President
Bush's Trip to Asia:
Promoting Security, Prosperity, and Peace
by John J. Tkacik and Balbina
HwangBackgrounder #1517
February 12, 2001 The Heritage Foundation
President George Bush, in his State of the Union address to the American
people, set the priorities for his agenda on his upcoming state visits
to Japan, Korea, and China. When he travels to Tokyo, Seoul, and Beijing,
his key priority will be security, but it will be followed closely by
economic issues and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The President
will likely raise in each country the problem of North Korea's relentless
effort to procure, produce, and proliferate weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). By identifying North Korea as a member of an "axis of evil,"
he did more than decry Pyongyang's deliberate sacrifice of millions
of its own citizens to starvation and death while feeding its military
programs. He also was making a bold declaration to the leaders of Asian
countries that North Korea's actions threaten not only U.S. and regional
security, but also global security, and can no longer be tolerated.
The South Koreans and Japanese understand the threat North Korea
poses and are gravely concerned. China's leadership also is uneasy with
North Korea's isolationism and defiance, but Beijing is loath to alienate
one of its last ideological soul mates by bowing to international pressure.
Beijing still proliferates technology and materiel for WMD and missile
delivery systems to the three "axis" states--Iraq, Iran, and
North Korea. Indeed, the United States sanctioned some Chinese "entities"
in January 2002 for selling chemical weapons precursors and production
equipment to Iran despite a previous agreement to stop such sales.
President Bush will confront differing challenges when he meets with
state officials in the three capitals. For example, he will need to
forge a consensus with leaders in Tokyo and Seoul on how to coordinate
effective policy toward a recalcitrant Pyongyang. In Beijing, he must
confront the issue of China's destabilizing proliferation activities
while at the same time reassuring Beijing that America and China can
work together, "in ways we have never before, to achieve peace
and prosperity." He also must make the case that "in every
region, free markets and free trade and free societies are proving their
power to lift lives."
Among his other important priorities: addressing the deepening economic
problems in Japan, some South Koreans' uncertainty about America's support
for peace on the Korean Peninsula, and the culmination of the political
succession in China, set for October 2002. These visits will be counted
as successes if President Bush can promote constructive economic reforms
by Japan, firmness in South Korea's management of relations with the
North, and moderation in China's foreign policies and reforms of its
human rights and trade behavior.
Agenda Priorities in Tokyo
Strengthening Both Economies.
As the world's two largest economies, the United States and Japan
should work together to strengthen their own as well as the global economy.
In light of Japan's decade of economic stagnation and the recession
in the United States, many realize that the vitality of both economies
is integral to prosperity around the world. Close cooperation in economic
policies will help prevent Japan's economic woes from spreading throughout
the region, and also will prevent the sort of hostility over trade and
other economic issues that existed between the two countries in the
1980s.
When President Bush addresses the Japanese Diet, he can encourage
much-needed reforms in Japan by voicing strong support for Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi's efforts and encourage the Japanese government to
proceed with the promised overhaul of the banking and financial systems.
Japan should also be encouraged to address the immense burden of bank
debt--a painful but necessary step to avert a meltdown of the financial
system. And the President should convince Japan of the importance of
communicating its monetary policy decisions to its neighbors. The devaluation
of the yen, although beneficial domestically, is causing concern in
East Asia that Japan is pursuing a "beggar-thy-neighbor" policy
that could contribute to regional instability. Furthermore, a steady
decline in the yen may contribute to increasing discontent among Americans
as bilateral trade pressures mount.
Finally, President Bush should convey to Japan that currency devaluation
is merely a short-term measure to alleviate recessionary pressures,
while overall structural reform is necessary for long-term revival of
the Japanese economy.
Strengthening the Alliance.
For 50 years, the U.S.-Japan alliance has been the basis for peace
and prosperity in Asia. Japan's critical role in this strategic partnership
became clearer in recent months with its strong show of support for
the war on terrorism. Shortly after September 11, Japan passed a significant
Anti-Terrorism Special Measure Law, enabling it to participate as a
more active political and military partner of the United States. This
was an important step for Japan in taking a leadership role in security
issues in Asia and provides a more secure basis for stability in the
region.
