Tibetan
envoys, Beijing agree to hold future talks
‘MONSTROUS CRIMES’: Chinese
media blasted the Dalai Lama and described his plans for a ‘greater Tibetan
region’ as both fraudulent and confusing
AP AND AFP, BEIJING AND SHENZHEN, CHINA
Tuesday, May 06, 2008, Page 1
Chinese officials and envoys of the Dalai Lama have agreed to a second round of
talks, China’s state-run media said yesterday, in an apparent sign of progress
in easing tensions raised by violent anti-government riots in Tibet.
State TV and Xinhua news agency said that the first round of talks had ended
after one day, but that no formal announcement was made.
CCTV said on its noon news broadcast that the two Tibetan envoys had to report
back to the Dalai Lama in India and that both sides had “agreed to meet again at
a suitable time.”
Xinhua said, however, that the Chinese officials had told the Dalai Lama’s
envoys at their meeting on Sunday that the protests had spawned new obstacles to
communication.
International critics have accused China of heavy-handed tactics in quelling the
anti-government riots and protests in Tibet and Tibetan areas of western China.
Some specialists believe Beijing agreed to meet the envoys to defuse that
criticism ahead of the Beijing Olympics in August.
The talks were held in Shenzhen, but neither side commented to a large group of
foreign reporters waiting outside a palm tree-lined statehouse venue.
Xinhua said the Chinese officials “answered patiently” questions raised by the
Dalai Lama’s envoys.
But even as the talks took place, China kept up its verbal attacks on the Dalai
Lama.
“The central government hoped that to create conditions for the next round of
contact and consultation, the Dalai side would take credible moves to stop
activities aimed at splitting China, stop plotting and inciting violence and
stop disrupting and sabotaging the Beijing Olympic Games,” Xinhua said.
The Dalai Lama has repeatedly said he was not behind the recent unrest and that
his envoys planned to ask China to address the accusations, said Samdhong
Rinpoche, prime minister of the self-declared Tibetan government-in-exile based
in Dharamsala, India.
State media also accused the Dalai Lama of “monstrous crimes.”
“Following the March 14 incident in Lhasa, the Dalai has not only refused to
admit his monstrous crimes, but he has continued to perpetuate fraud,” an
article in yesterday’s state Tibet Daily said.
The article, which did not refer to Sunday’s talks, described the Dalai Lama’s
demands for “genuine autonomy” in Tibet and the “greater Tibetan region” as
fraudulent.
The “Dalai Clique” is trying to “confuse public opinion and incite ethnic
hatred,” the article said.
The Dalai Lama’s attempt to realize a “greater Tibetan region is part of his
attempt to split the motherland,” it said.
The English-language China Daily called the Tibetan Youth Congress, run by
exiled Tibetans, a “terrorist organization” bent on separating Tibet from China.
The two envoys who held the talks with the Chinese officials will return to
India today or tomorrow and would then brief the Dalai Lama, Tibetan officials
said.
US President George W. Bush was one of the world leaders who had pressured China
to restart negotiations to end the Tibetan crisis and the White House
immediately welcomed their resumption.
“We hope discussions can lead to better understanding,” White House spokesman
Tony Fratto said on Sunday.
China also put its choice for the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama, Tibetan
Buddhism’s second-highest figure, on state TV yesterday to praise the ruling
Chinese Communist Party.
“I deeply pray for the successful holding of the Olympics. Under the leadership
of the great Chinese Communist Party, Tibet will definitely become more
prosperous, and lives of Tibetan people will become nicer and happier,” Gyaltsen
Norbu said.
Japanese
want tougher stance on China, poll shows
AFP, TOKYO
Tuesday, May 06, 2008, Page 5
A majority of Japanese believe that their country should take a tougher stance
on China, a new poll showed yesterday ahead of Chinese President Hu Jintao’s
(胡錦濤) landmark visit.
