Beijing
miffed over US on July 20, 2004 Beijing
miffed over US `interference' with TRA resolution REUTERS
, BEIJING China has condemned a US
Congressional resolution reaffirming America's commitment to supply weapons to
Taiwan. The US House of Representatives passed a resolution last week reaffirming
its commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act, the law that requires Washington to
arm Taipei, as the cornerstone of US relations with Taipei. The resolution said China's military modernisation and weapons procurement
programmes were matters of grave concern, particularly the recent deployment of
about 500 missiles directed toward Taiwan. "We express our strong dissatisfaction and resolute opposition to
this," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said in a statement
seen on the ministry's Web site yesterday. "[This] brazenly violates Chinese sovereignty and grossly interferes
in China's internal affairs," she said, adding that the Bush administration
should oppose the resolution. "Splittist activities by `Taiwan independence' forces are the biggest
threat to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait," Zhang said. China has made solemn representations with the US side, Zhang said, adding
that US arms sales to Taiwan would sabotage China-US relations and undermine
American interests. But analysts said the tone of the protest was relatively mild and unlikely
to sour ties with the US. Bilateral trade and investment are booming, and China
has backed the US-led war on terror and taken a leading role in trying to
resolve a crisis over North Korea's nuclear programmes. The resolution said US President George W. Bush should encourage further
dialogue between Beijing and Taipei and should not discourage Taiwanese
officials from visiting the US. Bush and Congress should determine whether China's arms build-up required
that additional defense articles and services be made available to Taiwan, the
resolution said. Beneficial
unification brings peace By
Chien Hsi-chieh China is viewing the
next 20 years as an opportunity for peaceful development. It is viewing these 20
years, the second stage of reforms and deregulation, as "a period of
strategic opportunity" for raising the country to new levels. China, however, views Taiwan's gradual move toward independence as the
greatest threat to this period of "peaceful" development. In
particular, with the planned amendment of the Constitution (or the writing of a
new one) in 2006 and the promulgation of that Constitution in 2008, Taiwan will
cross over China's "red line," and there is a definite possibility
that this will be seen as a provocation for war. The movement to rectify Taiwan's national title is not only a matter of the
Taiwan Solidarity Union trying to impose concrete demands for the writing of a
new Constitution, it is also an attempt by the independence-minded party to take
the initiative in the nation's "big issue." The use of Taiwan's
democratic process to write a new and appropriate Constitution and the attempt
to define the status quo in the Taiwan Strait from the perspective of
"Taiwan, Republic of China" are certain to cause much distain for the
US and China, and will be the defining issue on which China bases its decision
whether to invade. If China responds to this situation by speeding up the promulgation of a
national unification law, it will touch a sensitive nerve among Taiwan's
independence proponents and cause a wave of "anti-China" protests. If
that happens, cross-strait peace will deteriorate. China is hoping for 20 years of strategic opportunity, during which time it
can keep a lower profile and stop pressing "peaceful unification" and
"one country, two systems" on Taiwan in favor of maintaining the
status quo. A Beijing-based think tank, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, has
said that the next six to eight years are a crucial period in the cross-strait
relationship, and also the most dangerous period. Many analysts hold that the greatest obstacle to cross-strait negotiations
is China's insistence on the "one China" principle, as well as its use
of military intimidation. This issue is not only an obstacle to cross-strait
negotiations, it is also a catalyst for the Taiwan independence movement. As
long as Taiwan holds national elections, the nationalism inherent in such
independence slogans as "love Taiwan or sell out Taiwan" and
"protect Taiwan and oppose China" is the most effective way to
mobilize the public against the idea of reunification. Who, then, cares about
political ideology or administrative achievements? The leader who most fiercely opposes China will be the one who gets the
vote. Accordingly, Taiwan's future political leaders must become tougher and
more hawkish. But if China finds it difficult to tolerate such a leadership, its
own hawks are certain to rear their ugly head. And if the two sides of the
Taiwan Strait move toward more hawkish positions, nationalism and attempts at
vilifying each other will make war inescapable. China must change its idea of what Taiwan's independence is. How, for