But the war on terrorism is far from over, and Japan's close cooperation
is also needed to address the lingering threat posed by North Korea.
In August 1998, North Korea test-fired a multi-stage ballistic missile
over the Sea of Japan. The Taepo Dong-1, the first three-stage missile
launched by Pyongyang, is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Combined
with the North's pursuit of biological, chemical, and (most likely)
nuclear weapons programs, this action highlights the significant dangers
this regime poses to regional and global security.
In Tokyo, President Bush should praise Japan's contributions to the
war on terrorism, including its key role in rebuilding Afghanistan.
Japan's participation provides the Asian anchor to the coalition fighting
to eradicate terrorism. Japan also should be encouraged to recognize
the vicissitudes of the Asian security environment and seek to anticipate
rather than simply respond to problems after they arise. Specifically,
Japan should be urged to expand on the 1999 agreement with the United
States to cooperate on developing a ballistic missile defense infrastructure
that would protect the people of Japan as well as forward-deployed U.S.
forces and America's allies from missile attack.
Dealing with North Korea.
Maintaining North Korea on the U.S. State Department's list of state
sponsors of terrorism and identifying it as part of the "axis of
evil" directly addresses strong Japanese security concerns. North
Korea continues to harbor the fugitive terrorists of the Japanese Red
Army as well as maintain their denial of any involvement in the kidnapping
of Japanese civilians. As recently as December 2001, North Korea apparently
attempted to infiltrate its agents into Japan using a fishing boat,
firing upon the Japanese coast guard in the process. President Bush
should urge Japan to support his strong stance against North Korea and
work closely with his Administration and South Korea to pressure North
Korea to cease these activities.
Agenda Priorities in Seoul
Assuring South Korea of U.S. Support for Reconciliation.
There is a widespread misconception in Korea that President Bush opposes
engagement with North Korea, maintaining a hard-line stance toward that
country. In reality, the United States has offered North Korea an open-ended
invitation to meet at "any time, any place," while North Korea
has refused to meet with U.S. representatives and has slowed progress
in the North-South dialogue. The Bush Administration also has stated
repeatedly that it fully supports South Korea's efforts to encourage
the dialogue and reconciliation process.
Some South Koreans use President Bush's insistence on reciprocity
when dealing with North Korea as a way to blame the United States for
the frustrating lack of progress in the North-South dialogue. Even those
critical of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's "Sunshine Policy"
of engagement have perpetuated this misperception. President Bush's
most important priority in Seoul, then, should be to dispel this myth
by stating clearly, and repeatedly, that the United States is willing
to engage in dialogue with the North. While America fully supports Seoul's
initiatives to engage Pyongyang, the President should explain that the
United States must be cautious about its own engagement. North Korea
still poses a significant threat to the security of South Korea and
the world. Not making this clear could allow a misperception to undermine
the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance.
Finally, President Bush could use his trip to visit U.S. troops stationed
at the Demilitarized Zone, delivering a compelling message to the Koreas
and the world that the transportation corridor to the North could be
opened if only Pyongyang were to keep its end of the bargain.
Explaining Why North Korea Is a Terrorist State.
In his State of the Union address on January 29, President Bush made
it clear that it is a U.S. priority to "prevent terrorists and
regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons" from
threatening America and its allies with weapons of mass destruction.
North Korea is one of several countries that sponsor terrorism by proliferating
weapons, technology, and materials. For example, North Korea has sold
50 Nodong-1 missiles (with a range of 1,000 kilometers) to Libya, and
Syria is reportedly considering buying intermediate-range Nodong missiles
from Pyongyang. North Korea also still harbors the terrorists from the
Japanese Red Army and also those who assassinated South Korean officials
in Burma. And North Korea has perpetrated numerous acts of terrorism
in the sovereign territory of South Korea, including a submarine raid
that resulted in the deaths of 17 South Koreans.