Asked whether Japan needs to change its diplomatic and other positions on China,
51 percent of people said it should be stricter, the Mainichi Shimbun daily said
about the survey.
The ratio was twice as large as the 26 percent who wanted Japan to be “more
friendly” towards China, the May 1 to May 2 telephone poll of 1,042 adults
nationwide showed.
Hu heads to Tokyo today — the first visit to Japan by a Chinese president in a
decade and only the second ever.
Japan is his first foreign destination since major protests broke out in March
against China’s rule in Tibet. China’s ensuing crackdown has caused an
international uproar and cast a shadow on Beijing’s cherished Olympic Games.
But unlike European leaders who have flirted with shunning the Olympic opening
ceremony, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda said he hoped to go even before
Hu could formally extend the invitation.
Fukuda, struggling to reverse rock-bottom approval ratings caused by domestic
issues, has championed reconciliation with China throughout his career.
The Mainichi said the poll appeared to reflect unhappiness with China’s
insistence that the Tibet issue is an internal matter, as well as concerns over
the safety of food imports from China.
What a
green MAC chair means
By Lai I-chung 賴怡忠
Tuesday, May 06, 2008, Page 8
When the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came to power eight years ago, I was
in Washington serving as director of DPP representatives in the US. I received
endless meeting requests from Chinese officials and academics closely connected
to the government, military and the Chinese Communist Party.
By talking to these individuals, including Chinese experts on US politics, I
learned that future appointments in such organizations as the Mainland Affairs
Council (MAC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the National Security Council
(NSC) all serve as major indicators of the government’s future direction in
cross-strait and foreign affairs policies. Eight years later, the Chinese
Nationalist Party (KMT) is back in power and these indicators remain unchanged.
The declaration that cross-strait relations is a diplomatic priority from
president-elect Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), makes his policy and staffing decisions more
important domestically and internationally.
The complexity of cross-strait policy lies in debate over Taiwan’s domestic
position, its national identity and its foreign relations strategy.
The new MAC staff should be able to help resolve domestic disputes and unify
cross-strait and international strategy teams. The kinds of signals staff
appointments may send to China and to the international community are also
important.
One of Ma’s reasons for his appointment of Lai Shin-yuan (賴幸媛) as MAC chairwoman
is that her previous pan-green background can help expand public support for
cross-strait policies.
In order to mollify opposition from within the pan-blue camp, Ma pointed out
that the MAC is an executor of the government’s directives. Yet, if Lai is only
an instrument of the government’s will and in agreement with Ma’s policies, how
can she also represent the 5.44 million voters that do not support the policy of
“one China with each side having its own interpretation?”
Ma declared that cross-strait negotiations will be re-opened on the basis of the
so-called “1992 consensus.” Faced with US President George W. Bush’s concerned
phone call on March 26, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) has also reiterated
that the so-called “consensus” will be the basis of negotiations. Lai, however,
has openly expressed doubt over the so-called “1992 consensus.”
Aside from the DPP not supporting a “one China with each side having its own
interpretation,” and questioning the so-called “1992 consensus,” having a head
executor of China policies in Ma’s government who still refuses to embrace the
core of its China policies makes it difficult for the public to have high
expectations for this team.
The Lai appointment is most likely a surprise to Beijing. If China believes that
Ma acted under pressure to increase public support, then it could reasonably
assume that Ma’s policies have not received the support of the majority of
Taiwanese.
Beijing may regard Ma’s cross-strait promises as genuine cooperation or as a
deliberate move to play politics at home.
The only other explanation for this appointment is that Ma is responding to
international fears that he is too close to China.
The change from actively urging dialogue at the end of March to a more cautious
attitude as currently adopted by the US is not only related to the adulation
following the meeting between Hu and vice president-elect Vincent Siew (蕭萬長),
but has even more to do with Ma’s claims that cross-strait relations are more
important than foreign affairs.
Maybe the US is worried that, in the face of Chinese opposition, the Ma
government will reduce US-Taiwan security cooperation in order to diminish
tensions across the strait.
