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Don’t call ARATS chair a ‘C-list’ politician: Ma
 

‘DISRESPECTFUL’: SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kung said that neither he nor other foundation officials had made a comment the president called ‘very impolite’

STAFF WRITER
Monday, Dec 28, 2009, Page 1


President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) yesterday said it was inappropriate and disrespectful to dub Chen Yunlin (陳雲林), chairman of China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), a “C-list” politician.

Ma made the remarks following a report in the Chinese-language China Times yesterday that quoted a Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) official as saying that a situation in which three Taiwanese political heavyweights tried to meet Chen during his visit was like “the A-listers versus the C-listers,” with Chen as the “C-list” politician.

“Such remarks are very impolite and disrespectful to Chen,” Ma said. “Even if it was said in a private setting, it was still very inappropriate.”

Ma said SEF Chairman Chiang Pin-kung (江丙坤) told him that neither he nor other SEF officials had ever made such a comment.

Chen concluded his five-day stay in Taiwan on Friday, during which three deals were signed on Tuesday in the fourth round of cross-strait negotiations.

While staying at Sun Moon Lake, Chen called off a boat cruise after People First Party Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) arrived to talk to him.

Soong later expressed discontent over the manner in which the SEF conveyed Ma’s message that it was not a good idea for political parties to host banquets for Chen during his visit.

Soong said that without former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and his “ice-breaking” trips to China in 2005, Chen’s current visit would never have happened.

Ma, who previously expressed regret that Soong was not able to personally host a banquet for Chen, yesterday reiterated that cross-strait affairs were the focus of Chen’s visit and that he did not want it to be obscured by non-business related affairs.

Meanwhile, Chiang expressed regret over the “A-list versus C-list” report at a separate press conference yesterday.

He questioned the authenticity of the story, adding that he would try to clarify the matter with Chen.

Chiang said that Chen had asked to meet Lien, Soong and former KMT chairman Wu Po-hsiung (吳伯雄).

However, to avoid negative publicity similar to November last year — when Lien hosted a dinner for Chen and ended up stranded in a hotel for hours because of protests outside — the SEF this time chose to have local government chiefs host the banquets in Chen’s honor and invited local politicians, Chiang said.

Chiang said he was a good friend of Lien, Wu and Soong, adding: “I’d like to express my sincere apology to the four [Chen, Lien, Wu and Soong]” for any problems that may have been caused.

At a separate setting, Premier Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) said the phrase was inappropriate, while Soong said the statement would “have a negative impact on cross-strait relations.”

Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman Lai Shin-yuan (賴幸媛) said “there is no such thing as ‘A-list’ or ‘C-list’ in cross-strait exchanges because the people are the most important factor.”

Former vice president Annette Lu (呂秀蓮) on Friday said that the Chinese Communist Party had effectively driven a wedge into the pan-blue camp.

 


 

International participation should be part of cross-strait talks: Control Yuan
 

By Lin Yi-chang
STAFF REPORTER
Monday, Dec 28, 2009, Page 1


A Control Yuan report recommended that a model for participation in international organizations be added to the agenda for the fifth round of cross-strait talks next year.

Titled “Taiwan’s Participation in International Organizations,” the report also said the public should not have high expectations of the so-called “1992 consensus” because China’s insistence on the “one China” principle remains unchanged despite the change in Taiwan’s government.

The “1992 consensus” refers to an alleged agreement between China and Taiwan that there is “one China, with each side of the Strait having its own interpretation.”

A cross-strait diplomatic truce would require China’s tolerance of Taiwan participating in international organizations on a case-by-case basis, the report said.

However, when such participation reaches a certain number, it is feared that Beijing would insist on its “one China” principle, the report said.

The report also quoted former Chinese ambassador to the UK Ma Zhengang (馬振岡) as saying that it would be best to adopt a yearly review approach.

The report questioned how Taiwan’s sovereignty would be affected if it were required to seek consent from China or its blessing every time it wanted to apply to participate in an international organization.