The United States has taken a strong stance against terrorism and
is working with its allies to preempt another terrorist attack. If proliferation
of nuclear, chemical, and biological WMD continues, the next terrorist
attack would dwarf the devastation of September 11. Thus, it is in the
interests of the United States, South Korea, Asia, and indeed the world
for the United States to ensure that North Korea and other regimes cease
all proliferation activities.
American identification of North Korea as a perpetrator of terrorism
and part of the "axis of evil" is a policy that should be
equally important to South Koreans. They need only to be reminded of
the 1983 brutal assassination attempt on former President Chun Doo-Hwan
in Burma, which killed 17 senior South Korean officials, including cabinet
ministers. Or they might remember the 1987 North Korean bombing of a
Korean airliner killing all 115 civilians on board, or the more than
3,600 South Korean citizens that have been kidnapped by the North throughout
the past five decades.
President Bush can use this visit to Seoul to clarify U.S. objectives
and priorities regarding the eradication of global terrorism. Some argue
that a show of resolve backs North Korea into a corner, and they fear
that Pyongyang will react aggressively to a strong U.S. stance. President
Bush should communicate clearly that creating incentives for the North
to reduce terrorism and weapons proliferation is vital to national and
regional security. America's strong stance against states that sponsor
terrorism also is consistent with President Kim's Sunshine Policy to
bring peace and stability to the Korean Peninsula. And while the United
States maintains a policy of reciprocal engagement with North Korea,
issues related to terrorist activities must take priority as long as
the threat of global terrorism exists.
Strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance.
This 48-year-long relationship is part of the bedrock of stability
and prosperity in East Asia, and any minor policy differences that may
exist between the two countries should not be allowed to undermine or
fundamentally alter it. The strength of the U.S. commitment to South
Korea is visibly manifested in the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed there,
as well as in formal treaty commitments that obligate the United States
to aid the defense of South Korea should its security be threatened
by an external force. Nevertheless, lingering issues related to U.S.
troop presence in the South cause friction in the relationship.
In Seoul, President Bush should take this valuable opportunity to
reaffirm the strength of the alliance, reassuring the U.S. military
command of Americans' support and showing sensitivity to South Koreans
for the trade-offs they make in exchange for the U.S. commitment. On
the issue of the Yongsan Base, which currently houses the headquarters
of the U.S. Forces Korea, President Bush should reiterate America's
commitment to relocate that base to a locale outside of Seoul. Such
a move is currently constrained by the U.S. war on terrorism and by
the fiscal burden this would place on the ROK, but relocating the base
in the future will be an important step in improving U.S.-ROK relations.
President Bush should also take advantage of the opportunity to stress
the critical importance of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight
Committee (TCOG), which manages and coordinates North Korea policy among
the United States, the ROK, and Japan. The key objective is to ensure
that North Korea does not succeed in its long-held goal of driving a
wedge between the members of the U.S.-ROK alliance.
Clarifying the Need for Missile Defenses.
President Kim Dae Jung made what is widely considered a diplomatic
error last March by signing a joint declaration with President Vladimir
Putin of Russia in support of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
between the Soviet Union and the United States. This event revealed
the extent to which South Koreans are skeptical of a missile defense
system. Indeed, another disturbing but pervasive myth is that the Bush
Administration needs the threat of North Korean missiles to sell its
beloved missile shield. Such arguments are not only naive but foolish.
The events of September 11 graphically illustrate that the greatest
danger to security for America and its allies derives not from the responsible
nuclear powers of the international community, but from regimes, groups,
or even individuals who would stop at nothing to take advantage of America's
greatest vulnerability: its inability to protect its own people from
missile attack.
North Korea represents the most obvious of these threats today because
of its lethal combination of intent and capability, laid bare by its
threatening rhetoric and posture against South Korea and the United
States and by its rapidly growing capabilities. Soon, it will have ballistic
missile technology with a potential range of over 6,000 miles. The most
obvious response to such a blatant threat must be the development of
a system capable of defending against such terror.
In addressing the people of South Korea, President Bush should clarify
the true objectives of a missile defense program--to protect and defend
against weapons of mass destruction. He should allay fears that a missile
defense system would antagonize North Korea as well as China and convey
the salience of a missile defense system for the South's security.
