Keep warm hand to China but … on Oct 15, 2004

China negotiator invited to Taiwan

GOODWILL GESTURE: The MAC chairman extended another invitation to Wang Daohan to open talks in Taiwan, reiterating an offer that was first made in May

By Joy Su
STAFF REPORTER
 

The nation's top cross-strait policymaking body yesterday reissued an invitation to Wang Daohan, China's chief cross-strait negotiator, welcoming him to Taiwan for another round of talks and the opportunity to "write another page of history."

Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Joseph Wu extended the invitation yesterday morning during a speech commemorating the anniversary of the second round of talks that took place between the chairman of the semi-official Straits Exchange Foundation, Koo Chen-fu, and Wang in Shanghai between Oct. 14 and Oct. 18, 1998.

The 1998 meeting followed the historic negotiations that took place between the two men in Singapore in 1993.

"[The two meetings] were two of the most closely watched cross-strait events since 1949 and the agreements reached at these talks laid a firm foundation for mutually beneficial exchange ... looking back, it is clear that the 1998 meeting could not have taken place without the 1993 meeting, which could not have been without the 1992 meeting," Wu said, referring to a preparatory meeting in Hong Kong in 1992 which hammered out the protocols for the Singapore meeting.

During the 1998 Koo-Wang talks, one of the agreements reached had been that a visit to Taiwan be arranged for Wang at an appropriate time.

To date, the planned visit has yet to be realized.

This is the second invitation Wu has extended to Wang since Wu took office, having asked Wang to visit Taiwan in May of this year.

But while hopes for a breakthrough in cross-strait talks have been pinned on the two men, both are getting on in years: Koo is 87, and Wang 90.

As such, Wu yesterday revealed for the first time that the council had already begun training new negotiators in preparation for future talks.

"In other words, the council is prepared to engage in talks with China on any issue," Wu said, reiterating the government's willingness to discuss the possibility of reciprocal and direct chartered flights across the Strait to shuttle China-based Taiwanese business-people returning home for the Lunar New Year holidays next year.

Wu also elaborated on the content of President Chen Shui-bian's Double Ten National Day speech, giving specific examples of initiatives that could be included under the "Code of Conduct across the Taiwan Strait" that Chen proposed on Sunday.

According to Wu, the Code of Conduct could include initiatives allowing for the visitation opportunities between military personnel, exchange of information, an emergency hotline, participation at international security conferences, cooperative prevention of crime, vows to refrain from the use of military force and threats of military force, renunciation of first strike attacks and the mutual respect of air space.

"For any Code of Conduct, the basic condition is the renunciation of using military force or the threat of military threat," Wu said when reporters questioned the likelihood of such an initiative.

"This is necessary to meet the very basic definition of peace -- the lack of war," he said.

According to Wu, vows to avoid making the first strike, respect air space, and announcing of military drills were initiatives that Taiwan could implement on its own, he said however that other aspects of the Code of Conduct required "negotiations, or at the very least, contact with" China.

MOFA criticizes French ambassador's comments

By Melody Chen
STAFF REPORTER , WITH CNA

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday rejected remarks by the French ambassador to the US, Jean-David Levitte, that Taiwan and China are "one country."

"The Republic of China, Taiwan, was established in 1912. It is the oldest republic in Asia. It is now a democracy enjoying freedom and a prospering economy," said ministry spokesman Michel Lu.

"The People's Republic of China [PRC] was founded in 1949. Its human rights record remains poor now. These two [republics] are not one country," Lu said.

"We don't know Levitte's purpose of giving such a speech," he said, referring to a speech the French ambassador made on Tuesday to the Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies in Washington.

Entitled "Changes in Europe and America: A French View," the speech gave a French perspective of the major blocs around the world today and in the future.

In a question and answer session afterwards, Levitte was asked whether the French government supported the need to promote democracy in China by supporting democracy in Taiwan or believes that commercial interests are paramount and that arms sales to China should be permitted.

Levitte ducked the part about arms sales to China, but did comment on the prospects of China's democratization and on the development of cross-strait relations.

"We are in favor of democracy in China, as we are in favor of democracy all over the world," he said.

"My personal conviction is that you cannot have a strong market economy competing so well in this globalized world without democracy developing at the same time, even without knowing democratic values, because a market economy brings democracy," he said.

"With Taiwan investing so heavily in China, I believe that this convergence of the two economies will gradually result in the convergence of the two different regimes," Levitte said.

