Dear
Mr. Colin Powell, Please accept my sincere
thanks for your justice over the security of cross-strait issues. By recent report from Hong Kong,
we are recognizing that Beijing’s threats were on critical condition
over Asia-Pacific region. The Chinese military has started
war games off its southern coast opposite Taiwan, the Hong Kong newspaper
Wen Wei Po reported on Aug. 9, 2001. The amphibious mechanical unit of
the Chinese Liberation Army "Liberation No.1," also known as
"Donghai No. 6," began a joint military exercise off the
southeast coastal province of Fujian near Dongshan Island on Aug. 9, 2001,
reported the pro-Beijing newspaper, citing anonymous sources. The full-page report showed
large pictures of several war ships apparently patrolling along a coast. Tens of thousands of troops from
the navy, army and air force have performed a landing drill off Dacheng
Bay of the Zhaoan County, 204km from Taiwan and more than 300 top military
leaders will preside over the exercises, Wen Wei Po reported. The Chinese communist army has
mobilized "the most technologically advanced" weaponry --
including air fighters, war ships and missiles, it said. China's Foreign Ministry
representative office did not immediately respond to an inquiry. But a Taiwan Ministry of Defense
spokesman, speaking on customary condition of anonymity, disputed the
report. Hong Kong and Chinese news media had for months said the annual
exercises would take place but he said the war games have yet to happen. The parade of China's military
force came as President Jiang Zemin cautioned the US that arms sales to
Taiwan were "utterly wrong" and "would be very
dangerous." "Such a practice will
not serve the interests of the people of Taiwan and is not conducive to
peace in Asia, and it will also harm the US' own interest," Jiang
said in an interview with The New York Times published on Aug. 10, 2001. Washington announced an arms sale
to Taiwan earlier this year. In the interview, Jiang warned
that if pro-independence forces ever tried to move Taiwan away from the
mainland, "China can never renounce the use of force." Why Taiwanese people against
the “one China” principle? The election of Chen Shui-bian as
the 10th president of the Republic of China was not anticipated by
officials in China. As a result, China adopted a “watch, listen and
wait” attitude towards the new administration in Taiwan, and continually
pressured Chen Shui-bian to accept the “one China” principle and give
up his support for the “special state-to-state relationship” concept
in his inaugural speech. If Chen did not give into China’s demands, then
China threatened to use all necessary measures, peaceful or not, to bring
about a resolution to the Taiwan issue after a undefined period of
tranquility. In recent reactions to the “one China” principle, Chen
has made it clear that the “one China” principle should be an issue
for negotiation, not a precondition for dialogue. I support Chen’s
resolve that the “one China” principle should be an issue, not a
precondition for talks, mainly for the reason that any future
cross-strait negotiator must understand that Taiwan will suffer
politically if it accepts the “one China” principle, due to Taiwan’s
diplomatic isolation. If the “one China” principle is a bargaining
chip between Taiwan and China, then Taiwan should exercise extreme care
when dealing with the issue. I. Taiwan’s ambiguous sovereign
status will be threatened once the “One China” principle is no longer
an abstract concept Academics from Taiwan and abroad
have voiced their opinion that the “one China” principle should
continue to be viewed as an abstract concept. As long as the “one China,
each side with its own interpretation” consensus reached between China
and Taiwan 1992 is maintained, the scholars claim, and Taiwan refrains
from admitting that “the ‘one China’ refers to the People’s
Republic of China,” then there is nothing politically wrong with
agreeing to the principle in the interests of cross-strait peace. I do not
entirely agree with this view because: 1.
During the Clinton-Jiang
Summit in Shanghai in 1998, US President Clinton announced the so-called
“three no’s”; 2.
Ex-president Lee Teng-hui put forward the “special
state-to-state” theory in July 1999. These two events have removed any
political ambiguity from the discourse about cross-strait relations. If
Taiwan backs down now, it will signify that the ROC has given up the
“special state-to-state” relationship stance under pressure from China
and other countries, and has thereby negated Taiwan’s sovereignty. Such
a move would not simply take Taiwan back to the 1992 consensus on the
“one China” policy, but would be politically catastrophic. II. China’s “one China”
principle strategy is politically motivated If we carefully examine the “one
China” principle expounded by mainland China, it become clear that China
has actually pursued three different tactics regarding the principle: 1. The phrase “one China” refers to the People’s Republic of China in diplomatic dealings, and China refuses to discuss the “one China” principle internationally or with Taiwan. China attempts to avoid discussion on the issue to avoid leading to the impression that there are “two Chinas.” 2.
China insists that Taiwan is a part of China, and that China’s
territory and sovereignty are inviolable. China contends that by
restricting dialogue to that based on a consensus that “Taiwan is a part
of China,” it can reach the provisional goal of “preventing
independence and promoting unification,” help China in its international
campaign to drum up support for unification, and prevent other countries
from interfering in the Taiwan issue and 3.
During negotiations with China, Taiwan’s has remained committed
to the “one China, each side with its own interpretation” principle.