Agenda Priorities in Beijing
Because his visit to China necessarily will be short, President Bush
should concentrate on a results-oriented dialogue and avoid humoring
the Chinese where U.S. and Chinese differences are irreconcilable. The
President cannot ignore the difficult issues, and he should not fear
the typical reaction of Chinese leaders who purport to take offense
at America's directness. Serious issues exist between these two important
countries that must be broached without ambiguity, and less contentious
topics should be approached in a spirit of cooperation. Among the serious
issues: (1) China's military expansion, especially its missile buildup
that threatens regional stability, and missile development, which clearly
targets the capabilities of the United States; (2) China's proliferation
of missiles and nuclear and chemical weapons; (3) China's treatment
of Taiwan and the need for renewed dialogue without preconditions; and
(4) China's efforts to address human rights abuses.
In addition to these difficult issues, two significant issues that
bridge relations between the United States and China should also be
discussed: the war on terrorism and trade. President Bush should encourage
Chinese President Jiang Zemin to consider greater cooperation with the
coalition fighting the war on terrorism and offer praise for China's
progress in opening its markets to trade and acceding to the World Trade
Organization (WTO), while offering guidance on how China can best reap
the benefits of membership in that organization.
The Administration should recognize that Chinese negotiators commonly
propose "setting aside differences to concentrate on commonalities"
(cun yi qiu tong) in an effort to avoid discussion of issues on which
they have the weaker arguments. This negotiating tactic permits the
Chinese to control the agenda and diverts attention away from China's
shortcomings and toward areas where they hope to gain concessions by
proclaiming they are trying to reach consensus. This tactic also enables
the Chinese to claim afterwards that since the other side did not discuss
difficult matters, they must not have been all that important.
President Bush should firmly state his case, leaving no doubt as
to the American position on each matter. He should be wary of allowing
the Chinese to deflect straightforward discussion of China's proliferation,
its military buildup against Taiwan, the expansion of its intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) force, and its human rights abuses.
Convincing China that Its Missile Buildup Threatens
Stability.
The latest threat assessment of the foreign ballistic missiles by
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) lists China as the second major
threat to the United States behind Russia. According to this assessment,
China's "missile force [of 75 to 100 warheads] will increase several-fold
by 2015." More troubling, this massive increase in China's missile
force is "deployed primarily against the United States." Because
China's missile arsenal is capable of hitting anywhere in the United
States, President Bush should make this his top priority when he travels
to Beijing.
China's more moderate leaders appear persuaded that Beijing's aggressive
rhetoric against Taiwan, its military expansion into the South China
Sea, and the EP-3 showdown near Hainan Island were counterproductive.
The Bush Administration reacted to China's missile buildup on the coast
of the Taiwan Strait by reaffirming its defense commitment to Taiwan,
and many see China's growing missile force as a major cause of the Bush
Administration's commitment to develop a national ballistic missile
defense. President Bush's firm resolve when dealing with the issue of
missile buildup was key to this realization and need not be relaxed.
President Bush must avoid the mistake President Bill Clinton made
during a visit to Beijing in June 1998. President Clinton used the visit
to sign a "nuclear missile detargeting agreement" with China
in exchange for a public articulation of his infamous "Three Noes"
about Taiwan and its international standing. Since that signing, there
have been both an increase in China's missile arsenal and more Chinese
belligerence in the Taiwan Strait--not a decrease as one might expect.
President Bush should voice disappointment at the growing Chinese capability
to launch a nuclear strike against the United States despite the 1998
nuclear detargeting agreement.
Convincing China that Its Proliferation Threatens
the World.
China has violated virtually every non-proliferation commitment in
the past decade. Aside from effectively ignoring the 1998 detargeting
agreement, China has broken other promises. In February 2000, the Clinton
Administration, distressed by China's fourth consecutive violation of
pledges to halt missile exports, banned the issuance of satellite licenses
to China until it promised to end all transfers of advanced missile
technology to Pakistan. In November 2000, China swore--for the fifth
time--that it would end the transfers, making it possible for the United
States to resume normal processing of licenses for the launch of U.S.
satellites on Chinese boosters. Yet by February 2001, U.S. intelligence
had learned that China had continued these exports to Pakistan, causing
President Bush to order new missile sanctions on the Chinese government
and a Chinese aerospace company.
