidential election for example, the lengthy lawsuits made Chinese scholars even more convinced that Western democracy has got some problems, as it reduced the government's efficiency. Thus, discussions among Chinese scholars have once again returned to reform of the bureaucratic system, including how to increase government efficiency, combat corruption, etc. This, however, is still a far cry from the division and balance of power sought after in a democracy. Or maybe this is once again a unique by-product of China's special brand of socialism.

  Hsu Tung-ming is a freelance writer based in Beijing.

  Translated by Scudder Smith