Japan could also be concerned that by the time the next Sino-Japanese dispute
occurs, Taiwan would react to China’s demands by adopting Beijing’s line against
Japan.
To give the MAC to a non-pan-blue chair who has previously supported arms
acquisitions does partially resolve the widespread doubt over Ma’s overly
intimate relationship with China.
Yet a question remains: Has the international community lowered its expectations
because it believes that the future of Taiwan’s cross-strait policy is still
subject to change?
Individual staff appointments cannot be considered cross-party cooperation.
This appointment also does not make any direct contribution to the construction
of a consensus on cross-strait issues between the government and the opposition
parties.
The basis of cross-party cooperation rests upon discussions of policy between
parties, which helps to define a consensus, the differences and expectations, as
well as the limits for future cooperation and competition.
True consensus must still pass this test and this is a fact that Ma, who intends
to be a president for all citizens, cannot avoid — not even by appointing a
deep-green MAC chair.
Lai I-chung is deputy director of the
Democratic Progressive Party’s department of international affairs.
What drives
Ishihara to attend Ma's inaugural?
By Chin Heng-wei 金恒煒
Tuesday, May 06, 2008, Page 8
‘Ma’s return to Lee [Teng-hui]’s path during his term as the chairman of the KMT
is not only a matter of practical consideration, but also a matter of
authority.’
It’s not so strange for Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara to receive the Order of
Brilliant Star with Grand Cordon from President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). Nor is it
strange for Ishihara to visit ex-president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) during his visit
to Taiwan. However, it is interesting that Ishihara plans on attending the
inauguration of president-elect Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九).
Ishihara’s political stance is very friendly to Taiwan while being anti-China,
as he has made clear in the past.
But Ishihara’s plan to attend Ma’s inauguration is noteworthy.
Is Lee’s shadow lurking behind Ishihara? While Lee’s popularity has declined in
Taiwan, he remains popular in Japan.
More importantly, Ma immediately met with Lee after winning the presidential
election. Receiving Ma with eagerness, Lee even stated he would not hesitate to
travel to Japan for Ma if only he were younger. With Lee’s support, it then
becomes logical for Ishihara to attend Ma’s inauguration.
More importantly, Ma’s respect for Lee can forge not only a bond with Japan, and
dispel Japanese distrust, but Lee may also become Ma’s only possible advisor if
Ma should be confronted with problems of national politics.
After all, no one on Ma’s team has had experience in running the central
government, and Ma can hardly go to Chen for advice. Lee is thus the best
option.
From this angle, Ma’s decision to bear the displeasure of the Chinese
Nationalist Party (KMT) and appoint former Taiwan Solidarity Union legislator
Lai Shin-yuan (賴幸媛) as chairwoman of the Mainland Affairs Council is obviously
done with Lee in mind. Lai now guards Ma’s major weakness — the issue of
cross-strait relations. This is tantamount to Ma placing himself in the hands of
his opponents, but it is also a means of displaying his goodwill. This is also
the reason why Ma is downplaying the so-called “1992 consensus” and subscribes
more to “one China, different interpretations.”
Such an interpretation is really the “special state-to-state” approach, as
coined by Lee. Ma’s return to Lee’s path during his term as the chairman of the
KMT is not only a matter of practical consideration, but also a matter of
authority. Ma’s appointment of Lai effectively severs the “party-to-party”
mechanism built during the Chinese Communist Party and KMT economic forums.
Authority to direct the cross-strait fate has shifted from party back to state.
During an interview with Global Views Monthly (遠見雜誌), Lee emphasized that the
Straits Exchange Foundation was established at a politically advantageous
juncture — and that it is now the time for government-to-government contact. Now
Ma follows Lee’s path, and Lee scratches Ma’s back — so Lai’s appearance is of
course entirely reasonable.
Chin Heng-wei is editor-in-chief of
Contemporary Monthly.