China, however, believes that “each side with its own interpretation”
portion of the clause could draw attention to the separation of China and
Taiwan, and has therefore attempted to downplay down the consensus reached
in 1992, and has denied that it agreed to the “each side with its own
interpretation” part of the consensus. I believe that China’s use of
these three explanations of the “one China” principle is an skillful
attempt to use nationalist sentiment to convince the people of Taiwan that
Taiwan is part of China, lower the international status of the ROC, and
reiterate that the government on Taiwan is a local government belonging to
China. III. Understand the seriousness of the “one China” principle and considerations for future negotiations I believe that if the administration wants to accept the “one China, each side with its own interpretation” principle or negotiates with China over the “one China” principle in the future, the following should be taken into consideration: 1. An acceptance of the “one China” principle represents a capitulation of the “special state-to-state relationship” by Taiwan. It will impact on ROC’s (Taiwan) sovereignty in the international arena, and could return cross-strait relations to a previous stage when both sides vied to officially represent “China.” This runs counter to the work by ex-president Lee Teng-hui and his administration, and would be a serious diplomatic setback for Taiwan. 2. If Taiwan agrees to the “one China” principle, it will mean that Taiwan accepts that “China’s territory includes both Taiwan and mainland China.” In the present international environment where the UN and most countries accept that mainland China represents “China,” agreeing to the “one China” principle will trap Taiwan internationally, regardless of how Taiwan couches the meaning of “one China.” This will be particularly true if Taiwan signs an agreement with China stating such (at present, the only written document that contains any such statement is the National Unification Guidelines, while all other cross-strait consensus are based on oral agreements). If this happens, then Taiwan will clearly and actively dispel all ambiguities to Taiwan’s status that exist in the international community. Cross-strait politics will return to the starting point five decades ago when China’s civil war broke out. If this happens, then the US, Japan or other countries would be seen as violating China’s internal affairs if they intervene in cross-strait issues. Such a move would make it very politically difficult for international intervention in cross-strait conflict. Further, this would greatly complicate Taiwan’s plan to join the UN (Taiwan would be part of China, and no longer a sovereign state), and would also affect Taiwan’s relationships with countries that recognize the ROC, as well as military hardware procurement with other countries. 3.
Based on the principle of
“estoppels,” acceptance of the “one China” principle would negate
the use of a plebiscite to decide Taiwan’s fate. It would push Taiwan
down the road of unification. Therefore I conclude that a
cross-strait consensus on the “one China” principle must be the result
of cross-strait negotiations, not a unilateral and unconditional
acceptance. In other words, Taiwan need not completely reject the “one
China” issue, but should remain resolved on certain considerations. The
“one China” principle should be an issue, not a precondition.
If mainland China fails to give up its stubborn insistence on the “one
country, two systems” concept and refuses to improve its stance towards
the sovereignty of the ROC (Taiwan), Taiwan’s space in international
activities, and cross-strait security, then the cross-strait relationship
is doomed to remain a zero-sum game. The “prisoner’s dilemma” of
cross-strait politics is inextricably linked to the degree that China is
willing to improve cross-strait relations, as well as whether the US,
Japan and the international community have the confidence to support the
political stance of the ROC (Taiwan). Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian on
Aug. 10, 2001 pledged his support for the "one China" principle
outlined by his predecessors, clarifying his views on fraught
cross-Straits relations with Beijing. Until now Chen, viewed by Beijing
as a potential separatist since his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
came to power last year, has said the issue was open for discussion. In a meeting with US Senator
Christopher Bond, Chen said he supported the existing Taiwanese
constitution, created under the Kuomintang's (KMT) half a century grip on
power, which accepted the notion of a unified China while asserting the
Republic of China's (Taiwan's official name) dominance over the Beijing
government. "To solve the differences
across the Strait, the spirit of ROC's constitution has to be adopted to
set the course," Chen said when meeting Bond at the presidential
office here. "It is also the answer that
could be accepted by the people and governments across the Strait, to the
so-called 'one China' issue." "Communist China has to
accept the fact that I'm the ROC President, otherwise, it would be a
denial to the ROC and the ROC constitution which I myself cannot accept,
nor can the 23 million people in Taiwan." Chen, has openly refused to
embrace Beijing's "one China" policy under which Taiwan,
separated in 1949 at the end of a civil, is regarded as a renegade
province awaiting reunification, by force if necessary. Last week, China's defense
minister Chi Haotian called for the People's Liberation Army to be ready
to retake Taiwan in a speech marking the PLA's 74th anniversary. "We will definitely not
commit ourselves to the abandonment of force and we will never permit any
external force to interfere in the affairs of Taiwan." "All schemes to hinder China's reunification are doomed to fail." Beijing has proposed the two sides
unite under a "one country, two systems" scheme similar to that
which it uses to rule Hong Kong and Macau. The offer was turned down by
Taipei which feared that Taiwan would be relegated to the status of a
local government. Chen, disliked by Beijing for his
anti-unification stance, also used the meeting with Bond to repeat his
wish to attend the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in
Shanghai in October. "It's a (APEC) member's right
and obligation (to attend the summit) and it would be appropriate (for me)
to attend as the ROC President." Chen's earlier offer to join the
Shanghai summit was flatly turned down. Taiwan joined APEC in 1991 as
"Chinese Taipei" in line with conditions set by Beijing. China is for the first time
hosting APEC meetings, with the 2001 series of gatherings to culminate in
the summit to be attended by US President George W. Bush. APEC was set up in 1989 as an
informal talking group for a dozen Asia-Pacific economies, but has
developed into a powerful engine to drive global and regional free trade. In our struggle for freedom, we look forward to your continued help, and support in democratic Taiwan.
Yours Sincerely,
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