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Trade deal safety-valve shrouded in
mystery
By Nathan Novak 李漢聲
Monday, Jul 05, 2010, Page 8
Last Tuesday in Chongqing the Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement (ECFA) was signed into being. Both sides touted the agreement not only
as an economic deal that would bring further prosperity to Taiwan and China, but
also as a sign of growing cooperation and what essentially amounts to an
institutionalization of peaceful relations (although it must be added that
President Ma Ying-jeou’s [馬英九] administration has repeatedly said no political
issues were discussed).
The signing drew praise from other countries and members of the international
community. Sources such as the Wall Street Journal praised the pact. The US
welcomed the deal. Everyone seems to find the deal a huge step in a positive
direction.
Why then has the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) stressed the existence of the
“termination clause” as a “safety valve?”
After spending so much time and effort attempting to persuade Taiwanese to
embrace the package, why is the government now telling everyone that there is
still a way out and seeking credit for creating a backdoor exit? Without
releasing any substantial information about what the deal actually involves, the
focus has suddenly been placed on an issue that could have been left out, had
one of the attempts at a referendum been accepted.
If voters had unconditionally voted in favor of the ECFA, there would be no
reason to include a “safety valve.”
But what kind of a safety valve actually exists? Let us take a look at history.
Before the election of Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) in 2000, the People’s Republic of
China produced a defense white paper which added a third cross-strait casus
belli; translated into English, the clause read as follows: “[China will use
force against Taiwan] if the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die the peaceful
settlement of cross-strait reunification through negotiations.” China’s
“Anti-Secession” Law of 2005 also included what became known as the “third if”
from the 2000 white paper.
Beijing has not renounced the third if. With this in mind, is the termination
clause a realistic option? Would China choose to consider the termination of
ECFA as constituting this third if? In the event the Taiwan authorities sought
termination as the MAC says it could or even use it as a negotiation tool to
block political discussion — or threaten to use it to keep Beijing from pressing
for political discussion — would the third if then become reality?
Although Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) has said he wants to address easy
issues first and more difficult ones later, he may now be pressed, after the
“easy” ECFA economic questions are finalized, to begin testing the waters of
“difficult” political issues.
If the termination clause is invoked, will it be a roadblock for Hu’s strategy
for peaceful reunification? And if Hu comes under pressure to start work on
political issues and the termination clause becomes a threat to his strategy,
would he be tempted to use the third if as a justification for Beijing to
strike? Would Beijing use economic and or military means to force Taipei to
forgo the termination clause?
What is certain is that Hu will not lose his political skin over a safety valve
and when Ma leaves office, either in 2012 or 2016, what options will be left for
his successor? Neither Hu’s successor nor Beijing will give up on its claim to
legitimacy over “one China” — including Taiwan — over a safety valve.
The worst part about this situation is that no one knows exactly how the
termination clause is defined.
Exactly what kind of safety valve is that?
Nathan Novak studies China and the Asia-Pacific region at
National Sun Yat-sen University.
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