Former
guerrilla worries over new administration
By Yen Hung-Chun
STAFF REPORTER
Monday, Sep 08, 2008, Page 3
Despite his old age, 88-year-old democracy pioneer Chung Yi-jen (鍾逸人) took part
in the rally on Aug. 30 protesting President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) China-leaning
policies and criticized the president of mistaking a hostile country for his
homeland.
Chung was the leader of a group of guerillas in the mountainous regions of
central Taiwan that fought against the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) regime
after the 228 Incident.
The 228 Incident refers to an uprising against the KMT after Japan gave up
Taiwan at the end of World War II.
The uprising was violently put down, with tens of thousands of people killed or
missing, resulting in nearly 40 years of martial law.
Chung was arrested in Pulin Township (埔里), Nantou County, on a charge of
disturbing national security, with prosecutors seeking a death sentence. The
court sentenced him to 15 years in prison. Chung was later in and out of prison
five times on charges of “impure political thoughts.” He lived under close watch
by the KMT regime after he was released for the last time in 1964.
Although Chung no longer participates in politics and lives a quiet life with
his wife and children in Beidou Township (北斗), Changhua County, he said he still
cares about Taiwanese independence.
He joined tens of thousands in the Aug. 30 rally, organized by the Taiwan
Society and various civic organizations, calling on Ma to defend Taiwan’s
sovereignty, save the economy and help with the adoption of sunshine bills.
In an interview, Chung voiced worries that Ma could “sell out Taiwan” and that
Taiwan’s international reputation as an independent country would be endangered
if the public doesn’t speak out.
He said that Ma’s KMT had taken advantage of Taiwan’s democracy to regain power,
but still rules the country as a foreign regime.
Chung said that judging from the KMT administration’s attempts to show its
loyalty to Beijing and the fact that several government and party officials hold
US green cards, he believes Taiwan isn’t really on the minds of the new
government.
Chung said he worried that the government would betray Taiwan’s national
interests.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime, which came to power in China in 1949,
had never ruled Taiwan and yet it has never given up plans to take Taiwan
through military force, Chung said.
Noting that in the past, Taiwan has stood with countries such as the US and
Japan to defend itself against China’s ambitions, Chung said that since Ma was
inaugurated, “Taiwan’s policy towards China has become ambiguous.”
“I still don’t know where Ma is taking Taiwan,” he said. “I am worried that the
international community may misinterpret the voice of the Taiwanese if the
people don’t speak out.”
Chung said it was ironic members of the guerilla forces that fought against the
late dictator Chiang Kai-shek’s (蔣介石) regime never worried that Chiang would
sell out Taiwan to the CCP, but now he has to worry about the KMT’s relationship
with the CCP, adding that “the interests of Taiwanese would absolutely be
sacrificed if the two parties stand united.”
KMT officials are well received in Beijing because Taiwan is still an
independent country, he said, adding that if Taiwan was taken, “Who would care
about them?”
Ma is
giving it all away
Monday, Sep 08, 2008, Page 8
To the public, President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) “diplomatic truce” is all about
showing China too much goodwill and offering too many compromises. The
government is voluntarily restricting its freedom of movement without getting
anything in return. This looks more like capitulation than a truce.
The advantage of Taiwan and China not pursuing each other’s diplomatic allies is
that a lot of resources are saved, but it doesn’t mean that both sides gain
equal benefits, since they are far from equal in terms of leverage. The loss of
a few small diplomatic allies would not cost China much sleep, but for Taiwan,
its tiny band of allies underpins its claims to statehood under international
law. If Taiwan stops trying to develop diplomatic relationships, China will have
a lot of room, while Taiwan will be moving one step closer to the edge.
Diplomacy is supposed to protect and promote Taiwan’s existence and dignity.
Taiwan cannot afford to expose its national interests to so much risk or to try
to measure the value of its sovereignty. Some things shouldn’t be sold because
they are as valuable as life itself. There should never be the slightest hint at
the possibility that Taiwan has tried to sell or exchange its sovereignty or
even worse, give it away for free.
Sovereignty must not be a bargaining chip because that would put Taiwan on the
road to extinction. Without the moral courage to insist on this point, even our
self-respect will vanish. A country willing to use its sovereignty as a
bargaining chip will not win the respect of its opponent, nor will it gain
international support.
Taiwan’s effort to join the UN has also weakened noticeably, and it now seems to
be a perfunctory matter. It was extremely disappointing to see both the
Presidential Office and the Cabinet defend the oppressive comments by Chinese
Ambassador to the UN Wang Guangya (王光亞) regarding Taiwan’s UN hopes, rather than
showing some moral fiber and sticking to their position. China continues to use
its carrot and stick approach, but all Taiwan has is a weak defense. Seeing this
cowardly reaction, why should Beijing be bothered with anything Taiwan has to
say? If Taiwan’s leaders are unwilling to speak up for the nation, its
diplomatic allies are certain to stop speaking up on Taiwan’s behalf, too.