The report went on to say that China often demands that Taiwan not use the titles “Taiwan” or “Republic of China” when Taiwanese officials or NGOs participate in international organizations.

Instead, Beijing insists on “Taiwan, China,” or “Chinese Taipei,” in line with the “one China” principle.

Wong Ming-hsien (翁明賢), director of Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, was quoted in the report as expressing reservation over the term “Chinese Taipei” when participating in international organizations.

While the government has said the use of the term would not affect the country’s sovereignty, Wong said he feared other countries could conceivably, over time, confuse the two, believing “Chinese Taipei” to be the official name.

The report also quoted the Ministry of Justice as noting that the US is trying to get China to take part in the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units’ anti-money laundering initiative.

For Taiwan to be involved, China will insist on the use of the term “Chinese Taipei” instead of Taiwan, and the US, Japan and Russia are likely to agree to this, the report said.

 


 

 


 

What if the PRC moves some of its missiles?
 

By Lin Cheng-Yi 林正義
Monday, Dec 28, 2009, Page 8


With cross-strait tensions easing and 12 agreements reached by the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, Beijing is using economic means to promote unification. Yet it has not ruled out the use of force against Taiwan nor scrapped its “Anti-Secession” Law.

As Taiwan’s 2012 presidential election approaches, China is likely to freeze or reduce the number of its missiles pointed at Taiwan. For the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and US President Barack Obama’s administration, how to respond to this would pose a problem.

While meeting then-US president George W. Bush at Bush’s Texas ranch in October 2002, then-Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民) proposed a link between China’s missile deployment and US arms sales to Taiwan.

Last month, retired Chinese Lieutenant General Li Jijun (李際均) said at a seminar in Taipei that the withdrawal of missiles was negotiable, but added that a withdrawal would be the consequence of — not a prerequisite to — cross-strait peace talks.

Beijing has thus dismissed calls by Taipei and Washington to withdraw its missiles, and at the same time, wants to destroy the legitimacy of US arms sales to Taiwan. Hence, Taipei would have to make concrete concessions in cross-strait talks, and the international community would likely welcome Beijing’s move because a reduction of missiles is, after all, better than an increase.

With the KMT government touting this success, the strength of any DPP response would likely weaken. If the public feels Beijing is showing some goodwill, it will not think of the cross-strait missile crisis of 1995 and 1996. Taiwan’s fragile psychological defense will be confused by the misconception that peace has arrived.

Beijing can handle its missiles targeting Taiwan in several ways: avoid provocation, increase their number or remove them. Beijing could merely freeze its increasing deployment or it could withdraw a substantial number of missiles, but it is unlikely that it would withdraw them all. Even if it did so, it could quickly redeploy them at any time.

While it has refused to rule out military force, Beijing may also stress that as long as Taiwan does not declare independence, China will not attack.

Beijing says that if Taiwan embraces the concept of “one China,” there will be no war and Taiwan will not have to spend money on US arms.

The problem is that the KMT government does accept the “one China” principle — yet Beijing has not ruled out military force. And as Taiwan is a democracy, KMT rule cannot be guaranteed in the long-term.

The government’s talks with China have rarely touched on sensitive political issues, but as the pace of negotiations picks up, they will eventually run into the matter of sovereignty.

Even with cross-strait talks thus far placing business ahead of politics, security matters are already being touched upon through unofficial channels.

Retired military officers, academics and experts from both sides are exploring the possibility of setting up a mechanism for building military trust. They have proposed beginning with cooperation at certain spots in the South China Sea.

China can use the withdrawal of missiles as a kind of psychological warfare against Taiwan. Even if the Obama administration sells Black Hawk helicopters to Taiwan, it may continue to refuse the more crucial F-16C/D jet fighters. Taiwan’s security concerns are no less serious after the latest cross-strait talks.

Lin Cheng-yi is a research fellow of the Institute of European and American Studies at Academia Sinica.

 

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