Chinese tourists on July 21, 2004

Seventeen Chinese tourists disappear

PUZZLING: Officials discounted speculation that the missing tourists might have anything to do with today's military exercises, saying gangsters might be involved
By Joy Su
STAFF REPORTER

A group of Chinese tourists has been missing since arriving in Taiwan last Tuesday, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) confirmed yesterday, on the eve of the annual Hankuang military exercises.

According to the council, all 17 members of the tour group failed to meet the Taiwanese travel agency that was to greet them at the airport last Tuesday. Two members of another tour group from China disappeared last Wednesday, and another the following day.

Council officials were quick to dismiss speculation about the tourists' disappearance, saying that the timing of the incident did not necessarily indicate any link to the Hankuang drills, or Beijing's military exercises on Dongshan island off Fujian Province and its test of ballistic missiles in Shanxi Province later this month.

MAC Vice Chairman Liu Te-shun said the police suspect that the disappearance of the group of 17 tourists had something to do with the activities of gangs involved in human trafficking.

Liu said the disappearance of individuals on the 14th and the 15th was a totally different matter to the disappearance of the group on the 13th.

"Since allowing Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan, we've seen a few cases in which tourists unexpectedly leave their group. Usually these people return to the group later," Liu said.

Liu said that the travel agency immediately reported the disappearance of the 17-person group to the authorities.

He said that government agencies have a good idea of where the missing people might be.

The group originally departed from Fujian Province and consisted of more men than women. All the members of the group are middle-aged.

"MAC records show that 2,151 Chinese tourists visited Taiwan in 2002, 12,775 in 2003 and 8,448 tourists up to July of this year," council spokesman Chiu Tai-san said.

The council has no record of any Chinese tourists disappearing in 2002, while three disappeared last year. Liu said that to date these three have not been located.

"Of the 12,775 Chinese tourists who visited Taiwan in 2002, only three disappeared -- that's roughly one out of every 4,000," Chiu said.

Despite suspicions that the missing tourists might be illegal immigrants, council officials said yesterday that the incident would not affect current tourism policies.

"If safety is a concern, then we will work on improving it, but the policy will not change," MAC Chairman Joseph Wu said.

Taiwan first opened its doors to Chinese tourists in January 2002, but at the time permitted only people in the so-called "third category" -- those who were studying overseas or who have permanent residence in a foreign country -- to visit. The government later changed the definition of "third category" to include those who have lived and worked in Hong Kong or Macau for more than four years.

In May 2002, the government further relaxed the regulations, allowing tour groups of "second category" Chinese nationals to enter the country. The second category includes visitors who make stops in other countries, either for business or pleasure, before arriving in Taiwan.

KMT still doesn't get democracy

Back in May, the National Policy Foundation, a Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) think tank, produced a 20-page pamphlet entitled Bulletgate. Recently, reports have said it was distributed to US congresspeople, think tanks and the media. Since the serious accusations in the pamphlet have had a negative impact on Taiwan's international image, the issue has immediately attracted much discussion in Taiwan.

It is hard to understand why the pan-blue camp resorted to the kind of curbside propaganda it is using regarding the shooting of President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu. It is also hard to understand why it has continued to use it ever since the March 20 election defeat, and has seen fit to distribute this hackneyed propaganda in US political and media circles. Are the pan-blues simply seeking revenge, or do they have some other agenda?

Using propaganda that was appropriate on the hustings as the official party platform is reckless and takes no account of unintended consequences. The sensational language employed by the pamphlet may be of use in helping the pan-blues vent their anger at losing the election, thereby maintaining a state of heightened emotions among supporters. But the tone of the booklet uses extravagant language to make a case that is based on unsubstantiated rumors. When people in the US learn for themselves that the content of the booklet is false and misleading, how can the pan-blue camp hope to win the trust of officials in the US again?

The presidential elections took place four months ago, but the pan-blues still don't understand that their best recourse is to calmly wait for the results of the official investigation and court hearings. Instead, they are constantly coming up with ill-conceived, baseless accusations that cannot stand up to even the slightest scrutiny.

This is certainly not the way to win respect and sympathy. If the US government, Congress or the media decide to take a position regarding the election-related litigation, it will only be after the judiciary has completed its investigation and released an official report on the matter.

The case brought by the pan-blue camp challenging the validity of the election is being considered by the judiciary; the results of the recount demanded by the KMT and the People First Party (PFP) will also be released soon, as will the report on the March 19 shooting by Henry Lee, the forensics expert -- sanctioned by the pan-blue camp -- who was brought to Taiwan to study the case. That the KMT-PFP alliance should choose this period, prior to the release of these reports, to hype up stale, one-sided propaganda makes one suspect that they are afraid the results of the reports will not be favorable to them, and hope to muddy the waters while they can.

The US election battle in 2000 between President George W. Bush and former vice president Al Gore is still fresh in our memories. Gore's defeat, no matter how unjust he felt it was, hinged on the fact that he had no direct evidence of malfeasance in the Florida polls. He accepted his defeat and even today is still praised by some as a model of democratic grace.

But when Americans see Lien Chan, a former vice president, and James Soong, a former provincial governor, as incapable of following the example of virtuous predecessors, or even exhibiting the basic respect for democracy by waiting patiently for the results of the judicial investigation, instead spreading nonsensical rumors attacking the administration, how can they not be disgusted?