Noting that he lived in China during the Cultural Revolution, Levitte said that "if you compare the level of freedom, liberties and market economy in China in the days of the Cultural Revolution with that of today's China, you'll see it's a totally different world.

China's inflexibility blocks progress

President Chen Shui-bian has shown a very high level of flexibility in his Double Ten Day speech toward China, which many had hoped would open a rare and precious opportunity for a significant breakthrough in the cross-strait impasse. However, the response on Wednesday of Zhang Mingqing, the spokesperson for Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office, to Chen's speech dashed hopes for any such breakthrough.

Upon examining both Chen's speech and Zhang's statement, it isn't hard to see that Beijing's stubborn stance on the "one China" principle continues to be the obstacle to any meaningful improvement in the cross-strait relationship.

Almost all would agree that the most noteworthy element of Chen's talk was his call for using the 1992 cross-strait talks in Hong Kong as the basis for an acceptable solution and in preparation to push for further negotiations. Chen's statement is not an acknowledgement of what Beijing calls the "1992 consensus under which each side [of the Taiwan Strait] makes its own interpretation of `one China'," since it would mean an acceptance of the "one China" principle. Chen is not at liberty to accept this, even if he wanted to. As Taiwan is already completely democratized, although he is the president, Chen has no authority to make such an acceptance -- which has serious implications for the future and status of Taiwan -- without getting the support of the people of Taiwan.

The truth of the matter is that the closest thing to a consensus -- if it can even be called a consensus -- that the two sides have ever reached was to agree that, since they could not reach any consensus on the political issue of the "one China" principle, they might as well move on to deal with non-political administrative issues.

During the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong, negotiations over handling document certification broke down as a result of the two sides' inability to agree on the "one China" principle. So the two sides then began to speak about the possibility of leaving aside political issues to pursue non-political ones. This meeting in Hong Kong was the precursor to what Taiwan believes is the consensus -- to move on and deal with non-political issues first. This is precisely what Chen was calling for in his speech on Sunday.

The pragmatism demonstrated by Chen's talk was acknowledged and well-received by countries such as the US and Japan. In particular, less than three hours after Chen gave his speech, the US State Department spokeswoman Darla Jordan, in a statement, called Chen's talk "constructive."

The flexibility of Chen's talk was further demonstrated by the fact that it was criticized by many members of the pro-independence group. For example, Senior Advisor to the President Koo Kwang-ming said it was unnecessary for Chen to make a reference to the 1992 talk in Hong Kong. Even former president Lee Teng-hui lashed out at Chen for saying that "the Republic of China (ROC) is Taiwan" -- which negates the need to rectify the name of the country to "Taiwan" and implies the preservation of political status quo.

Beijing evidently didn't like the speech either. On Wednesday, Zhang accused Chen of practicing Taiwan independence and again called for acknowledgement of the so-called "1992 consensus" and to "leave aside the political disputes, so as to resume cross-strait talks on the basis of the `one China' principle."

But what political dispute is left between the two sides once Taiwan accepts "one China" and negotiates on that basis? In view of Zhang's usual rhetoric, it is clear that China isn't ready to deal with Taiwan in any manner until Taiwan acknowledges that it is part of China. This was, of course, not the first time that Beijing has rejected goodwill gestures made by Taiwan. Under the circumstances, one cannot help but wonder: why should Taiwan bother to extend an olive branch to China?

Move ahead with cross-strait talks

By Andy Chang

The content of President Chen Shui-bian's Double Ten National Day address had been kept a secret before it was delivered. If it is to have a positive impact on the cross-strait relationship, Beijing and Taipei should actively plan to undertake action, not just work on ways to interpret the statement. What is needed is action, not empty words.

Both Chinese President Hu Jintao's words and Chen's speech indicate that the two sides have absolutely no consensus on Taiwan's sovereignty, and the interpretation of "one China." Further, they often toughen their stances so as not to allow the other party too much room for imagination or mistaken expectations. Their attitudes toward economic and social issues, or even dialogue, in contrast, are unusually proactive.

Their tactics can be summarized as being "tougher on the hard issues, and softer on the soft issues." It is up to the other party, though, to interpret what is tough and what is soft.