example, should it be defined? Could a clearly-defining recognition of de facto
indepen-dence but not formal independence satisfy the Chinese government? If
that were possible, China would not have to worry about provocations or a
gradual push for formal independence. Dialogue must be built on recognition of
the status quo. The People's Republic of China has never ruled Taiwan. Asking that Taiwan
enter into negotiations based on the "one China" principle will be
seen by the people of Taiwan as a request to surrender their country. No
political leader will want to play the role of Li Hongzhang, the viceroy of the
Qing dynasty who signed the Shimonoseki Treaty with Japan. They are even more
afraid of being labelled traitors. China's leaders often say that they pin their
hopes on the people of Taiwan, but they do not understand them. The
reconciliation between East and West Germany began with a mutual respect for the
status quo, not a "one Germany" principle. Furthermore, West Germany understood how to treat a weaker entity, and this
is why German reunification succeeded. East Germany did not feel pressured or as
though it was being annexed, and that allowed peaceful unification. One of the biggest obstacles in the present cross-strait relationship is
the "crisis of trust." China believes that giving up the military
option will result in Taiwan declaring independence and the US changing its view
of what "one China" means. Taiwan, on the other hand, constantly
changes its rhetoric; one day talking about the "five noes" pledge,
another day about "one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait." Given China's consistent use of military pressure, such ever-changing
rhetoric will never succeed in building mutual trust. Peace does not, in fact, equal surrender and submission. Only through
justice and fairness will true peace be achieved. The best chance for achieving
peace is to follow these three steps: First, respect for the status quo is necessary to maintain the status quo,
build a foundation of trust and create a situation where it is possible to
discuss a mid-term agreement for the Taiwan Strait. Second, talk of the peaceful rise of China should center on cross-strait
peace and do away with any strategy of resorting to military force against
Taiwan. Third, China must give up its strategy of isolating Taiwan diplomatically
and economically and replace it with closer economic and diplomatic cooperation,
and mutual exchanges to create a win-win relationship. Through these measures, China would get its 20 years of peaceful
development, and in 2050 the two sides could agree on "mutually beneficial
unification." Given the cross-strait stand-off, Taiwan should allow visits from Chinese
workers in the private sector -- in particular from China's gradually maturing
nonprofit organizations. Think tanks and nongovernmental organizations should
engage in exchanges with Chinese think tanks to let them gain a better
understanding of Taiwan. Chien
Hsi-chieh is the executive director of the Peacetime Foundation of Taiwan. China's
HK policies fail Chinese officials, such as Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, use every
opportunity to point out that there is more democracy in Hong Kong now, under
Chinese rule, than when it was a British colony. They say that, since the people
of Hong Kong did not complain under British rule, it is hypocritical of Western
powers to accuse China of suppressing their human rights ("China snorts at
Western concern for human rights," July 16, page 1). At first blush, the rationale may seem reasonable. However, what Chinese
officials are really saying is that if Western powers thought it was okay for
the British to deny the people of Hong Kong a say in their future, then China
should not be criticized for doing the same. In addition, the people of Hong
Kong have no cause for complaint. After all, they have never had a say in their
future so it should not matter to them if their oppressors are British or
Chinese. But the Chinese comparison of its rule with British rule is incomplete.
During the past century, the British have de-colonized. Beginning with Canada in
the mid-1800s, the British allowed their far-flung colonies to gain
independence. The 53 members of the Commonwealth are former British territories
who now govern themselves. If that practice continues, it is likely that when
Hong Kong develops the desire for self-government, the British will also help
coordinate its independence and membership of the Commonwealth. On the other hand, I can think of no territory that China has let go of. To
the contrary, in the past century, China has been absorbing territories that may
once have paid tribute to the Chinese empire, but were actually self-governing.
Its desire for Taiwan is yet another example of China's appetite. To complete the comparison of the human right records of British and
Chinese rule over Hong Kong, British de-colonization and Chinese expansionism
must be considered. At that point, perhaps Chinese officials will find other
arguments to justify their disregard for the concerns of Hong Kong's people. Kenneth
Choy Hong Kong |