Maybe the pan-blue camp has once again underestimated the wisdom of the Americans. Through their irrational and irresponsible actions, Lien and Soong have shown the US and the international community that the miracle of democracy that they see in Taiwan does not have its roots in the pan-blue camp. The Bulletgate fiasco is merely another example of this.

It's time to revisit the status quo

By Nat Bellocchi

Last October, as Taiwan's presidential election campaign was heating up for the election in March of this year, I wrote about the status quo in terms of the many polls in Taiwan that asked people's preference on the subject of unification or independence.

My concern then was that so many of the respondents opted for the status quo, in one way or the other, thus making the majority's preference less clear. The polling was seen as Taiwan's internal matter, with important external political and security consequences to be sure, but cloaked primarily as a domestic campaign issue. Speak of status quo today -- and the media and the politicians do in great abundance -- and the term is seen abroad only as a cross-strait issue.

The result of Taiwan's presidential election has put into question the status quo of the past several years. It is getting increasingly difficult to confine the meaning of status quo to a narrow definition of China wanting Taiwan, a Taiwan that does not want to be a part of China and that neither side can unilaterally change. There are too many activities going on between both sides, underneath that broad status quo umbrella, that are meant eventually to meet the same objective of one side or the other. These activities will continue, and are drawing ever closer to a point where the old umbrella can't keep out the rain.

The US was genuinely pleased with the strengthening of democracy when the 2000 election resulted in a change in government, and especially after the new president's inaugural speech of that year. As the election drew near, there were many in the US that expected the pan-blue ticket would return to power. This was based more on the number of votes the pan-blue coalition had obtained in the last election than ideological preference.

But the US government's stance was, traditionally and realistically, that the US could work with whoever is elected.

The assertive strategy of the ruling party in the campaign on the issue of national identity, however, shook the foreign policy establishment in the US. Seeing the issue in cross-strait terms, and ignoring the tendency in America's own elections that winning an election is paramount, tensions in the US-Taiwan relationship escalated. Following the election and after some communication between the two sides took place, tensions receded, but the need for a policy review became apparent. A near consensus on national identity by the people of Taiwan made it clear that the status quo as defined by the poll takers may have changed.

China's behavior in the election in Taiwan was considerably different than in the year 2000. The coercive rhetoric was modified. The result of the latter election, however, came as a much greater surprise. This is understandable -- China's leaders aren't much on democratic elections. But there is more to this surprise than that. "Separatists" in Taiwan were supposed to be in the minority. "Taiwan compatriots" were supposed to be the mainstream. The migration of so many companies, people and money from Taiwan to China was supposed to bring people closer to China. And though it must have hurt, the opposition, despite its shift in campaign rhetoric closer to the Democratic Progressive Party, was more to China's liking than the present ruling party. Here too, then, the need for policy review was becoming apparent.

Although Taiwan, as the recent election demonstrated, had taken a major step toward a consensus on national identity, it is not there yet. During the campaign for the president, introducing the referendum into it brought concern by the Americans, strong opposition to it by China, several domestic challenges by the opposition but strong pressure for it by the pan-green coalition. Aside from Taiwan's domestic politics, and China's general fear of free people's voting, there was another purpose in pushing for a referendum. It was meant to encourage awareness by the people of the security dangers Taiwan faces.

There are different views on all of this, but the government's concern in Taipei (and among those people in Washington involved in Taiwan's security), is how to cope with legislators -- mostly opposition but others as well -- who oppose providing the resources for modernization of the military; organizations and NGOs who place a higher priority elsewhere; and the younger voters who take for granted their separate identity and have little sense of urgency about the danger Taiwan faces.

In fact, the latter is Taiwan's greatest danger as the government pursues legal reform and efforts to cope with cross-Strait relations.

China, as usual, has procrastinated over the present cross-strait tensions. It may have to continue doing so as the cross-strait issue is taking on a more complicated color -- besides Taiwan, the behavior of the people in Hong Kong, and now, perhaps, a different Singapore may be a trend relevant to its ambitions. While China waits for the elections in the US and Taiwan this year, it voices strong complaints about the US role in these matters. What we hear now is that the US should stop its arms sales to Taiwan, or stop supporting Taiwan in the international arena, or in permitting transit/visits of Taiwanese officials. These are old complaints, that Beijing is well aware are non-starters. The reason for this might be based on Beijing's domestic political problems or a way of trying to limit any hostile rhetoric from forming in the American election campaign.

The US tabled its strategy following Taiwan's election in testimony before the Congress on April 21. The US reiterated standing policies such as "one China" policy commitments to the three communiques and the TRA, a peaceful resolution of the cross-strait problems, the six assurances and no unilateral change to Taiwan's status. It also included some new Taiwan policies -- American involvement in making judgments on provocations and specific efforts at political reform, among others.

According to an article about National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice's visit to Beijing, she suggested a "higher level of dialogue" was needed between the US and China. If this is true, and its purpose is to better cope with the many differences between the two countries, one subject they will surely include is the US-Taiwan relationship. That would contradict one of the six assurances given to Taipei. In addition, if sensitive and difficult but important decisions need a higher level of dialogue, it should be true of Taiwan as well.

Next year, after the elections in the US and Taiwan are history, and China, perhaps, has settled its own internal differences, how best to address the status quo in cross-strait terms, and how best to work with a Taiwan that has largely decided its own identity may become clearer.

Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special advisor to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.