At first, China insisted that the U.S. sanctions were based on faulty
intelligence. But in November 2000, China stated that because it felt
its missile technology contracts signed before then were not covered
by the pledge, it could continue to transfer missile components to Pakistan
even after November 2000. This, of course, was the same line the Chinese
used to explain away their violations of the 1991 commitment to halt
sales of M-11 missile technology, a commitment made by then-foreign
minister Qian Qichen to then-Secretary of State James Baker, with another
commitment in 1994 and yet a third in 1996.
Washington responded by demanding that Beijing put into writing its
oral agreement of November 2000, pledging to cease all exports of advanced
missile technology. But Beijing demurred and pleaded that it would instead
establish a governmental export control regime to regulate missiles
and missile technology exports.
China also continues to export chemical weapons materials and condones
the export of chemical weapons precursors and manufacturing equipment
to rogue states, as evidenced by the new U.S. sanctions on three Chinese
entities for selling such items to Iran. These sanctions are ineffectual.
An unclassified CIA report says that prior to the last half of 2001,
"Chinese firms had supplied dual-use [in this case, chemical weapons]-related
production equipment and technology to Iran." Those entities had
also been hit with sanctions in 1997, and they have been sanctioned
again this year.
The President should ask the Chinese why the United States would
place any further credence in China's written assurances when the first
written pledge (Vice Premier Qian Qichen's in 1991) and virtually all
since then have proved untrustworthy. In this context, the President
should explain that the United States feels it must deploy a national
ballistic missile defense system in large part because China continues
to proliferate advanced missile components and technology to rogue states
that threaten the American homeland.
The President should publicly address China's repeated violations
of virtually every commitment to cease its proliferation of advanced
nuclear, chemical, and missile technology. However, unless his words
are supported by action, China will assume the U.S. position is not
serious. One concrete step would be to link all future waivers of sanctions
to an extensive period of Chinese compliance as verified by U.S. "national
technical means," not new promises.
The President's State of the Union address made it clear that the
United States will no longer ignore countries that develop weapons of
mass destruction or their delivery systems. Moreover, President Bush
warned he would act aggressively against these countries. The United
States must also take action against nations that proliferate missiles
and WMD technology. Placing U.S. sanctions on Chinese "entities"
that proliferate merely treats the symptoms, not the disease--the Chinese
government's toleration and support of proliferation is the real problem.
President Bush should take this opportunity to emphasize that if
China does not stop these destabilizing actions, the United States will
be forced to review all of the 50-odd science and technology cooperation
protocols it has entered into with China since 1979--particularly in
high-energy physics cooperation--and terminate those that may improve
China's military capacities.
Encouraging China to End Its Hostility to Taiwan.
Taiwan remains at the heart of Beijing's unhappiness with Washington.
Some in Beijing want to play down the Taiwan issue during President
Bush's visit to avoid provoking statements more supportive of Taiwan.
The visits of several senior Chinese officials to Washington in January
and early February 2002 were designed to convince the United States
of China's moderate stance on the Taiwan issue. The President in Beijing
should reiterate that America has a long-standing friendship with the
people of Taiwan and their elected representatives, and that the China-Taiwan
friction can be resolved only if Beijing engages in an unconditional,
direct dialogue with Taipei. President Bush should repeat the statements
he made in Shanghai encouraging Beijing to treat Taiwan with respect.
On January 24, Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen delivered an "important
speech" on the Taiwan issue, highlighted by the attendance of China's
Vice President and heir-apparent Hu Jintao. Qian termed China's and
Taiwan's entry into the WTO "a major event" and "a new
opportunity for further development of economic and trade relations
between the two sides." The Vice Premier chose his words carefully.
