EDITORIAL : Enough
with the pessimism
In addition to helping us avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, history can
also teach us that our pessimistic urges, when we believe that all is lost, have
nothing original about them.
There was a time, soon after the euphoria that followed the end of World War II,
when failure seemed certain and that the selflessness and sacrifices of the
ˇ§greatest generation,ˇ¨ which had ensured victory of the ˇ§free worldˇ¨ against
fascism, had been spent in vain. The early successes of the Soviet Union,
starting with the detonation of its first nuclear bomb in August 1949 through
the launch of the Sputnik satellite in October 1957, added to the ˇ§lossˇ¨ of
China in 1949 and ill-starred beginnings to the Korean War in 1950, came as body
blows that threatened to fell what just a few years before had seemed like an
implacable force.
Soon, mass pessimism was taking hold of Washington and allied capitals, leading
otherwise intelligent officials to inflate the Soviet threat with the so-called
ˇ§missile gapˇ¨ that put the Westˇ¦s very existence at risk. Only years later would
it become known that a gap did exist ˇX in the USˇ¦ favor ˇX and signs emerged that
all along the USSR was plagued by contradictions and inefficiencies that imposed
severe handicaps in almost every race Moscow engaged in against the West, be it
in the military, ideological, social or economic sphere.
After years of waging a Cold War against an opponent that would ultimately
become so heavy it would crush its fragile foundations, the West, self-doubts
notwithstanding, proved it was resilient enough to wear out a giant that had
long been thought could not be beaten. Not only that, but the West never allowed
defeatism to discourage its constituents from continuing to fight for what it
believed in.
Sixty years later, the West finds itself in a similar situation. Just as it did
back then, pessimism pervades in the wake of a sweeping ideological victory. No
sooner had the ˇ§end of historyˇ¨ been hailed by the West, than fears arose it
would be made history, this time because of Chinaˇ¦s seemingly unstoppable
ˇ§rise.ˇ¨ Even the almighty US, the remaining superpower, now seemed incapable of
standing up to Beijing, deflated and overextended as it was by two open-ended
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as if Korea and Vietnam had not been equally
taxing on the national treasury.
This is not to say that the emergence of China does not represent a challenge to
the international system. It does. However, its surfacing as a force to be
reckoned with should by no means force the rest of the world into a stupor that
allows Beijing to do what it wants, or to turn into liars liberal democracies
that a few years ago had vowed, to quote a serving prime minister, never to sell
their ideals to the ˇ§almighty dollar.ˇ¨ Knowledge of history, of the other dark
periods in the recent past, should be sufficient to make us realize not only
that we have seen all this before, but more importantly, that something can be
done about it.
There is no reason why democracies should capitulate on human rights just
because Chinaˇ¦s economy is supposedly holding the whole world together, or that
Beijingˇ¦s military has become so strong as to paralyze an entire region. Thatˇ¦s
mostly a myth, a monster the West created out of its own fears. It had similar
apprehensions about Japan in the 1980s; how risible those fears seem today.
The ˇ§China threatˇ¨ looms large because through pessimism, the West has allowed
Beijing ˇX a Beijing that is endlessly wracked by insecurity, ironically ˇX to get
away with murder for too long.
The West has been there, and prevailed. Did it have assurances it would be
victorious? No. However, democracies fought nonetheless. If history teaches us
one thing, it is that there is no reason to think and act any differently today.
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