Whether a full understanding of the other side's stance will be enough to dispel fantasy so that reality can be dealt with in a pragmatic manner will depend on a change in thinking by the leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

What garnered the attention of outsiders most in Chen's speech was the formal proposal that both sides use the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong as a basis for preparations to move toward resumed dialogue, as well as Chen's promise to invite party leaders to establish a Committee for Cross-strait Peace and Development to push forward constitutional reforms after this year's legislative election.

What was the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong about? Why didn't Chen use the term "1992 consensus" instead? What is the difference between the two expressions?

Actually the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong mainly dealt with the issue of how to interpret and handle the issue of "one China." Both sides did make their own interpretations of "one China" in the 1992 meeting, but they certainly had different views on whether a consensus was reached.

Now Taipei is willing to take a step forward based on the 1992 meeting. This is not necessarily a regression from the previous state, when both parties gave their own interpretations of "one China."

Why is it necessary to establish a Committee for Cross-strait Peace and Development? What lessons should the committee learn from the earlier National Unification Council and the Advisory Group on Cross-strait Relations?

Through the committee, the ruling and opposition parties can together push forward constitutional reform. This proposition shows that Chen realizes there is a common concern held by China, the US and even Taiwan internally, that future constitutional reform may trigger a cross-strait crisis.

Because the international community is worried about potential military tension across the Strait, the formation of a committee to promote peace and development is essential for easing doubts and worries over constitutional reform.

To approach the cross-strait relationship in a pragmatic manner, Taipei needs to realize that showing goodwill takes consistent and continual efforts, as well as practical measures. Taipei should not lose patience if Beijing does not respond immediately; neither should such a strategy be affected by the end-of-year legislative elections.

Even if a cross-strait dialogue is unlikely to materialize in the near future, a double authorization mechanism (that is, allowing the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) to authorize another entity to delegate negotiations) should be activated now to facilitate cross-strait shipping and direct chartered flights during the Lunar New Year. Such a mechanism will also be needed to negotiate with Beijing on allowing Chinese citizens to visit Taiwan.

Beijing should be aware that the Chen administration did not recognize the 1992 consensus because it believed that Beijing and Taipei only made their own interpretations of "one China" with no consensus reached. Even if there had been a consensus, Beijing should know very well that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has never seen eye to eye with China in the definition of "one China."

It is a hard fact that leaders on both sides have reached no consensus over "one China." Given this, to argue over whether a consensus was reached 12 years ago is simply misplacing our priorities. After all, the fact that Taipei disagrees with Beijing's interpretation of "one China" is identical to Taipei's disagreement with Beijing's interpretation of the Republic of China.

Therefore, the main issue of cross-strait development is not whether a consensus was reached, but how both sides should pragmatically pursue dialogue given the lack of a consensus on the "one China" issue.

We, on the one hand, would like to urge Taipei to activate the double authorization mechanism immediately and start negotiations with Beijing on chartered flights for passengers and cargo and other issues. We also expect Beijing to reintroduce the model used in the meeting for such issues as renewing contracts for Taiwan-Hong Kong flights, allowing Taipei officials to enter Hong Kong and leading negotiations under the title of consultants.

Will we see such dialogue take shape in the near future? It requires only a change in thinking by the leaders on both sides.

Andy Chang is a professor in the Graduate Institute of China Studies at Tamkang University.

Revolting analysis

By Brian Vranjac

I found Graeme Meehan's letter (Letters, Oct. 8, page 8) so revolting that I felt ashamed of being Australian. How dare he insinuate that "the Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, has urged both sides to engage in dialogue to find peaceful ways to settle their differences"? Who is he kidding? While Downer was so busy bashing democratic Taiwan, I have never heard him asking China to remove its missiles aimed at Taiwan, to stop the illegal occupation of Tibet, East Turkestan and Southern Mongolia and to improve its Frankenstein-like record on human rights.

Anyone with a standard degree of literacy and a normally functioning brain can figure out that China can go on practising its brutal form of state terrorism with impunity because of Downer and those like him.

Has Downer learned nothing from history? Does the name "Neville Chamberlain" (yes, the most ineffective prime minister in the history of our former colonial master) ring a bell? Can Downer not think that an increasingly emboldened and aggressive dictatorial China might one day threaten Australia, or hold Australia to ransom?

And business-friendly realpolitik is not even an excuse. The only result of the FTA that Downer plans to conclude with Beijing will be to legalize and stimulate China's already widespread practice of dumping substandard goods into the Australian market, with hugely detrimental effects on the Australian industry.

Brian Vranjac   Kaohsiung