Last November, a senior Chinese spokesman had argued, "it is inappropriate
for the two sides to discuss economic and trade relations within the
WTO framework." While Vice Premier Qian did not directly contradict
this statement, his words implied that the WTO could be a venue for
cross-Strait trade talks. His speech suggests, moreover, that Chinese
and Taiwanese trade delegates could begin to work out trade problems
discreetly in Geneva. President Bush should publicly welcome China's
view that WTO participation by Taiwan is "a new opportunity"
to develop economic and trade ties with the people of Taiwan, and encourage
Beijing to follow up on this moderate rhetoric with deeds.
Vice Premier Qian's speech was not a new opening to Taiwan. China
adamantly refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of Taiwan's elected
government. While the American media painted the Vice Premier's invitation
to supporters of Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
to visit China as a dramatic turn, in Taiwan, DPP partisans only shrugged;
DPP members travel privately to China all the time. Vice Premier Qian's
reference to the DPP was a simple acknowledgement that the DPP now runs
Taiwan. Still, Qian insisted that only an "extremely small number"
of DPP members support Taiwan's independence. In response, the DPP Secretary
General asked, "where are these DPP members who don't support Taiwan
independence?" A Beijing spokesman then clarified that only DPP
members committed to "one China" are welcome in China and
declared that Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian is clearly not one of
them.
Understanding the "One China" Policy.
Washington must be clear that its "one China" policy simply
means that the United States recognizes the People's Republic of China
as the "sole, legal government of China." It does not mean
that the United States accepts China's territorial or sovereign claims
to Taiwan; China knows this and agreed to establish diplomatic relations
with the United States in spite of it. Moreover, the 1979 Taiwan Relations
Act (P.L. 96-8) explicitly mandates that the United States shall "maintain
the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion"
against Taiwan, and explicitly acknowledges Taiwan as a "foreign
country, nation, state, government, or similar entity" for the
purposes of U.S. domestic law.
On July 14, 1982, President Ronald Reagan gave "six assurances"
to Taiwan's president that confirmed, among other things, that the United
States would not terminate arms sales to Taiwan, would not pressure
Taiwan into negotiations with China, and most important, "has not
changed our long-standing policy on the matter of sovereignty over Taiwan."
That "long-standing" policy had been one that saw the issue
of sovereignty over Taiwan as "undetermined." The Chinese,
aware of this position, will seek to cloud the issue by repeating their
demand that the United States recognize China's territorial claim to
Taiwan under the "one China principle"--a principle that the
United States does not share and never has shared.
In Beijing, President Bush need only note that the United States
has a "one China" policy within the context of the Three Communiques,
the Taiwan Relations Act, and President Reagan's "Six Assurances";
all have been consistent U.S. policy for over 20 years. If necessary,
President Bush can ask the Chinese whether they would like him to restate
the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan or move on to other issues. "Strategic
clarity" from the President on this issue should suffice to move
dialogue on to other issues.
Addressing Concerns About Human Rights Abuses.
In the run-up to the February summit, it is important that U.S. policy
toward China asserts American values. The President's personal intercession
in the human rights dialogue with China is vital if progress is to be
made. This was poignantly demonstrated by Beijing's reaction to President
Bush's muscular protests (via the U.S. embassy in Beijing) regarding
the death sentence for a Hong Kong man caught smuggling Bibles into
China; the charges were reduced substantially, and the man was released
from prison for health reasons.
Unless the President places these uncomfortable but necessary issues
on the agenda for his talks with the Chinese leaders, they will assume
that he is not seriously concerned about these issues and will gauge
his demeanor in Beijing against the U.S. domestic press reports of his
reaction to that incident. U.S. policymakers must step back from efforts
simply "to get the words right" and understand that the ultimate
goal is to help China get its "system" right.
Encouraging Greater Cooperation in the War on
Terrorism.
President Bush's forthright conversations with President Jiang in
Shanghai last October confirmed in Chinese minds that the new President
wishes China well but also means what he says. The President must now
engage Beijing in one area where there are common interests but diverging
perspectives--cooperating more fully on the war on terror. China's cooperation
already has been useful in a number of areas. For example, China has
been supportive in the United Nations; it has shared some useful anti-terror
intelligence; it has not prevented Hong Kong from providing financial,
shipping, and other intelligence and interdiction efforts against terrorism;
and it has pledged $150 million (U.S. dollars) to Afghan reconstruction,
although details are vague.
