CRS study
urges review of US-Taiwan ties
CHALLENGES: The study says
the Ma government’s tilt toward China may enhance regional stability, but
changes in the past 15 years necessitate a comprehensive review
By William Lowther
STAFF REPORTER, WASHINGTON
Wednesday, Apr 29, 2009, Page 1
A new congressional study says that the deepening of Taiwan-China economic and
social links under President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) poses “increasingly difficult,
competing policy challenges for the United States.”
Ma’s changes have led, the study says, “to periodic discussions about the
efficacy of current US policy and whether or not it should be reviewed or
changed.”
The Taipei Times recently reported that US President Barack Obama’s
administration was now actively considering a major new Taiwan Policy Review.
The study by Kerry Dumbaugh, a specialist in Asian Affairs with the
Congressional Research Service (CRS), is entitled Taiwan-US Relations:
Developments and Policy Implications.
Ma’s initiatives are welcomed by many, the study says, for contributing to
greater regional stability.
But it adds: “More pessimistic observers see growing PRC [People’s Republic of
China]-Taiwan ties eroding US influence, strengthening PRC leverage and,
particularly in the face of expanding economic links, jeopardizing Taiwan
autonomy and economic security.”
The study says that among Obama’s policy challenges are “decisions on new arms
sales to Taiwan, which are anathema to the PRC; how to accommodate requests for
visits to the US by President Ma and other senior Taiwan officials; the overall
nature of US relations with the Ma government; whether to pursue closer economic
ties with Taiwan; what role, if any, Washington should play in cross-strait
relations; and, more broadly, what form of defense assurances to offer Taiwan.”
Changes under Ma have led, the study says, to questions about “whether the
United States should conduct a reassessment of its Taiwan policy in light of
changing circumstances, and what the extent of such a possible reassessment
should be.”
“At the very least, some say, the US needs to consider doing another
comprehensive review of its Taiwan policy in order to revisit once again the
1979-1980 Taiwan Guidelines that govern US government interactions with Taiwan
and with Taiwan officials,” the study says.
“Furthermore, since the 1993-’94 policy review, there have been dramatic
developments in Taiwan’s political development. Taiwan has become a fully
functioning democracy. In addition, since 1995 the PRC has undertaken a
substantial military buildup along the coast opposite Taiwan and in 2005 Beijing
adopted the anti-secession law suggesting hostile intent against Taiwan. These
significant developments since 1993-94, according to this view, justify another
Taiwan Policy Review to make selected changes in US policy,” it said.
“The implications of a Taiwan policy review for US-PRC relations likely would
depend on the nature of the policy review itself. A substantial or comprehensive
public review undoubtedly would raise concerns both in the PRC and likely in
Taiwan,” the study said.
DPP’s
Taipei branch approves bid to reinstate Chen
By Mo Yan-chih
STAFF REPORTER
Wednesday, Apr 29, 2009, Page 3
The Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Taipei City branch yesterday approved a
proposal to allow former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) to return to the party.
All 15 members attending the branch’s executive committee provisional meeting
voted for the proposal and agreed that the DPP should allow Chen to return.
“Chen could help solve disputes among different factions if he returned to the
DPP, and it should have a positive effect in terms of party unity,” branch
director Huang Ching-lin (黃慶林) said after the meeting.
Huang said he would take a membership application form with him when he visits
Chen at the Taipei Detention Center today. The branch will ask the party to
approve Chen’s application.
Chen and his wife Wu Shu-jen (吳淑珍) withdrew from the DPP last August after he
admitted that Wu had wired an unspecified amount of money overseas from
donations he had received during his two Taipei mayoral and two presidential
election campaigns.
Executive committee member Hsu Chieh-yuan said Chen had expressed a wish to
return to the party when he visited him last Thursday and so the branch had
proposed inviting Chen back into the fold.
Huang said Chen withdrew from the DPP to prevent the pan-blue camp from using
his case to attack the party.
The prosecutors’ handling of Chen’s case has been problematic, Huang said.
“I believe the public can clearly see that political manipulation has been
involved in the handling of Chen’s case,” he said.
Huang and other committee members urged the party to listen to the local branch
and not to ignore Chen’s influence.
DPP spokesman Cheng Wen-tsang (鄭文燦) told a press conference that if Chen
submitted a membership application, a review committee consisting of three
Central Standing Committee members would review the application.
