Dear
Mr. Vice President Richard B.
Cheney, It is with great pleasure that I could express my heartfelt wishes to you and would tell you the situation of Taiwan. Should Taiwan hold joint military exercises with the US? Can Taiwan resist China's missile threat without joining the Theater Missile Defense system? These questions have prompted considerable noise from Taiwan's pro-unification media. Does Taiwan have the wherewithal to stop a Chinese invasion or a missile attack? A local pro-unification newspaper, the China Times, said in its editorial: "Taiwan's true security lies neither in weapons nor dependence on a superpower, but in starting a cross-strait dialogue and reconciliation." The newspaper cited this as a reason to oppose Taiwan's participation in the US-led missile defense system. Given China's continuing military threats against Taiwan, and given the plight of Hong Kong and Macau after returning to Beijing's rule, what other means -- other than strong defense capabilities -- does Taiwan have to stop China from treating it like a lamb waiting for slaughter? Under British rule, Hong Kong was deprived of the ability to resist Beijing while London pinned its hopes for the territory's future on Beijing's promises. But less than four years after the handover, the promise of keeping Hong Kong's government system intact for at least 50 years is worth less than a pre-World War II Shanghai bond. And not only has Hong Kong's judiciary lost its final appeal powers, the "popularly elected" -- by 800 handpicked yes-men -- chief executive can now be fired by Beijing. Are China's promises worth anything at all? Nevertheless, Taiwan's
pro-unification, pro-China media -- especially the China Ruan Ming, a former aide to the late Communist Party secretary general Hu Yaobang, recently pointed out that a vast majority of the people in China still earn less than US$3 a day. Is this what the people of Taiwan aspire to? Faced with a Chinese regime that cares more about building up military muscle and ensuring the comfort of its chosen few instead of improving the plight of its own people, how can Taiwan not work to ensure its own national security through regional defense mechanisms? North Korea's test-firing of the Taepodong-1 missile over the Sea of Japan in August 1998 triggered concern in the US, Japan and South Korea which in turn led to discussions on developing a joint missile defense system. Taiwan has no reason to stay out of the system given that China staged two missile tests into the seas off Taiwan in March 1996 and others in August 1995. A joint US-Taiwan military program would certainly help raise Taiwan's defense capabilities. Surely, the US military successfully tested a missile interceptor, bringing down an intercontinental ballistic missile. It was the Pentagon's fourth anti-ballistic missile test and its second successful one. Despite critics both at home and abroad -- especially in China and Russia -- the Bush administration is determined to move ahead with a missile defense system. The US is likely to deploy the system both on its soil and in allied countries in East Asia in order to prevent military adventurism in the region. Perhaps Taiwan's pro-unificationists
will say TMD is too expensive for Taiwan. But what use is all the wealth
Taiwan has accumulated if the country does not have sufficient measures to
ensure national security and safeguard the people's welfare? The
pro-unification media will need far better reasoning to persuade the
people of Taiwan otherwise. The confusing statistics reflect not only the different polling methods employed by pollsters, but also the different ways in which the people of Taiwan understand the concept of one country, two systems -- not to mention the political biases of Taiwan's media. An analysis of the polls shows that the different figures are a result of different polling methods. Questionnaires with different descriptions of one country, two systems naturally generate different understandings and attitudes. Generally, these descriptions fall into three categories. The first does not offer a clear definition of the concept, but simply asks whether or not one supports it as a model for future cross-strait relations. This type of question yields relatively high support rates -- up to 47 percent. The second type basically describes one country, two systems as the "Hong Kong-Macau model." This type of poll draws lower support rates, generally around 30 percent. The third type of question, exemplified by MAC-commissioned polls, clearly defines the content of one country, two systems -- including the fact that Taiwan's government would be viewed as a local government, that the ROC would no longer exist and that Taiwan would be ruled by Beijing. This type of questionnaire yields the lowest support rates, generally between 10 percent and 16 percent. Obviously, if you ask people whether they would endorse a blank slate entitled "one country, two systems" with no clear explanation of what the term means or what its long-term impact will be, then they are more likely to answer without giving the issue serious thought. In this regard, the recent United Daily News poll belongs to the first category; the MAC-commissioned polls belong to the third. One can easily see which is more credible. Generally, the recent surveys more accurately reflect the pro-China leanings of those who commission the polls than they do the opinions of the people of Taiwan. Beijing's vice premier Qian Qichen recently came up with a seven-point guarantee about what Taiwan will get to keep under one country, two systems. It's hard to see what's so attractive about Qian's guarantee, given that the status quo is far superior to what is on offer. If Beijing wants Taiwan to accept unification, it needs to provide far better political, economic, trade, social and cultural incentives. Before Hong Kong's handover in 1997, Beijing promised to keep the territory's system intact for 50 years. Just four years later Hong Kong's democracy is bankrupt, its chief executive able to be sacked at Beijing's whim. How Taiwan can trust China's promises is a big question. The officials in Beijing
charged with cross-strait affairs are trying to use various organizations
in Taiwan to create a mirage of rising public support for one country, two
systems. This illusion has been created
by the convergence of the hot air emitted by China's puppets in Taiwan and
the authorities in Beijing with the desire of an economically-pressed
populace for some soothing reassurance of stability. But remember, mirages