If both Taiwan and China want a cross-strait diplomatic truce, it is only right
that the stronger party make some goodwill gestures first. Why should the weaker
party make all the compromises? Since Taiwan is the underdog, it must act with
utmost caution. The seesaw diplomatic battle over recognition may have come to a
temporary halt, but Taiwan cannot give up its diplomatic efforts before having
achieved some concrete results — that would be both dangerous and stupid.
The Ma administration is afraid of offending China and even more afraid of
criticizing Beijing because any of its political achievements seem to be utterly
dependent on Chinese cooperation. What’s worse, top decision makers seem to lack
both idealism and theoretical grounding. Because they also are completely
disconnected from reality, they appear weak and cowardly on one hand, and to be
acting unilaterally on the other. Surrendering national sovereignty without
getting anything in return and calling it “a show of goodwill” will only lead to
the destruction of the nation.
Taking a
lesson from Clausewitz
By James Holmes
Monday, Sep 08, 2008, Page 8
Vice President Vincent Siew (蕭萬長) opened National Chengchi University’s annual
Conference on Contemporary China last week by vowing to craft a “win-win-win”
solution to the impasse between China and Taiwan. By publicly disavowing legal
independence from China, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) hopes to orchestrate a
“diplomatic truce” between the feuding parties. As tensions subside, efforts to
repair ties across the Taiwan Strait can proceed.
I have no quarrel with Taiwanese leaders’ determination to seize this chance to
improve cross-strait relations. They should.
But they must not succumb to euphoria. After our conference, Ma told the US
delegates that everything has changed in China-Taiwan relations. This overstates
matters. While Ma’s election may indeed have postponed a reckoning with Beijing,
the basic strategic dynamics remain largely unchanged. Taipei must leaven its
attempts at reconciliation with a healthy measure of skepticism.
A durable peace rests on a foundation of hard military and economic power. Too
lopsided a military mismatch across the Taiwan Strait would pose grave dangers
for Taiwan — even in this apparent era of good feelings.
Why paint such a gloomy picture? In his classic treatise On War, Carl von
Clausewitz relates the effort a society puts into a campaign to the “value of
the object.” That is, the value of the political goals determines the
“magnitude” and “duration” of the effort expended in any political endeavor.
The higher the value of the object, in other words, the more resources a society
will hazard on that object’s behalf — and for longer. Lesser objectives warrant
lesser — or briefer — efforts. A campaign that demands too much in material
terms or takes too long should be abandoned on the best terms possible. Needless
to say, political leaders should forego any enterprise whose expected payoff
doesn’t justify the expected costs.
Next, Clausewitz offers a novel way of examining power politics. For him the
three “dominant tendencies” of war are primordial passions, notably enmity and
violence; chance and creativity; and rationality, manifest in political
supremacy over warfare. The people “mainly” inhabit the domain of passion,
effective armed forces display creativity and panache and the government imposes
rational direction on the war-making process.
Keeping this “paradoxical trinity” in balance, “like an object suspended between
three magnets,” falls to statesmen. Popular support, military acumen and skilled
policy making and execution are all central to diplomatic and military
undertakings.
Apply this template to China, Taiwan and the US. China is the easiest case to
analyze. All three elements of the Chinese trinity — the government, the
People’s Liberation Army and the people — are riveted on unification. Neither
the communist regime nor Chinese citizens have wavered in their desire for
control of Taiwan, while the military is building up a commanding edge in the
Strait.
Next, Taiwan. Ma’s “three noes” policy rules out unification, formal
independence and the use of force. Ma has voiced doubts that unification will
take place “in our lifetimes,” pointing out that liberalization is occurring in
China at a glacial pace — if at all — and that Taiwanese would never willingly
submit to authoritarian rule.
To Chinese eyes, the “three noes” looks suspiciously like Taiwan independence,
in fact if not in name. Beijing’s patience could prove finite as it amasses the
military wherewithal to dictate the timing and terms of unification.
Whether Ma can rally Taiwan’s defenses remains to be seen. With Taipei’s talk of
peace accords and win-win situations, the popular tendency will be to assume the
worst is past in the cross-strait standoff. If so, Ma may find it difficult to
convince constituents to devote even 3 percent of GDP — the modest figure of
which he has spoken — to defense. Indeed, news reports suggest the defense
budget will decline this year — a stark contrast to China’s annual double-digit
increases.
If Taiwan seems ambivalent, the US is distracted. Taiwan should expect little
from the Bush administration in its final months, while neither the campaigns of
senators Barack Obama nor John McCain have made cross-strait relations a major
issue. Taiwan barely registers with US voters, and public support for defending
Taiwan against China, a major US trading partner, is tepid at best.
With US military supremacy on the wane in Asia, moreover, the probable magnitude
and duration of a conflict in China’s backyard will rise. Clausewitzian logic
suggests Washington may hesitate in a time of crisis.
Some election-year advice from Clausewitz to Taiwan: Stand to your defenses.
James Holmes is an associate professor
of strategy at the US Naval War College. The views voiced here are not
necessarily those of the US Naval War College, the US Navy, or the US Department
of Defense.