He said Chen had voluntarily withdrawn from the party to avoid damaging the
party.
Cheng said Chen should focus on his judicial cases, protect his judicial rights
and the party would help Chen fight for a fair trial.
Treaty
confirmed sovereignty: Ma
ANNIVERSARY: The president
said it was easy to read between the lines of the Treaty of Taipei and see that
the ROC government is the legitimate ruler of Taiwan
By Ko Shu-ling
STAFF REPORTER
Wednesday, Apr 29, 2009, Page 3
|
A photographer
kneels yesterday to take a shot of a new bronze sculpture at the Taipei
Guest House depicting the signing of the 1952 Sino-Japanese Peace
Treaty, better known as the Treaty of Taipei. The sculpture forms part
of an historical exhibition that will be open to the public one weekend
a month. PHOTO: CNA |
President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) said yesterday that the 1952 Treaty of
Taipei affirmed the transfer of Taiwan’s sovereignty from Japan to the Republic
of China (ROC).
Ma’s statement deviated from his previous claim that it was the 1943 Cairo
Declaration that gave the ROC its claim to Taiwan.
“While the 1952 treaty does not specify the legal successor government [of
Taiwan], it was clear between the lines,” he said. “Japan would not have signed
the accord with the ROC if it did not intend to concede the territories to the
ROC.”
Ma said the 1952 pact had three meanings: It not only affirmed the “de jure
termination of war between Japan and the ROC” after Tokyo’s surrender in 1945,
but reasserted the “de jure transfer of Taiwan’s sovereignty to the ROC” as well
as “restoring friendly and normal relations with Japan.”
Ma made the remarks at an unveiling ceremony at the Taipei Guest House of a
bronze sculpture depicting representatives of Japan and the ROC signing the
treaty on April 28, 1952. The statues are part of an exhibition marking the 57th
anniversary of the treaty.
The Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, better known as the Treaty of Taipei, affirms
the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, and states that the Japanese government
would renounce any claim to Taiwan, Penghu, the Spratly Islands and the Paracel
Islands. It did not, however, specify the legal successor government of the
territories.
Pro-unification groups, including the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), have long
claimed that the 1943 Cairo accord and the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 gave
China the right to resume sovereignty over Taiwan and Penghu. They say the Cairo
Declaration was a legal document that establishes the ROC’s claim.
Independence activists, however, doubt the validity of the 1943 declaration,
saying it was little more than a press release and cite the 1952 treaty to argue
that Taiwan’s international status remains undefined.
Ma said yesterday that although Tokyo nullified the 1952 treaty when it
established diplomatic ties with Beijing in 1972, the disposition of the
property and nationality of the inhabitants of Taiwan remained unchanged.
Academia Historica President Lin Man-houng (林滿紅) said that Ma had specifically
instructed her to “tell more stories.”
Lin has said she “discovered” from the Treaty of Taipei that Japan handed
sovereignty over Taiwan to the ROC in 1952.
The anniversary exhibition’s literature states that Taiwan’s international
status was settled because Japan restored territorial sovereignty over Taiwan
and Penghu to the ROC government after Japan’s surrender in 1945 and reaffirmed
the ROC’s claim in the 1952 accord.
To begin with, it says the treaty was signed between the ROC and Japan.
Second, Article 3 of the treaty states that “the disposition of property of
Japan and its nationals in Taiwan and Penghu and their claims, including debts,
against the authorities of the Republic of China in Taiwan and Penghu” shall be
“the subject of special arrangements between the Government of the Republic of
China and the Government of Japan.”
Third, Article 10 of the treaty considers the 6 million inhabitants of Taiwan at
the time as having ROC nationality and “naturally signifies that Japan regarded
Taiwan as belonging to the ROC, otherwise there would have been no such
provision.”
Meanwhile, former vice president Annette Lu (呂秀蓮) said Ma’s attendance at
yesterday’s ceremony was tantamount to recognizing the Treaty of Taipei.
The 1952 pact superseded the 1943 Cairo Declaration, she said.
On Monday Lu had challenged Ma to declare “two Chinas” and to apologize for
citing the Cairo Declaration as the KMT’s rationale that Taiwan is part of China
and that the ROC is the legal government of Taiwan.
She also urged the president to modify high school history books to show that
the ROC was not the legitimate government of Taiwan.