On the other hand, China has been highly suspicious--if not downright
paranoid--about America's new strategic presence in Central Asia, a
region Beijing considers within its own sphere of influence. On January
16, 2002, the Liberation Army Daily quoted China's Chief of the General
Staff Fu Quanyou as warning the United States against using the war
on terrorism to dominate global affairs, saying that "counter-terrorism
should not be to used to practice hegemony." ("Hegemony"
in China's diplomatic lexicon refers to the U.S. role as the sole superpower.
)
General Fu views the war on terrorism as threatening China's geopolitical
position in Asia. In the two weeks following the September 11 attacks,
China saw at least six strategic allies, including Pakistan and Russia,
join the U.S. war effort without consulting Beijing. Another setback
for China came as Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi committed a large
naval force to support the U.S. campaign.
President Bush needs to be sensitive about China's perceptions, but
he need not apologize either for a protracted U.S. military presence
in Central Asia or for Japan's increasing participation in Asian regional
security. He should welcome China's offer of $150 million in development
aid to the new Afghan regime, as well as its support of efforts to ease
tensions between India and Pakistan following the December 13 terrorist
attacks on the Indian Parliament House complex in New Delhi that killed
14. President Jiang Zemin deserves recognition as a constructive participant
in the complex conflict.
Praising Progress on Trade.
Trade, environment, and law enforcement are areas where Washington
and Beijing share congruent interests. As such, they do not require
a prominent position on the summit agenda, and President Bush should
point to them as needed to highlight areas in which the United States
and China can and do cooperate.
China's foreign trade minister said in November that joining the
WTO was a "strategic decision" by Beijing to promote China's
market reforms. He promised China would "abide by WTO rules and
honor its commitments while enjoying its rights," and "fully
demonstrate the resolve and confidence of China to deepen its reforms
and to open further to the outside world." The terms for China's
WTO entry require it to reduce tariffs on most industrial products from
the 1997 average of 25 percent to 8 percent by January 2004. If China
follows through, the reforms will open China's massive market to American
exports of industrial goods, services, and farm products to an unprecedented
degree and strengthen the world economy.
In Beijing, President Bush should point out that only China's strict
adherence to its WTO commitments will help it reap the benefits of WTO
membership. The United States cannot be sympathetic if China's entry
into the WTO spawns even more disputes rather than helping to end them
as Chinese firms, government agencies, and localities ignore even the
clearest of the government's promises to open markets.
Conclusion
On his first official state visits to Japan, Korea, and China, President
Bush must seek ways to address America's goals of greater security,
prosperity, and peace in the vital Asia region. He must discuss ways
to strengthen alliance coordination with Japan and Korea and to confront
Beijing's proliferation activities.
On the whole, his task is manageable. In Tokyo, the President should
voice America's support both for the economic reforms instituted by
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and for Japan's military deployments
in the war on terrorism. In Seoul, he should assure the Koreans that
America fully supports its efforts at reconciliation, but that the United
States must remain cautious in its own engagement toward the North.
North Korea is a terrorist state and threatens regional and global security.
The President must also discuss ways to strengthen the U.S.-ROK Alliance
and explain to South Korea the clear and growing need for missile defenses.
The President's firm resolve to fight terror and his commitment to
Taiwan forced Beijing to rethink its geopolitical position in Asia and
recently to back away from its hostile rhetoric toward Taipei. The President
should speak clearly about China's destabilizing proliferation and missile
buildup activities, invite China to increase its cooperation in the
war on terrorism, address America's concerns about human rights abuses,
and affirm China's progress on opening its markets and access to the
WTO. Finally, the Administration, in the run-up to the summit in Beijing,
should insist that China allow the President's comments to be broadcast
to the Chinese people uncensored--which was not the case in the last
two U.S. presidential visits to Beijing.
－John J. Tkacik
is Research Fellow for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, and Balbina Hwang
is Policy Analyst for Northeast Asia, in the Asian Studies Center at
The Heritage Foundation.