disappear as one gets closer to them. The two biggest pieces of news to come out of the New Party's trip were its reaching of a consensus with China on six points and China's Vice Premier Qian Qichen's relaying -- via the New Party -- a message that outlined seven substantive elements of the "one country, two systems" scheme. Given the New Party's unificationist platform, their support for the "one China" principle is understandable. The problem is that the party also professes to support Taiwan, but lacking any clause that "each side has its own interpretation," the meaning of their six-point consensus can easily be distorted by China. The most problematic part of the consensus is the declaration that, "both sides agree that the people on either side of the Taiwan Strait are all Chinese and the Taiwanese people, regardless of their provincial origin, should interact amicably with each other." Taiwan's internal problems should be settled by the people of Taiwan themselves. Why should they be turned over to Beijing? Isn't this inviting trouble and saying that Beijing has the authority to interfere in Taiwan's internal affairs? If this item stands, then one China carries a connotation of Beijing having jurisdiction over Taiwan. It implies that the one China is the PRC, and that even the high degree of autonomy provided by one country, two systems can't be achieved. The most ridiculous aspect of this element of the consensus lies in the question of whether China's minority peoples, such as the Tibetans and Uighurs, are "Chinese." There are issues of provincial origin and also of ethnicity at stake here. Could it be that these peoples don't have to "interact amicably" with other "Chinese" peoples? Ever since the late president Chiang Ching-kuo lifted the ban on forming opposition political parties and newspapers, Taiwan has been making great strides toward democratization. Even if tensions between different ethnic groups continue, such tensions have not erupted into outright fighting. But Taiwan does have unscrupulous politicians scurrying west to hold closed-door meetings with Chinese officials. The government hasn't arrested them for harming national security, nor have those who swagger around Taiwan waving PRC flags been taken into custody. Looking at China, however, we see that the authorities do not wear silk gloves in their suppression of separatist movements arising from ethnic conflicts. In mid-May, for example, the New China News Agency, the official mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), quoted Meng Deli, director of the judicial department of the Tibet Autonomous Region, as saying that at present more than 100 people are in jail in Tibet for national security offenses. There is also frequent news of executions of Uighurs in Xin-jiang, all the more so during the last few months of Beijing's "Strike Hard" crackdown on crime and separatists. Recently, there have been fights between Han and Hui students at Xi'an Jiaotong University. Last year, there were also violent clashes between Han and Hui students in Yangxin County in Shandong province, leading to several deaths. During the Falun Gong suppression and killing, the CCP also ordered "patriotic congregations" to denounce Falun Gong, inciting the masses to fight each other on grounds of religion and faith. There are obviously more problems in China regarding friendly relations between ethnic groups and even the pluralization of faiths, so why doesn't the New Party reach an agreement with the CCP on these issues? A relationship in which we let China interfere in Taiwan's domestic politics without Taiwan interfering in China's is an unequal one, with Taiwan willingly accepting an inferior position, giving up its sovereignty. Qian's seven-point statement about "one country, two systems" is nothing new. It has all been said before, and some of it is even a retreat from earlier positions. For example, the then president of China, Li Xiannian said in 1985 that Taiwan could even keep its special intelligence system. If we look at the situation in Hong Kong, we see that China's promises are not to be trusted. A Hong Kong ruled by Hong Kong people is in fact a Hong Kong ruled by Hong Kong traitors, doing the things that the CCP is afraid of doing themselves. When territory's chief executive Tung Chee-hwa, for example, recently awarded medals of honor to leaders of the 1967 anti-British, pro-Beijing disturbances, it restored the reputation of the Cultural Revolution. The Hong Kong Legislative Council, controlled by "patriots," recently passed regulations for the election of the chief executive that were proposed by the Special Administrative Region government. In so doing, they voluntarily expanded Beijing's control over the territory by adding articles originally not in the Basic Law, allowing Beijing to recall the chief executive whenever it wants. The New Party's transmission of Qian's seven-point statement is also an unequal, one-way, united front offensive. Since Taiwan has a free media and freedom of speech, the party is free to pass on Qian's words. The sweet-talking of the CCP will undoubtedly influence those people who lack an understanding of the communists, leading to divisions of which China will take advantage. The New Party did not use the strong points of Taiwan's democracy to put pressure on China, but simply expressed hopes for a democratic and wealthy China in an off-handed manner. Their talk of China's economic development being affected if she takes to arms has all been censored, and the Chinese people hear nothing of it. There is no way that Taiwan will be able to launch its own "united front" offensive against the Chinese people through cross-strait exchanges. We can only sit back and listen to the Chinese message. This kind of exchange only makes the New Party a megaphone for the CCP, and this is probably something that most New Party members don't wish to see either. I once exchanged views with some
friends in the New Party. They said that they opposed both Taiwan
independence and the Chinese communists. Considering this most recent
exchange, though, they are only opposing Taiwanese independence and not
the communists. Why isn't their opposition to independence also an
opposition to dictatorship? Supporters of the party loudly sang,
"China will surely be strong," when Beijing won the right to
host the 2008 Olympic Games. I'm afraid that Taiwan will be swallowed up by a China that is strong, but also undemocratic and without fairly distributed wealth. This will not be to the benefit of the Chinese people. In our viewpoint,
apparently, the U.S. does not have to be directly involved in Taiwan’s
war with China, in the future. However, the U.S. cannot be directly
involved in an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, during peacetimes the navy of Taiwan will seek to use the Kidd-class destroyers for joint naval training with the U.S. navy. At times of war, the Kidds will lead the U.S. naval ships into the Taiwan Strait. We also thought that global realities would change Japan to consider changing its pacifist postwar constitution. Taiwan-South Korea-Japan should link with whole security of Asia-Pacific defense. No country can develop its own security by isolating the fundamental security interests of other countries. In a clear message to
Washington the Russia and China will act together to counter its role as
the world’s only superpower the United States. So, Taiwan needs your help.
Yours Sincerely,
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