The Treaty of Taipei anniversary exhibition at the Taipei Guest House will be
open to the public once a month to coincide with the weekend openings of the
Presidential Office.
An Obama
TPR: Too little, too late?
Wednesday, Apr 29, 2009, Page 8
While reports of an imminent Taiwan Policy Review (TPR) are premature, it would
be a useful exercise as part of a global strategic review of China’s emerging
pre-eminence.
China is now the second-most powerful nation on earth. Its economy has already
surpassed Japan and Germany in terms of industrial output. It has massive
financial clout with which it has bought incredible political patronage across
the map. It has a rapidly modernizing military — as the celebrations last week
of the Chinese navy’s 60th anniversary demonstrated.
There is no wisdom in confronting China head-on in Asia, and a TPR by the
administration of US President Barack Obama must take this into account. But if
the US is to balance China’s looming rise with a coalition of Asian democracies,
Taiwan must be a key policy element.
With Kurt Campbell’s nomination as Obama’s — and US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton’s — assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs,
Obama’s national security appointments offer a prospect that his administration
might actually salvage some of the Asia policy wreckage of the administration
under former president George W. Bush. Campbell understands the looming crisis
in Asia policy — the challenge of China’s rise — as does his fellow nominee at
the Pentagon, retired Marine Lieutenant General Wallace “Chip” Gregson, for
assistant secretary for Asian and Pacific security affairs, and his deputy,
Derek Mitchell.
Unfortunately, “geostrategic considerations,” when it comes to Taiwan (or China,
for that matter) have long been absent in Washington policy circles. Former
intelligence officer and White House Asia expert Robert Suettinger, in his book
Beyond Tiananmen, admits that “the notion that American policy [toward China] is
directly driven by strategic considerations ... is grossly inaccurate.” It had
been driven instead by business pressures — if not by sheer intellectual inertia
— long after the US’ strategic imperatives with proudly authoritarian China
evaporated in the 1992 collapse of the Soviet Union and the 1989 reversal of
China’s political reforms at Tiananmen.
Former president Bill Clinton’s China policy quietly changed in August 1999
after spectacular increases in Chinese missile deployments and jet fighter
sorties in the Taiwan Strait. Clinton’s defense department secretly began to
build up military cooperation with Taiwan — a momentum that continued without
publicity through the Bush years — and Campbell was at the center of that
initiative. He was an advocate of strong alliances with Japan and Australia —
alliances that Bush minimized in an unhealthy reliance on Beijing’s influence in
Asia.
The cascade of Asia policy disasters in the last four Bush years stemmed from
the president’s preoccupation with Iraq and Afghanistan and his chronic
inattention to geopolitics or strategy anywhere else. The erosion of the
US-Japan alliance; permitting North Korea to drive the US’ Asia policy; complete
neglect of Southeast Asia; inattention to a strategic partnership with India;
abandoning democratic Taiwan in the face of war threats from undemocratic
Beijing — that was the Bush Asia policy.
All of these failures sprang from the miscalculation that China was an active,
responsible stakeholder in East Asian security, trade, humanitarian relief, the
environment and so on. The Bush administration also persuaded itself that Taiwan
was of such existential urgency to Beijing that China’s viciousness was
excusable. Beijing therefore was permitted to alter the “status quo” with its
missile deployments and its 2005 “Anti-Secession Law,” but Taiwan could never
react.
When it came to Japan’s security and its panic over China’s vast military
buildup, Bush rebuffed Tokyo’s appeal for F-22s, fearing (it is said) it would
“alter the strategic balance.” The default mode for Bush’s Asia policy was
China-centric to the exclusion of all other considerations. It was a common
affliction in Washington, one that author Jim Mann famously dubbed “the China
Fantasy.”
“Fantasy” indeed. As my friend Yuan Peng, a think tank researcher for China’s
intelligence services, has written: “In the world today, virtually all of
America’s adversaries are China’s friends.” You name them: North Korea, Burma,
Iran, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Syria, Hamas (through Syria) and Hezbollah, have I missed
any? China gives them both weapons they use in the field and diplomatic cover
they need in the UN. Why? As China’s foremost US expert, professor Wang Jisi
(王緝思), has said: “Facts prove that it is beneficial for [China’s] international
environment to have the United States — both militarily and diplomatically —
deeply and inextricably sunk in the Middle East.” This has nothing to do with
Taiwan, and everything to do with China’s freedom of action in Asia.
Even today, China’s poor record on issues of greatest concern to the US —
nonproliferation, territorial pressures on US friends and allies (Japan, India
and Taiwan, to name a few), supplying arms (via Iran and Syria) to insurgents in
Iraq, Afghanistan and the Levant, consumer product safety, global warming,
environmental despoliation, intellectual property, currency manipulation,
locking up oil and mineral resources, dumping and cybersecurity, not to mention
human rights and political freedoms — is embraced with a “what-me-worry”
insouciance among Washington’s foreign policy, business and financial elites.
Taiwan’s significance in Asia is eclipsed in this China fantasy. Taiwanese now
feel they have nowhere left to go but China. The rest of Asia watches US-Taiwan
trends to see if the US might draw some line with China. All Asian governments
understand Taiwan’s strategic importance to the US. I say this despite the
comments of my good friend and former Chinese-language classmate, American
Institute in Taiwan Chairman Ray Burghardt, who said on March 19 that “a
geostrategic character to American policy toward Taiwan ... isn’t really there.”
Taiwan’s strategic value was not discussed in the Condoleezza Rice State
Department or in the Bush White House. However, Taiwan’s significance to US
security is not dismissed by defense and intelligence officials who observe
China’s expanding military power: They must plan for weapons systems 20 years
into the future and China’s military, naval, missile and cyberspace
modernization keeps them awake. Taiwan’s geographic location in Asia and its
geopolitical disposition are essential to monitoring these developments.
Whether State Department or White House Asia policy aides often think of these
things is beside the point. They are facts: Taiwan is positioned astride sea
lanes plied by vast fleets of Asian shipping; Taiwan’s lofty mountains provide
phased-array radar coverage of missile and aerospace activity 1,930km into
continental East Asia; submarines moving from the East Asian coast into the
Western Pacific go through Taiwan’s waters to avoid Japan’s extensive
anti-submarine acoustic detection; Taiwan occupies the two largest islands in
the South China Sea, Taiping and Pratas.
More important, Taiwan is the US’ poster-child for democracy in Asia; the US’
10th-largest export market; and the world’s fourth-largest foreign exchange
reserves holder. Taiwan’s GDP is bigger than any in Southeast Asia. Taiwan’s
population is bigger than Australia’s. In short, US equanimity at the prospect
of democratic Taiwan’s absorption by communist China is a clear signal to the
rest of Asia that the US has bought on to the “Beijing Consensus” — Asia may as
well go along, too.
Sooner or later there will be an Obama “Taiwan Policy Review.” But it won’t
amount to much. An Obama TPR will judge that the powerful momentum in
cross-strait dynamics is pushing Taiwan rapidly into full economic dependence on
China. It will conclude that Taiwan’s inextricable economic dependence on China
— absent counterbalancing action — will quickly drive the country beyond its
“tipping point” toward political and, ultimately, security dependence on
Beijing. At that point, Obama can dust off his hands and say: “Oh well, I really
wanted to help Taiwan, but it was too late.” Some will say, “It’s not so bad,
look at Hong Kong.” Others will say, “Oh well, it was Bush’s fault.”
It may already be too late. For, despite China’s resolute disruption of US
“hegemonistic” human rights and nonproliferation goals in Asia (and Africa, too,
for that matter), key Bush White House aides believed China was one of
“Washington’s New Comrades” and foresaw (in the words of former White House Asia
expert Victor Cha) a new Northeast Asian “regional architecture” in which
“Washington looks forward to China assuming a major role as a real problem
solver in the region.”
Obama is unlikely to be confrontational with China or anyone else. But
democratic Asia needs US leadership if it is to balance China, and the test of
the Obama administration’s Asia policy will be to provide that leadership. A
Taiwan Policy Review will only be a small subset of that calculation. Now that
Campbell has been nominated, Obama has an outline of an “Asia Team” that can
begin to reassess the US’ erosion in the Western Pacific. If Campbell can’t stop
the collapse of the US’ Asian interests in Taiwan, it’s hard to see where he can
do it.
John Tkacik is a retired US foreign
service officer who had postings in Taipei, Beijing, Hong Kong and Guangzhou. He
was chief of China intelligence at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence
and Research in the first Clinton administration.